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the	more	substantial	ones,	are	central	 to	 this	dissertation.	They	are	 the	kinds	of	
questions	 whose	 answers,	 if	 true,	 provide	 one	 with	 a	 piece	 of	 self-knowledge,	










2015).	 Privileged,	 because	 self-knowledge	 seems	especially	 epistemically	 secure,	
and	peculiar,	because	it	is	only	the	person	herself	who	has	this	kind	of	access	to	her	
own	mental	 attitudes.	 Self-knowledge	 is	 thus	 often	 viewed	 as	 epistemologically	
distinct	in	light	of	its	epistemic	status,	namely	particularly	secure,	and	in	light	of	the	
method	 used	 to	 acquire	 self-knowledge,	 namely	 a	method	 only	 available	 to	 the	
person	whose	mental	life	is	at	issue.		
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INTRODUCTION	2	
What	 is	 often	 left	 out	 of	 these	 discussions	 of	 the	 epistemology	 of	 self-
knowledge	is	the	connection	between	self-knowledge	and	the	nature	of	the	person	
who	is	seeking	self-knowledge.	Why	should	self-knowledge	matter	to	us?	What	are	
the	 connections	 of	 self-knowledge	 to	 personhood,	 to	 moral	 psychology,	 and	 to	
(mental)	 agency?	 These	 moral	 psychological	 issues	 about	 self-knowledge	 aren’t	
meant	to	replace	questions	about	its	epistemology,	but	they	do	provide	a	renewed	
starting	 point	 to	 ask	 and	 answer	 them.	 The	 underlying	 thought	 is	 that	 moral	
psychological	issues	determine	the	kind	of	self-knowledge	at	issue,	and	that,	in	turn,	




should	 be	 understood	 within	 a	 moral	 psychological	 framework,	 where	 the	
connections	to	personhood,	moral	psychology,	and	(mental)	agency	are	recognized	
as	 crucial	 to	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 self-knowledge.	 Especially,	 this	
dissertation	seeks	to	incorporate	into	the	picture	of	self-knowledge	the	connection	
















mind.	 The	 achievements	 and	 developments	 of	 the	 behavioral,	 cognitive	 and	
                                                        
1 The sense of “cannot” and “must” that is used here is to be understood in the following way: given our 
abilities of committing ourselves and taking a stance, the options available to us have changed in such a 
way that each option we choose is informed by this ability. The sense used here might thus be called 
“agentive” (instead of say, purely metaphysical or purely normative) and follows the spirit of recent work 
on the agentive modalities. cf. Maier (2013). More on these abilities further on in this introduction. 
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE,	SCIENCE,	AND	AGENCY	 3	
neurosciences	are	so	extensive	that	‘science	has	come...to	be	widely	viewed	as	the	




regarded	 as	 the	 sole	authority	 to	 tell	 us	about	 the	 nature	 of	 things.	This	 faith	 in	
science	and	disregard	 for	 other	 forms	 of	knowledge	 is	part	 of	a	 larger	 historical	
movement	called	scientism.2		
What	 is,	 roughly,	 the	 view	 of	 self-knowledge	 in	 science?	 In	 science,	 our	






an	 inseparable	mix	 of	 confabulation,	 retrospective	 self-justification,	













deepest	 desires	 or	 about	 the	 significance	 of	 traumatic	 experiences,	 but	 self-
knowledge	 isn’t	 limited	 to	 such	claims	 about	 our	 deeper	 psychological	make-up.	
Self-knowledge	also	concerns	very	mundane	beliefs,	desires	and	intentions.	By	and	
                                                        
2 cf. Schöttler (2012). As van Woudenberg et al. (2018) write: “Scientism is, roughly, the view that only 
science can provide us with knowledge or rational belief, that only science can tell us what exists, and 
that only science can effectively address our moral and existential questions.” For proponents of 
scientism, see Dennett (2017); Ladyman (2011); Rosenberg (2011). For an excellent overview of different 
kinds of scientism, see Peels (2018). For different kinds of explorations and criticisms of scientism, see de 
Ridder, Peels, and van Woudenberg (2018). 
3 cf. Curruthers (2011); Dennett (1987); Wilson (2002); Nisbett & Wilson (1977); Lamme (2011). 
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claims,	however,	aren’t	 scientific	but	philosophical	 in	nature.	This	means	 that	we	
have	to	engage	in	philosophical	work	to	determine	what	view	of	self-knowledge	we	
should	use	in	evaluating	the	scientific	results.		
Another	 reason	 to	 not	 let	 science	 uncritically	 trump	 our	 common	 sense	
intuitions	 is	 that	 the	 view	 of	 self-knowledge	 purported	 by	 science	 bypasses	
precisely	those	things	about	self-knowledge	that	seem	to	be	its	most	distinguishing	
features,	namely	the	relation	between	self-knowledge,	agency,	and	the	first-person	






problem	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 observational	 model,	 the	 difference	 between	 a	 person’s	
                                                        
4 There are different accounts of self-knowledge elaborating this basic idea, varying from so-called inner 
sense accounts, to monitoring accounts and to functional accounts. Each of these accounts has its 
particular merits and difficulties in explaining self-knowledge. For the most prominent accounts, see 
Armstrong (1968); Lycan (1996); Goldman (1993; 2006); Nichols and Stich (2003); Rosenthal (2005). 
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE,	SCIENCE,	AND	AGENCY	 5	
knowledge	of	her	own	and	of	other’s	mental	attitudes	is	merely	a	matter	of	epistemic	
access.	 Only	 the	 person	 herself	 has	 observational	 access	 to	 her	 own	 mental	
attitudes.	But	this	is	just	a	contingent	fact	about	our	current	capacities.	We	can	easily	
envisage	 the	 difference	 dissolving.	 For	 instance,	 we	 might	 develop	 telepathic	
powers,	 thereby	 acquiring	 the	 ability	 to	 observe	 other	 minds.	 Or	 perhaps	 we	
develop	 a	 scanning	mechanism	 that	 not	 only	 scans	 our	 own	minds	 but	 also	 the	





model	 of	 self-consciousness	 is	 that	 perception	 is	 a	 relation	 that,	 in	
principle,	 should	 be	 possible	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 whole	 range	 of	
phenomena	of	a	certain	type.	On	such	a	model,	then,	there	would	seem	
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INTRODUCTION	6	
mental	 states,	 but	 not	 being	 able	 to	 have	 peculiar	 access	 to	 them,	 i.e.,	 to	 have	





would	 you	 then	 make	 the	 exclamation	 about	 “melanzane”	 at	 all?	 Or	 consider	 a	
person	walking	 to	 the	medicine	 cabinet	 and	 taking	 pain	 killers	 and	 responding,	
when	asked	whether	she	is	 in	pain,	 that	 she	doesn’t	know,	but	given	what	 she	 is	
doing,	 she	 probably	 is.	 Both	 cases	 seem	 inconceivable,	 because	 saying	 that	 we	
should	 make	 “melanzane”	 and	 taking	 painkillers	 doesn’t	 show	 us	 what	 mental	
attitudes	a	person	has,	rather	they	are	intelligible	only	if	she	knows	that	she	likes	






The	 outlook	 of	 this	 dissertation	 is	 to	 neither	 uncritically	 side	 with	 the	
scientific	doubt	about	self-knowledge	nor	with	the	dominant	observational	model	
of	 self-knowledge.	 Rather,	 I	 will	 be	 attempting	 to	 do	 justice	 to	 our	 everyday	
intuitions	surrounding	self-knowledge	and	to	understand	philosophically	how	the	
nature	of	the	first-person	agential	perspective	should	inform	our	conception	of	self-











                                                        
5 For a complete exposition of the example of pain, see Shoemaker (1996, 273-5). 
6 There is, of course, more to say about the observational model, about its merits as well as about its 
problems. In this dissertation, however, I follow these arguments and assume that the observational 
model cannot explain our intuitions regarding self-knowledge. 
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE,	SCIENCE,	AND	AGENCY	 7	
1.2	Agential	account	of	self-knowledge	
Recent	 developments	 in	 the	 self-knowledge	 debate	 seem	 to	 offer	 a	 promising	
alternative	 to	 the	 observational	 model	 and	 the	 scientific	 perspective.	 These	
developments	show	a	restoration	of	the	importance	of	the	first-person	perspective	
for	 understanding	 self-knowledge.	 This	 is	 seen,	 especially,	 in	 so-called	 agential	




























                                                        
7 That self-knowledge seems to have these features is generally acknowledged and many philosophers 
consider them as a datum a theory of self-knowledge should explain, which minimally implies that the 
theory should explain why self-knowledge appears to have these features, while knowledge of other 
minds doesn’t. 
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mere	 succession	 of	 representations	 (to	which,	 for	 some	 reason,	 [I	 am]	 the	 only	
witness)’	(Moran	2001,	32).9	
An	 essential	 feature	 of	 this	 picture	 of	 self-knowledge	 and	 the	 deliberative	
stance	 is	 that	 self-knowledge	 is,	 for	Moran,	 not	 a	matter	 of	 arriving	 at	 the	most	
accurate	description	of	my	psychological	state,	but	a	matter	of	avowal.	An	avowal	
consists	of	a	report	of	one’s	mental	attitude	including	an	explicit	endorsement	of	its	
content.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 belief,	 to	 avow	my	 belief	 is	 to	 express	 my	 ‘own	 present	
commitment	 to	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 proposition	 in	 question’	 (Moran	 2001,	 86).	 By	
avowing	myself	on	the	matter,	I	take	responsibility	for	my	mental	attitude.	Avowing	
the	 belief	 that	 p	 thus	 expresses	 my	 endorsement	 of	 p.	 Moreover,	 it	 involves	 a	
commitment	to	the	truth	of	p.	As	soon	as	I	start	doubting	p’s	truth	or	as	soon	as	I	
                                                        
8 Importantly, this claim holds for self-knowledge of intentional mental attitudes. These attitudes, such 
as beliefs, emotions, desires and intentions, are fundamentally different from sensations, headaches and 
heart rates, because they involve, for the subject of those states, a characteristic grasp of the world. That 
is to say that these attitudes involve, from a first-person perspective, grasping the (propositional) object 
of those states as true, as to be done, as dangerous, etcetera. 
9 The deliberative stance is partly motivated by Moore’s paradox. Although it is not unusual to say about 
someone else that she believes something that is actually false, and although it could well be a state one 
is actually in, from a first-person point of view, it does not make sense to say “P but I don’t believe P”(see 
Moore 1993; Moran 2001, Ch. 3). Why is that? As Moran seeks to explain, the best explanation for the 
paradoxality of Moorean sentences is that, from the first-person perspective, there is a certain blindness 
to the difference between declaring one’s belief that p and declaring p itself. As Wittgenstein (2009 
[1953]) remarks, ‘if there were a verb meaning “to believe falsely,” it would not have any significant first-
person present-tense indicative’ (quoted in cf. Moran 2001, 73). As Moran (2001, 77) puts it: ‘What is 
unavoidable from the first-person perspective… is the connection between the question about some 
psychological matter of fact and a commitment to something that goes beyond the psychological facts.’ 
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way	 to	 be	 specified,	 she	 looks	 beyond	 (or	 “through”)	 the	 attitude	 to	 what	 the	
attitude	 is	 about.	 This	 is	 why	 Moran's	 account	 of	 self-knowledge	 is	 called	 a	








This	 is	a	brief	overview	of	 the	basic	 tenets	of	Moran’s	account,	which	 is	a	





to	 depict.	 Given	 the	 threat	 from	 science	 to	 our	 everyday	 intuitions	 about	 self-




























that	 a	 person	herself	 is	 in	a	 good	position,	and	 especially	 a	 position	 better	 than	
others,	to	know	her	own	mind.	
Another	sense	of	transparency	is	what	is	also	called	the	diaphanousness	of	











us:	 it	 seems,	 if	 I	may	 use	 a	metaphor,	 to	 be	 transparent	 –	we	 look	
through	it	and	see	nothing	but	the	blue	...	(Moore	1903,	446).		
                                                        
10 I largely follow Sarah Paul’s (2014) terrific overview in “The Transparency of Mind.” 
11 Gertler (2015) defines self-intimacy (or omniscience) as requiring that ‘being in a mental state suffices 
for knowing one is in that state.’ But self-intimacy seems to be a stronger thesis than that: it places a 
necessary connection between being in a mental state and knowing this is so. There is no mental state 
one is in but of which one is ignorant. Self-intimacy should be distinguished from the infallibility thesis, 
which says that if a subject believes she is in a mental state, she is in that state. Or, alternatively put, the 
infallibility thesis holds that ‘one cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a certain mental 
state’ (Gertler 2015). 
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a	metaphysical	 thesis	 as	well	 as	 to	 an	 epistemological	 thesis.	 The	metaphysical	
thesis	 associated	with	 the	 diaphanousness	 of	 experience	 is	 that	 experience,	 and	
mental	 attitudes	 as	 well,	 don’t	 have	 introspectable	 properties.	 The	 associated	







in	 using	 the	 word	 “transparency.”	 Where	 diaphanousness	 refers	 to	 the	
phenomenological	or	metaphysical	character	of	awareness	itself,	the	latter	notion	
of	 transparency	 refers	 to	 how	a	 person	achieves	 self-knowledge.	 It	 is	 associated	
with	Wittgenstein’s	criticism	of	traditional	views	of	introspection	and	the	relation	
of	a	person	to	her	own	mind	that	such	views	support.	Put	differently,	it	is	associated	



















when	 asked	 a	 question	 about	 one’s	 own	 state	 of	 mind,	 one’s	 “gaze”,	 i.e.,	 one’s	
thinking	 and	 attention,	 isn’t	 directed	 “inward”,	 to	 the	 mental	 state	 itself,	 but	
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
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INTRODUCTION	12	
“outward”,	 to	 the	 intentional	object	of	one’s	mental	 state.	On	 the	other	hand,	we	
could	 also	 say	 that,	 from	a	 first-person	perspective,	 the	 question	 about	my	 own	
mental	attitude	is	transparent	to	a	question	about	its	intentional	object,	for	example,	






We	 get	 into	muddy	waters,	 however,	when	we	 try	 to	 state	 this	 notion	 of	
transparency	 in	 less	 general	 terms.	 It	 is	 especially	 unclear	 whether	 we	 should	
understand	it	as	making	an	empirical	claim,	i.e.,	that	our	thinking	will	be	directed	









self-knowledge.	 If	 self-knowledge	 is	 to	 be	 knowledge,	 then	 it	 should	 have	 an	
epistemic	basis.	But	what	is	the	epistemic	basis	 in	transparency	accounts	of	self-












and	 the	 belief	 that	 it	 is	 raining	 neither	 stand	 in	 a	 relation	 of	 implication	 nor	 of	
evidential	support.	This	is	why	transparency	accounts	face	the	Two	Topics	Problem	
(TTP):	 the	 problem	 that	 the	 apparent	 basis	 for	 self-knowledge,	 i.e.	 p	 (including	
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observation	 or	 through	 reasoning.13	 As	 outlined	 above,	 my	 discussion	 of	 self-
knowledge	assumes	that	the	kind	of	self-knowledge	that	we	are	after	isn’t	the	result	

















But	 should	 we	 accept	 this	 assumption?	 This	 question	 ultimately	 rests	 on	
another	 question.	 Namely,	 what	 should	 be	 true	 of	 reasoning	 to	 verify	 this	
assumption?	 Byrne	 presupposes	 that	 when	 a	 person	 reasons,	 she	 believes	 the	
premises.	This	is	in	line	with	current	orthodox	views	in	the	philosophy	of	reasoning,	
in	which	reasoning	 is	analyzed	as	a	change	 in	attitudes.14	 In	 this	view,	 reasoning	
indeed	necessarily	involves	believing	the	premises	and	conclusion,	and	so	this	view	
supports	Byrne’s	assumption.	The	question	is,	however,	whether	this	view	is	true.	If	
it	 isn’t,	 then	 Byrne’s	 assumption,	 which	 is	 crucial	 in	 his	 account,	 would	 be	
undermined.	 Assessing	 Byrne’s	 account	 thus	 involves	 assessing	 the	 view	 of	
                                                        
12 The problem at hand is also known as the puzzle of transparency, the problem of two subject matters, 
and the evidentialist objection. See, for instance, Barnett (2015), Byrne (2005), Gallois (1996), Martin 
(1998), Moran (2001), O’Brien (2003), Roessler (2013a), among others. Since its recognition, a number 
of transparency accounts are proposed specifically in response to this problem.  
13 This refers to a puzzle created by Boghossian, who states that knowledge is the result of (1) 
observation, of (2) reasoning, or of (3) nothing. If (1) and (2) were both rejected, it seems that a 
deflationary account of self-knowledge is all that is left. cf. Boghossian (1989). 
14 Cf. Boghossian (2014); Broome (2013); Harman (1986); McHugh & Way (2018). 
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The	 third	 theme	 in	 this	dissertation	 is	 the	scope	of	Moran’s,	or	an	agential	 style,	
transparency	account	of	self-knowledge.	Moran	explicates	his	transparency	account	
for	beliefs,	but	claims	that	the	account,	with	relevant	adjustments,	should	apply	to	









First	of	all,	Moran’s	account	applies	only	 to	 intentional	mental	attitudes,	 such	as	
beliefs,	intentions,	desires,	many	kinds	of	emotions,	etcetera.	It	isn’t	an	account	of	
self-knowledge	 of	 sensations,	 character	 traits,	 one’s	 identity	 nor	 one’s	 personal	





generally	 (not	 only	 states	 of	 mind,	 but	 actions,	 practices	 and	
institutions,	 including	 linguistic	 ones)	 is	 that	 they	 admit	 of	 a	
distinction	between	inside	and	outside	perspectives,	the	conception	of	
them	 from	the	point	of	view	of	agents	or	participants	as	contrasted	
with	 the	 various	 possible	 descriptions	 in	 some	 more	 purely	
naturalistic	or	extensional	idiom.	(Moran	2001,	34-5)	
	
                                                        
15 See, for instance, Moran (2001, 64-5; 2004, 471; 2012, 214). 
16 As can be witnessed in many responses to Moran on this topic. See Ashwell (2013a); Cassam (2011); 
Gertler (2011); Lawlor (2009); Shah & Velleman (2005); and many more. 
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SELF-KNOWLEDGE,	SCIENCE,	AND	AGENCY	 15	
The	 agential	 “inside”	 perspective	 that	 agential	 transparency	 accounts	 seek	 to	
capture	is	manifest	only	in	intentional	mental	attitudes.	Sensations	also	allow	for	an	
“inside”	 perspective,	 but	 here	 the	 inside	 perspective	 is	 qualitative	 rather	 than	































                                                        
17 For more on the difference between self-knowledge of intentional mental attitudes and sensations, 
see Boyle (2009b). 
18 These distinctions are mainly based on cf. Schroeder (2015); Schwitzgebel (2015). 
19 Some philosophers use the adjectives “occurrent” and “standing” to distinguish between different kind 
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way.	 On	 a	 first	 reading,	 calling	 an	 attitude	 conscious	 is	 calling	 it	 an	 explicit	
occurrent20	conscious	attitude,	i.e.,	an	attitude	that	one	is	currently	aware	of.	In	this	
                                                        
of mental items. Occurrent mental states, they claim, are things such as sensations, thoughts, and mental 
acts (e.g. judging). By contrast, standing mental states, i.e. the intentional mental attitudes discussed so 
far, have a dispositional nature. In this picture of attitudes, a person holds a certain attitude only if she 
expresses the attitude in a particular range of actions and reactions (cf. Cassam 2014; Schwitzgebel 
2010). The strange result of this position is that there is no such thing, for instance, as a “conscious 
belief.” A belief could be expressed in a conscious judgment (an occurrent mental state) but could not 
become conscious itself (cf. Boyle 2009a). This seems to me a counterintuitive consequence and one 
that we should seek to avoid. This is not to say that I dismiss the relevance of patterns of actions and 
reactions to self-knowledge of our intentional mental attitudes. But I do think that what that relevance 
precisely is, should be explicated in different terms. 
20 Occurrent is not the same as conscious: one might be in pain (an occurrent mental state) but being so 
focused on something else (perhaps winning a race) that one is conscious only of the finish line. 
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(in	 this	 case,	 from	 the	 subject’s	 point	 of	 view,	 her	 attitude	 is	 rational).	 Another	
possibility	is	that	an	attitude	lacks	rationality	if	the	subject	maintains	holding	the	
attitude	despite	her	best	judgment	to	the	contrary	(this	need	not	imply	she	doesn’t	
have	 any	 reason	 in	 favor	 of	 holding	 the	 attitude).	 Such	 attitudes	 are	 called	
recalcitrant	 or	 persistent.	 A	 fourth	 option	 for	 lacking	 rationality	 is	 an	 alienated	
attitude.	An	attitude	is	alienated	if	the	subject	isn’t	in	touch	with	reasons	pertaining	
to	 the	 attitude;	 if	 her	 reflection	 on	 the	 object	 of	 the	 attitude	 doesn’t	 seem	 to	 be	
related	 to	 having	 the	 attitude.	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 can	 distinguish	 between	 the	
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she	might	 still	 lack	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 if	 she	 cannot	 avow,	 and	 thereby	
endorse	 the	 view	 purported	 by	 her	 resentment.21	 The	 notion	 of	 alienation	 thus	




The	 last	 distinction	 that	 I	want	 to	mention	 is	 that	 between	 so-called	 trivial	 and	
substantial	 attitudes.	 A	 person’s	 attitude	 is	 called	 trivial	 if	 it	 isn’t	 significant	 and	










other	hand,	one	may	also	stick	 to	 the	scope	delineated	by	 the	account	 itself	and	
inquire	whether	the	account	actually	meets	its	delineated	scope.		
In	the	case	of	Moran’s	account,	it	is	explicitly	specified	that	his	account	should	
apply,	 first,	 to	 intentional	mental	attitudes	of	 the	doxastic,	 conative	and	affective	














                                                        
21 Cf. Moran (2001, 85). 
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in	 achieving	 self-knowledge.	 Recall	 that	 the	 deliberative	 stance	 is	 a	 stance	 from	
which	 the	 person	 recognizes	 her	 active	 involvement	 in	 her	 mental	 life	 and	 the	























permission,	 or	 disapproval	 from	 the	 reflective	 standpoint.’	 This	means	 that	 the	
possibility	 of	 reflection	 brings	 with	 it	 the	 responsibility	 to	 take	 a	 stance:	 to	
determine	whether	to	believe	based	on	what	I	perceive.	Beliefs	(and	other	mental	
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attitudes	as	well	 as	 actions)	 of	 reflective	 creatures	aren’t	mere	 results	 from	 the	
strongest	impulses	or	sense	impressions.	By	contrast,	the	reflective	agent	needs	to	
determine	for	herself	whether	she	has	reason	to	believe	something.	And	the	general	
idea	 is	 that	 such	 determination	 matters	 to	 what	 will	 be	 believed.	 That	 is,	 by	














attribution	requires	us	 to	deliberate,	 reflect	on	our	 reasons,	and	 to	make	up	our	
mind.	If	you	ask	me	whether	I	believe	that	Paris	is	the	capital	of	France,	I	know	the	
answer	immediately	and	it	would	be	unnecessarily	laborious	to	actually	reflect	on	
the	 question	 whether	 Paris	 is	 the	 capital	 of	 France,	 to	 go	 over	 my	 reasons	 for	
thinking	it	is,	and	make	up	my	mind	about	it.		
Secondly,	 the	 picture	 doesn’t	 actually	 explain	 the	 kind	 of	 agency	 that	 is	
exercised	vis-à-vis	one’s	mental	attitudes.	As	Matthew	Boyle	(2011a,	3-4)	analyzes,	
our	normal	vocabulary	of	decision,	choice	or	voluntary	action	seems	to	be	inept	to	










way	 as	 she	would	 change	 the	 furniture	 in	 her	 room.	 As	 if	 a	 person	 reflectively	
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essentially	 different	 from	 a	 third-person	 relation,	 we	 need	 something	 else	 for	
agency	to	mean.23		
It	is	useful	here	to	come	back	to	the	distinction	between	intentional	mental	















by	 committing	 myself	 to	 the	 views	 purported	 by	 the	 attitudes.	 I	 may	 take	
responsibility	 for	 them	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 I	 may	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	
conclusion	of	my	reasoning,	or	for	the	love	I	feel	for	someone,	not	because	I	could	
reason	in	whatever	way	I	wish	or	love	whomever	I	favor,	but	precisely	because	the	
                                                        
22 Cf. Boyle (2009a; 2011a); Moran (2001, 118-19). See also fn. 6 (Moran 2001, p. 119) where Moran cites 
Dennett (in disagreement): ‘Acting on a second-order desire, doing something to bring it about that one 
acquires a first-order desire, is acting upon oneself just as one would act upon another person: one 
schools oneself, one offers oneself persuasions, arguments, threats, bribes, in the hopes of inducing in 
oneself the first-order desire. One’s stance toward oneself and access to oneself in these cases is 
essentially the same as one’s stand outward and access to another’ (Dennett 1978, 284-85). 
23 And perhaps, we also need another name for the “deliberative stance,” since it isn’t deliberative agency 
that is invoked in that stance. 
24 This is also why Moran rather speaks of authority than control (2001, 139). Moran sides here with the 
philosophical tradition of “self-consciousness as reflection” – a tradition most closely related to Kant, but 
also to Sartre who is strongly represented in Moran’s views. This tradition is also of main interest to, for 
instance, Christine Korsgaard (1996; 2009) and Matthew Boyle (2005; 2009a; 2011a; 2019). 
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reasoning	and	love	are	expressive	of	my	own	stance	(cf.	Moran	2008).	Understanding	
what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 active	 with	 respect	 to	 a	 mental	 attitude	 of	 mine	 thus	 means	
understanding	what	it	is	to	be	committed	to	the	grasp	of	the	world	purported	by	the	








The	 final	 theme	 that	 I	would	 like	 to	 introduce	 is	what	 is	now	known	as	analytic	












reason,	 then	we	 need	 to	 presuppose	 the	 same	 distinction	 that	we	 are	 trying	 to	
understand.	Hence,	‘we	should	be	going	round	in	circles,’	as	Anscombe	(1957,	§5)	





is	 now	 known	 as	 analytic	 Aristotelianism.	 The	 core	 commitment	 of	 analytic	
Aristotelianism	is	that	some	concepts	require	philosophical	analysis,	not	in	terms	of	
                                                        
25 cf. Moran (2001, 77); Boyle (2015, 341). The mental agency that Moran seeks to address is further 
developed in Boyle (2011a); Hieronymi (2009); and Moran (2008; 2012). 
26 It has also helped me to see the parallels between discussions on transparent self-knowledge, 
intentional action and reasoning. 
27 For recent illuminating papers on Anscombe’s method, see Ford (2015); Frey (2013); Hlobil & 
Nieswandt (2016); Vogler (2001). 
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A	 key	 motivation	 for	 using	 analytic	 Aristotelianism	 is	 that	 it	 helps	 to	
understand	one	of	Moran’s	core	claims	about	self-knowledge.	Moran	maintains	that	











that	 he	 is	 after	 is	 a	 distinct	 category	 ultimately	 requires	 understanding	 the	












Chapter	 1	 begins	 by	 addressing	 the	 question	what	Moran’s	 transparency	 claim	
regarding	 belief	 precisely	 consists	 of.29	 In	 his	 depictions	 of	 transparency,	Moran	
                                                        
28 The approach will be further addressed in Chapter 3 and the Concluding Reflections. 
29 In Moran’s account, the paradigm case for transparency is belief. To arrive at a charitable evaluation 
of Moran, the case of belief is the place to start. This chapter is co-written with René van Woudenberg. 
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30 “Transparency” is in brackets, because the intuition is shared, not only by proponents of 
transparency accounts of self-knowledge, but also by some of those proposing different accounts of 
self-knowledge. Cf. Finkelstein (2003); C. Peacocke (1998).  
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28)	 has	 put	 it,	 we	 should	 ‘distinguish	 inference	 in	 general	 from	 coming	 to	 a	
conclusion…;	no	particular	attitude	to	[a]	proposition	is	implicit	in	inference	itself.’	
By	discussing	examples	of	reasoning	without	a	change	in	view,	it	will	become	clear	
















feel	 betrayed	 if	 either	 the	 person	 or	 the	 betrayal	 itself	were	 insignificant	 to	me.	
Similarly,	only	if	I	care	about	a	sports	team,	will	their	wins	and	losses	spark	joy	or	
disappointment,	respectively.	We	only	feel	an	emotion	if	something	matters	to	us	(cf.	
















avowing	 these	 attitudes	 remains	 essential	 and	has	 a	 unique	 status	 in	 coming	 to	
know	them.	My	arguments	show	that	the	status	of	avowal	is	unique,	first,	because	
the	significance	of	patterns	of	action	and	reaction,	and	what	such	patterns	tell	about	


































A	 widely	 discussed	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 self-knowledge	 is	




                                                        
1 This chapter is co-authored with René van Woudenberg and will be published as: Woudenberg, R. van 
and N. Kloosterboer. 2019 (forthcoming). “Three Transparency Principles Examined.” Journal of 
Philosophical Research 44. 
2 Mental attitudes other than belief, for example desires, have been argued to be transparent too (see, 
for example, Fernandez 2013, ch. 3). We focus on doxastic Transparency. 
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other	minds	 lacks.	Moran	 accounts	 for	 these	 asymmetries	 by	 distinguishing	 two	
                                                        
3 As we shall see in section 3, different Transparency accounts can be derived from Moran (2001). 
Moreover, the literature on Transparency provides descriptions of Transparency that differ from the 
ones that we distil from Moran (2001), for instance Byrne (2005), Gertler (2012), Finkelstein (2012), 
Silins (2012), Fernandez (2013), Cassam (2014), Barnett (2016). 
4 One point of criticism raised against Moran is that, on his account(s), Transparency’s scope is 
restricted to rational mental states and hence in the case of beliefs to rational beliefs only. According 
to the critics, his account(s) do(es) not explain how we know, as we sometimes do, that we have 
irrational beliefs, which in turn means that there are more ways to obtain self-knowledge than through 
Transparency. Criticisms along these lines are offered by Lawlor (2009), Finkelstein (2012), Paul (2012), 
and Cassam (2014). As we will explain further on, Moran holds that Transparency doesn’t apply to 
irrational beliefs, but only if they are irrational because they are alienated. 
5 The more traditional accounts of self-knowledge, especially the so-called perceptual view, focused 
almost exclusively on the epistemic asymmetries between knowing one’s own and knowing someone 
else’s mind. 
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When	 one	 answers	 the	 question	 “Do	 I	 believe	 that	 p?”	 from	 a	 theoretical	
stance,	one	attends	to	the	sort	of	evidence	that	could,	in	principle,	also	be	consulted	
when	someone	else	inquires	whether	I	believe	that	p	–	evidence	consisting	in	one’s	








myself	 to	 the	 question	 of	my	 state	 of	mind	 in	 a	 deliberative	 spirit,	






on	 the	 psychological	 attitude	 one	 has	 vis-à-vis	 p	 (one	 should	not	 set	 oneself	 to	
answer	 the	 question	 “Do	 I	 have	 the	 belief-attitude	 towards	 p?”).	 Transparency	
requires	that	ascribing	to	oneself	the	belief	that	p	is	connected	to	taking	p	to	be	true.	





contrast,	 uttering	 (or	 thinking)	Moore-type	 sentences	 is	 paradoxical	 if	 not	 plain	
irrational.	Given	 that	Moore-sentences	are	indeed	paradoxical	and	 irrational,	 the	
fact	 that	 Moore-type	 sentences	 are	 sound	 from	 the	 theoretical	 stance	 but	
paradoxical	 and	 irrational	 from	 the	 deliberative	 stance	 speaks	 in	 favor	 of	 the	
deliberative	 stance.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 reasons	 for	Moran	 to	 say	 that	
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Alienated:	 One’s	 belief	B	 is	 alienated=df.	B	 persists	 independently	 of	









Connecting	 this	Biconditional	 to	Moran’s	 statements	 about	 rationality	 yields	 the	









the	 first-person	 stance	 vis-à-vis	 one’s	 own	 beliefs.	 According	 to	 Moran,	 these	






                                                        
6 We assume here that if a person is irrational due to not forming the belief that p in a Transparent way, 
the belief that p itself is thereby rendered irrational. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer








Quotation	 1:	Ordinarily,	 if	 a	 person	 asks	 himself	 the	 question	 “Do	 I	
believe	that	P?,”	he	will	treat	this	much	as	he	would	a	corresponding	
question	that	does	not	refer	to	him	at	all,	namely,	the	question	“Is	P	
true?”	 And	 this	 is	 not	 how	 he	 will	 normally	 relate	 himself	 to	 the	
question	of	what	someone	else	believes.	(2001,	60)	
	


























                                                        
7 See also Moran 2001, 62-63, 84. 
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us	call	this	latter	question	“QProposition”,	or	QP	for	short).8	Alternatively,	it	is,	as	
quotation	 2	 has	 it,	 that	a	 rational	 person	 “treats”	QB	as	 “equivalent	 to”	QP.	And	
quotation	3	says	that	a	person	answers	QB	by	answering	QP.	These	quotations,	we	
take	it,	say	essentially	the	same	thing.	Quotation	4	says	something	different,	viz.	that	
when	 we	 answer	 QB,	 we	 answer	 it	 by	 “considering	 the	 reasons	 for	 P	 itself”.	
Quotation	5	says	something	different	yet,	viz.	that	the	answer	to	QB	must	be	given	
“by	 reference	 to	 the	 same	 reasons	 that	would	 justify”	 an	 answer	 to	 QP.	 So,	 the	




TR2-	one	answers	QB	by	considering	 the	reasons	 in	favor	of	p	 itself	
(=by	considering	the	reasons	relevant	to	answering	QP);	
TR3-	 one	 answers	QB	by	 reference	 to	 the	 same	 reasons	 that	would	
justify	an	answer	to	QP.	
	


















                                                        
8 QB and QP are very different indeed: QB is about what someone believes, whereas QP is about the 
truth of a proposition; QB makes an essential reference to a first-person perspective (see Edgley 1969, 
90), QP does not; QB is “inward-looking”, whereas QP is “outward-directed” (to use Evans’ phrase; see 
Evans 1982, 225). Moreover, the truth conditions for the answers to QB and QP are different. 
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of.	 It	 sits	 in	her	mind	 like	a	 stone.	 (The	only	way	she	can	make	sense	of	 it	 is	by	
adopting	a	theoretical	stance	towards	it	and	ascribe	it,	say,	to	an	excessive	form	of	
anxiety.)	 Her	 belief,	 therefore,	 is	 alienated.	 But	 then,	 by	 Biconditional	 and	
Conditional,	her	belief	isn’t	transparent,	and	hence	is	irrational.	
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to	the	contrary.	Hence	her	belief	conforms	to	TR1.	But	since	her	belief	is	alienated,	







most	 often	 be	 Transparent.	 Therefore,	 and	 here	 is	 the	 important	 point,	 TR1’s	
formulation	 of	 Transparency	 doesn’t	 explain	why	 obsessive	 beliefs	will	 often	 be	
alienated	and	irrational.	So,	if	Transparency	is	understood	as	formulated	in	TR1,	we	
have	a	 counterexample	 to	Moran’s	 remarks	 that	 suggest	 an	 intimate	 connection	
between	 transparency	 and	 alienation/irrationality	 (as	 captured	 by	 the	














Elisabeth	 nonetheless	 keeps	 on	 believing	 that	 her	 husband	 will	 return	 home.10	
When	asked	why	she	believes	this,	the	reason	she	gives	is	that	there	have	been	other	





                                                        
9 This was suggested to us by an anonymous reviewer for Journal of Philosophical Research. 
10 This example was developed independently from, but bears similarities to, Finkelstein’s example of 
Lana (2003, 166). 
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is	not	 alienated.	This	 state	 of	 affairs	goes	 against	 the	Biconditional,	 according	 to	
which	Transparency	and	non-alienation	stand	and	fall	together.	Hence,	assuming	
we	 want	 to	 maintain	 the	 Biconditional,	 TR3	 is	 not	 an	 adequate	 formulation	 of	
Transparency,	 as	 it	 doesn’t	 have	 the	 right	 entailment	 (it	 entails	 that	 Elizabeth’s	
belief	is	alienated,	which,	we	have	suggested,	it	is	not).	
Now	consider	TR2.	Elisabeth	does	answer	“Do	I	believe	that	my	husband	will	
return	 home?”	 by	considering	 reasons	 for	 the	 proposition	 that	 her	 husband	will	
return	home.	For	she	has	a	(weak,	to	be	sure)	positive	reason	for	her	belief	and	she	
thinks	this	positive	reason,	somehow,	trumps	the	negative	reasons	(i),	(ii),	and	(iii).	
So,	 if	 Transparency	 requires	 what	 TR2	 formulates,	 then	 Elizabeth’s	 belief	 is	
                                                        
11 Others have raised objections against Transparency. See, e.g., Barnett (2016, sec. 4.2), Silins (2012, 
304-5). However, their objections target Transparency theses that are different from our TRs; Barnett’s 
target is the thesis that “P is a good reason for you to believe that you believe that p”, and Silins’ target 
is the thesis that “If you judge that p, then your judgment that p gives you immediate fallible 
justification to believe that you believe that p.” 
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Elisabeth	 can	 and	 likely	 does	 answer	 QB	 “Do	 I	 believe	 my	 husband	will	 return	
home?”	by	answering	the	corresponding	QP	“Will	my	husband	come	home?”	So,	if	





























we	proceed	 this	way,	we	satisfy	 the	requirements	of	Transparency	 in	each	of	 its	
                                                        
12 Shah and Velleman (2005, 506) distinguish between the deliberative question whether to believe 
that p and the question whether one believes that p. 
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three	 formulations.	 For	we	 answer	 this	 QB	 by	 answering	 the	 corresponding	 QP	
(“Did	cricket	originate	 in	Burma?”),	 and	so	satisfy	 requirement	TR1.	But	we	also	
satisfy	requirement	TR2,	for	we	answer	QB	by	considering	the	reasons	in	favor	of	p	
itself.	We	even	satisfy	requirement	TR3	for	we	answer	QB	by	reference	to	the	same	
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p	is	not	Transparent.13	But	if	a	belief	is	not	Transparent,	then	by	Biconditional	and	
Conditional	 it	 is	alienated	and	irrational.	We	have	suggested,	however,	that	 long-
standing	beliefs	are	not,	as	such,	alienated	or	irrational.	From	this	 it	 follows	that	
long-standing	 beliefs	 are	 counterexamples	 to	 Transparency,	 if	 that	 requires	 the	
satisfaction	of	TR2	and	TR3.		
Long-standing	 beliefs	 may	 still	 be	 Transparent,	 if	 it	 requires	 what	 TR1	
formulates.	 If	 your	 belief	 in	 the	 greenhouse	 effect	 is	 long-standing,	 do	 you	 then	
answer	“Do	I	believe	in	the	greenhouse	effect?”	by	answering	the	question	“Is	the	
greenhouse	effect	 real?”?	You	very	well	may.	Note	 that	proceeding	 this	way	isn’t	
laborious;	 it	 doesn’t	 require	 you	 to	have	 reasons,	 let	alone	 to	 produce	 justifying	
reasons	for	the	reality	of	the	greenhouse	effect.	It	merely	requires	that	you	take	the	
greenhouse	effect	to	be	real.		







specific	 sense	 that	 the	 belief	 that	 constitutes	 the	 knowledge	 is	 “immediately	
justified,”	by	which	they	mean,	roughly,	that	the	justification	of	the	belief	does	not	
derive	from,	nor	is	it	based	on,	other	beliefs	that	the	subject	has	in	favor	of	the	belief	




belief	 in	 self-evident	propositions,	 such	as	 the	Principle	of	 Identity,	A=A,	and	 the	
proposition	 that	 2+1=3.	 Many	 also	 take	 belief	 in	 incorrigible	 reports	 from	
experience	such	as	“I	seem	to	be	seeing	something	blue”,	to	be	“properly”	basic.		
                                                        
13 One might think that one’s long-standing beliefs do not violate TR2 and TR3 when or because the 
reasons one once had can be recalled (even when in fact they are not actually recalled). However, 
when one knows one believes that p, and one does not actually recall at that moment one’s reasons for 
p, one knows what one believes at that moment in a way that is not transparent – one’s knowledge just 
isn’t based on reasons pertaining to p. But believing that p is not, on account of its non-transparency, 
alienated. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this matter.)  
14 Versions of foundationalism have been developed by Chisholm (1982), Audi (1998) and Plantinga 
(1993). For a defense of the idea that some beliefs are basic against several traditional objections, see 
Van Woudenberg (2005). 
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by	arguments	 that	Rik	has,	and	 that	 constitute	 the	evidence	 for	 it.	Moreover,	his	
belief	links	up	perfectly	with	other	beliefs	that	he	has,	for	instance	with	his	belief	
that	 identity	 is	 transitive,	 reflexive	and	symmetrical,	 and	with	his	belief	 that	 the	
Evening	Star	is	the	Morning	Star.	Nor	does	his	belief	float	free	from	what	he	thinks	






not	by	reference	 to	 reasons	 that	would	 justify	an	answer	 to	 the	question	 “Is	 the	
Principle	of	Identity	true?”	So,	his	belief	is	not	Transparent,	if	Transparency	requires	
what	TR2	or	TR3	formulate.	But	by	Biconditional	and	Conditional	this	entails	that	
Rik’s	 belief	 is	 alienated	 and	 hence	 irrational.	 But	 this,	 as	we	 suggested	 (and	 as	





answer	 to	 the	 latter	question	 is	easy	enough,	as	 the	Principle	 is	overwhelmingly	




We	 conclude	 that,	 on	 the	 assumption	 of	 foundationalism,	 properly	 basic	
beliefs	are	not	Transparent,	if	Transparency	requires	what	TR2	and	TR3	formulate.	











propositions	 that	 has	 often	 been	 noted	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	 simple	 and	 seemingly	
persuasive	argument	for	the	conclusion	that	it	can	never	amount	to	knowledge.	The	
argument	is	the	famous	closure-based	argument	for	radical	skepticism.15	The	first	
premise	 of	 the	 argument	 is	 that	 if	 one	 is	 to	 have	 knowledge	 of	 a	wide	 range	 of	
everyday	propositions	(call	them	OHs),	then	one	must	be	able	to	rule	out	radical	
skeptical	 hypotheses	 (such	 as	 the	 BIV-hypothesis)	 that	 one	 knows	 to	 be	









1981,	 167)	 To	 be	 sure,	 most	 philosophers,	 and	 virtually	 all	 non-philosophers,	
believe	the	anti-skeptical	propositions.	Such	beliefs	are	paradigmatic	examples	of	
what	Thomas	Reid	 (1764	 [1997],	170)	has	called	common	sense	or	 “instinctive”	






from	 Jane’s	 belief	 that	 she	will	 fail	 her	 examination	 even	 though	 all	 the	 reasons	
available	to	her	point	in	another	direction;	Jane	cannot	make	sense	of	her	belief.	But	
believers	in	anti-skeptical	propositions	can	make	sense	of	their	beliefs	and	they	do	
link	 up	 with	 many	 other	 beliefs	 that	 they	 have.	 Such	 beliefs	 are	 by	 no	 means	
irrational.	Rather,	they	seem	entirely	rational,	even	if	their	rationality	is	not	derived	
                                                        
15 See Pritchard (2005, 27-8). 
16 See Machuca and Reed (2018). 
17 As is forcefully argued by Stroud (2002, 99-121). Externalists, of course, disagree with Stroud’s 
assessment. However, Moran is certainly no partisan to externalism, and hence for a discussion of 
Transparency views inspired by Moran, externalist responses to the skeptical problem are not relevant. 
Pritchard (2005) is an in-depth discussion of the dialectic between internalist and externalist responses 
to skepticism. 
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skeptics	would	 allow)	 that	would	 justify	 (as	 skeptics	 don’t	 allow)	 an	affirmative	
answer	to	“Am	I	a	BIV?”	This	means	that	Geraldine’s	belief	is	not	Transparent,	if	that	








BIV,	 etc.	 So,	 if	 Transparency	 requires	 what	 TR2	 specifies,	 Geraldine’s	 belief	 is	












life,	 alas,	 he	 forgot	 how	 the	 proof	 went,	 but	 still	 remembers	 the	 theorem	 and	
continues	 to	 believe	 it.	 This	 is	 a	 paradigm	 case	 of	 a	 belief	 based	 on	 forgotten	
evidence.18		
Related	to	this	is	the	case	of	someone	who,	like	Casimir,	believes	the	theorem,	
but	 unlike	 Casimir	 not	 because	 he	 once	worked	 through	 the	 proof	 himself,	 but	
because	of	the	testimony	of	others.	Virtually	all	people	who	have	heard	of	Andrew	
Wiles’	proof	of	Fermat’s	so-called	Last	Theorem,	are	in	this	position	vis-à-vis	the	
                                                        
18 For discussion of similar cases, see Boyle (2019, 5-6) and Byrne (2005, 84-5). 
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not	 Transparent	 if	 that	 requires	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 TR3.	 By	 Biconditional	 and	
Conditional,	 this	 entails	 that	 his	 belief	 is	 alienated	 and	 irrational.	 But	 this,	 as	
indicated,	 is	 a	 claim	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	 maintain.	 Hence	 Casimir’s	 belief	 is	 a	
counterexample	 to	Transparency	 if	TR3	 is	 the	proper	 formulation	of	 it.	Casimir’s	
belief	is	also	a	counterexample	to	Transparency	if	that	requires	fulfillment	of	TR2.	
For	 Casimir	 doesn’t,	 later	 in	 life,	 answer	 QB	 by	 considering	 reasons	 for	 the	
mathematical	 theorem,	as	 he	 has	 forgotten	 the	 proof.	 Still,	 his	 later	 belief	 in	 the	










is	not	a	 fraction?”	he	may	answer	by	reference	 to	his	 remembering	 that	he	once	
worked	out	the	proof	himself.	And	by	doing	so,	he	satisfies	the	requirement	of	TR2,	
                                                        
19 For example, Foley (2001). 
20 For an overview of positions that endorse this, see Gelfert (2014). 
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Should	 one	 of	 these	 evaluations	 be	 preferred	 over	 the	 other?	 In	 order	 to	











Casimir’s	 initial	 reason	 to	 believe	 the	 theorem	was	 a	 direct	 reason	 –	 the	












call	 that	 restricted	 Transparency),	 beliefs	 based	 on	 forgotten	 evidence	 are	 not	
Transparent,	 whereas	 if	 Transparency	 allows	 for	 reference	 to	 both	 direct	 and	
indirect	 reasons	 (let	 us	 call	 that	 unrestricted	 Transparency),	 such	 beliefs	 are	
Transparent.		
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 56
CHAPTER	ONE	44	
We	 thus	 conclude	 that	 if	 Transparency	 is	 to	 hold	 for	 cases	 of	 forgotten	




can	 honestly	 answer	 “Do	 I	 believe	 Fermat’s	 Last	 Theorem?”	 by	 answering	 “Is	
Fermat’s	Last	Theorem	true?”	Her	honest	answer	to	the	latter	question	is	likely	“yes”	
and	so	her	answer	to	the	former	“I	do.”		
Her	 belief	 is	 not	 Transparent,	 however,	 if	 Transparency	 requires	 the	
satisfaction	 of	 restricted	 TR2,	 for	 Agnes	 has	 no	 direct	 reason	 in	 favor	 of	 the	
proposition	that	Fermat’s	Last	Theorem	is	true	itself.	Nor	is	her	belief	Transparent	








testimony	 are	 Transparent	 if	 that	 requires	 either	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 TR1,	
unrestricted	TR2	or	unrestricted	TR3.	









The	 results	 are	 the	 following.	 First,	 there	 are	 counterexamples	 to	
Transparency	if	that	requires	the	satisfaction	of	TR3.	Beliefs	based	on	non-justifying	
reasons,	long-standing	beliefs,	basic	beliefs	(on	the	assumption	of	foundationalism),	
belief	 in	 anti-skeptical	 propositions	 (on	 the	 assumption	 of	 internalism)	 are	 not	
Transparent	if	that	requires	the	satisfaction	of	TR3.	And,	belief	in	propositions	the	
evidence	 for	which	one	has	forgotten,	as	well	as	 testimony-based	beliefs	are	not	
                                                        
21 It seems plausible that most if not all testimonial reasons, i.e., reasons whose content is that it has 
been testified that something or other is the case, are indirect reasons. 
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Transparent	 if	 that	 requires	 the	satisfaction	of	 restricted	TR3.	Yet	 they	often	are	
neither	alienated,	nor	irrational.	Given	Biconditional	and	Conditional,	 this	strikes	
against	TR3	and	restricted	TR3	being	adequate	formulations	of	Transparency.	









also	 faces	 problems.	 It	 doesn’t	 say,	 given	 Biconditional	 and	 Conditional,	 that	
obsessive	 beliefs,	 such	 as	 Jane’s	 belief	 that	 she	will	 fail	 the	 exam,	 are	 alienated	 and	
irrational	(which,	intuitively,	it	is).	Nor	does	it	say	that	beliefs	based	on	non-justifying	
reasons,	 such	as	Elisabeth’s	 belief	 that	 her	husband	will	 return	home,	 are	 irrational	
(which,	intuitively,	it	is).	This	isn’t a flat-out objection to TR1, but it is an example of 
a tension between TR1 and the deliberative stance (to be discussed next). 
The significance of these results is that they reveal a tension between 
Transparency and the central motivation for Transparency, namely the deliberative 
stance. The tension is that while the best formulation of Transparency is that it requires 
the satisfaction of TR1, one can conform to TR1 without exemplifying the deliberative 
stance. At the outset, TR1 seemed to be in line with the deliberative stance, since one 
concentrates on p rather than on the psychological attitude one has vis-à-vis p. 
However, since TR1 does not specify how QP is to be answered – a simple “Yes” suffices 
– TR1 puts no restrictions on the relation between one’s belief and one’s reasons. 
Consequently, TR1 seems to be ill equipped to give a correct verdict on cases of 
alienated belief, such as obsessive beliefs. Given the intended relation between the 
deliberative stance and alienation, TR1 thus seems to be too minimalistic in what it 
requires to exemplify the deliberative stance. 
Hence, the significance of the results is that they present friends of 
Transparency with a hard choice between the following options: 
 
[i] Accept that Transparency requires the satisfaction of either restricted 
TR2, or restricted TR3, both of which exemplify the deliberative stance, 
and accept that large classes of belief, notably long-standing beliefs, 
basic beliefs (given foundationalism), anti-skeptical beliefs (given 
internalism), beliefs the evidence for which one has forgotten, and 
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testimonial beliefs are not Transparent, and, given Biconditional and 
Conditional, are alienated and irrational. Or, 
[ii] Accept that Transparency requires the satisfaction of either 
unrestricted TR2, or unrestricted TR3, both of which exemplify the 
deliberative stance, and accept that large classes of belief, notably long-
standing beliefs, basic beliefs (given foundationalism), and anti-
skeptical beliefs (given internalism), are not Transparent, and, given 
Biconditional and Conditional, are alienated and irrational. Or, 
[iii] Accept that Transparency requires the satisfaction of TR1, that has 



























Transparency	 accounts	 of	 self-knowledge,	which	 are	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 one	
learns	of	one’s	own	mind	by	attending	to	the	world	at	 large,	face	the	Two	Topics	
Problem	 (TTP):	 the	 problem	 that	 the	 apparent	 basis	 for	 self-knowledge,	 i.e.	 p	
(including	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 p),	 doesn’t	 provide	 a	 reason	 to	 self-ascribe	 a	
particular	mental	attitude	regarding	p.	A	careful	glance	at	the	state	of	the	debate	on	
transparent	self-knowledge	shows	that	there	is	no	consensus	of	what	the	relation	




that	 TTP	 is	 only	 apparent;	 2)	 inferential	 views;	 3)	 judgment	 views;	 and	 4)	





















isn’t.	 Hence,	 transparency	 accounts	 face	 the	 Two	 Topics	 Problem	 (TTP):	 the	
problem	 that	 the	apparent	 basis	 for	 self-knowledge,	 i.e.	p	 (including	evidence	 in	
favor	 of	p),	 doesn’t	 provide	 a	 reason	 to	 self-ascribe	 a	particular	mental	 attitude	
regarding	 p	 (TTP	 is	 further	 explained	 in	 section	 2).1	 Friends	 of	 transparency	
accounts	of	self-knowledge	thus	need	to	clarify	how	the	two	topics,	the	proposition	
and	the	self-ascription,	are	related	to	one	another.	
	 A	 careful	 glance	 at	 the	 state	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 transparent	 self-knowledge	
shows	 that	 TTP	 remains	 unsolved.	 There	 is	 no	 consensus	 of	 what	 the	 relation	
between	p	 and	 I	 believe	 that	 p	might	 be,	 nor	what	 kind	 of	 solution	 respects	 the	
commitments	 of	 transparency	 views	 that	 actually	 establish	 the	 source	 of	 TTP.	
Discussing	the	pitfalls	and	merits	of	each	response	proves	to	be	difficult,	because	








	 The	 responses	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 four	 subgroups2:	 1)	 First	 of	 all,	 in	 the	
literature	 TTP	 is	 sometimes	 dismissed	 as	 a	 philosophical	 invention	 (cf.	 Cassam	
2014,	Jongepier	2017).	This	response	presses	the	question	what	it	is	that	makes	TTP	
                                                        
1 I will focus on the problem regarding belief and not regarding other mental attitudes. Belief is the most 
central, and sometimes regarded as the only, case in the literature on transparency. The problem at hand 
is also known as the puzzle of transparency, the problem of two subject matters, and the evidentialist 
objection. See, for instance, Barnett (2015), Byrne (2005), Gallois (1996), Martin (1998), Moran (2001), 
O’Brien (2003), Roessler (2013a), among others. Since its recognition, a number of transparency accounts 
are proposed specifically in response to this problem.  
2 In general, solutions to TTP have an epistemic and metaphysical dimension: Epistemically speaking, one 
might think that some transition takes place between thinking p and thinking I believe that p or one might 
hold that in certain situations one thought is contained by the other. Metaphysically speaking, one might 
hold that being in a mental state and knowing one is in that state are distinct mental states or are one 
and the same state. The result is a conceptual map of four categories of possible solutions: i) transition 
accounts involving distinct states (portrayed in inferential views and epistemic judgment views), ii) 
transition accounts involving a single state (this will be exemplified in Boyle’s reflectivism in section 5.2), 
3) non-transition accounts involving distinct states (an implausible view), and 4) non-transition accounts 
involving a single state (represented in metaphysical judgment views and constitutive views). 
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response	 to	TTP	and	delineate	what	makes	TTP	 a	 genuine	 problem.	Next,	 I	will	
review	and	raise	problems	for	the	other	responses:	2)	inferential	views	(section	3);	







as	 a	 problem	 by	 abandoning	 one	 of	 the	 starting	 points	 of	 transparency.	 Not	
everyone	is	convinced	that	TTP	poses	a	genuine	problem.	In	the	literature	TTP	is	
sometimes	 dismissed	 as	 a	 philosophical	 invention	 (cf.	 Cassam	 2014,	 Jongepier	
2017).	The	idea	is	that	TTP	is	merely	an	epistemological	problem	that	is	the	result	









This	 conception	 of	 epistemic	 reasons	 does	 not	 sit	 well	 with	
                                                        
3 Unfortunately, I cannot do as much justice to all accounts as they deserve. Since this paper seeks to 
provide a broad overview, sometimes I have had to trade depth of coverage for breadth. I hope the 
tradeoff works, and I hope that the conciseness of the discussion of different views doesn’t negatively 
influence portraying them correctly and sympathetically.  
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I	 agree	 that	 putting	 the	 problem	 in	 epistemic	 terms	 adequately	 captures	 the	
puzzling	 aspect	 of	 transparency	 (hence	 my	 own	 formulation	 of	 TTP	 in	 the	




not	 abandon	 transparency?	 From	 such	 a	 viewpoint,	 the	 easiest	 solution	 to	 TTP	
seems	to	give	up	the	idea	that	p	(or	reasons	pertaining	to	p)	are	the	grounds	for	self-
ascribing	 the	 belief	 that	 p.	 Hence,	 on	 this	 portrayal	 of	 TTP,	 why	 not	 abandon	
transparency	views	of	self-knowledge?	
	 On	 this	 line	 of	 thought,	 however,	 the	 gist	 of	 TTP	 no	 longer	 relates	 to	 the	
motivations	 for	 transparency	views	of	 self-knowledge.	Given	 the	motivations	 for	
transparency	views	of	self-knowledge,	the	source	of	TTP	is	not	merely	epistemic	but	
is	to	be	found	in	the	first-person	perspective	and	its	concomitant	rational	demands.	
Moran	 discusses	 the	 problem	 of	 TTP	 in	 light	 of	 ‘two	 quite	 different	 types	 of	







	 And	 here	we	 see	 the	 non-epistemic	 roots	 of	 TTP,	 for	 the	 commitment	 of	
endorsement	and	the	making	of	an	empirical	claim	put	different	types	of	rational	
demand	on	self-ascribing	a	belief.	On	the	one	hand,	making	an	empirical	claim	that	
I	 have	 the	 belief	 that	p	 requires	 a	 relevant	 epistemic	 basis:	 I	must	 secure	 some	
epistemic	basis	to	report	on	my	belief	that	p.	Only	if	I	have	such	an	epistemic	basis	
for	my	 self-knowledge	will	my	 possession	 of	 self-knowledge	 be	 justified.	 On	 the	
other	hand,	the	commitment	to	the	truth	of	my	belief	that	p	requires	endorsing	p	as	
                                                        
4 Note that Barnett formulates Transparency also in terms of reasons, i.e. only in epistemological terms: 
‘p is a good reason for you to believe that you believe that p’ (2015, 2). Byrne (2005, 95) also formulates 
TTP merely in epistemological terms. See Martin (1998) and Roessler (2013a) for a different approach. 
5 Cf. Boyle (2011a, 17; 2011b, 231); Moran (2001, especially Ch. 3 and 4); Peacocke (1998, 86). The view 
that self-ascription of belief commits oneself to the truth of belief is supported by, for instance, Moore’s 
paradox. As many have noted in the debate on transparency, including the previously mentioned 
authors, transparency and Moore’s paradox seem to be two sides of the same coin. 
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true:	I	must	attend	to	p	itself	and	consider	reasons	in	favor	of	or	against	p.	How	can	
these	 two	 requirements,	 i.e.,	 requirement	 of	 endorsement	 and	 requirement	 of	









sort	 of	 philosophical	 invention	 implies	 dismissing	 either	 the	 requirement	 of	
endorsement	or	the	requirement	of	securing	a	relevant	epistemic	basis.	Hence,	we	







reason	 to	self-ascribe	 the	belief	 that	p.	This	 route	 is	most	 fervently	defended	by	
Byrne,	who	claims	that	transparent	self-knowledge	is	acquired	by	drawing	a	special	
kind	of	inference,	namely	‘an	inference	from	world	to	mind’	(2011,	203).	Following	







Both	 Gallois	 and	 Byrne	 recognize	 the	 abnormality	 of	 the	 schema.	 ‘Plainly	 the	





                                                        
6 For this portrayal of TTP, see especially Martin (1998, 110-1); Roessler (2013a, 8-10). 
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(cannot	 easily	 be	 false),	makes	 the	 reasoning	 epistemically	 justified.	And	 if	 the	
schema	is	 self-verifying	and	 if	 self-verification	suffices	 for	epistemic	 justification,	
then	it	seems	that	Byrne	has	formulated	a	solution	to	the	two	topics	problem.		
In	evaluating	Byrne’s	account,	I	want	to	focus	on	the	crucial	assumption	that	
inference	 from	 a	 premise	 entails	 belief	 in	 that	 premise.	 Before	 discussing	 this	
assumption,	however,	let	me	first	outline	various	objections	to	Byrne’s	account	that	
have	been	raised	 in	 the	 literature.	Most	of	 these	objections	 target	 the	 inferential	
nature	of	the	doxastic	schema.7	Despite	the	claim	that	the	inference	is	self-verifying,	
one	might	find	it	problematic	that	the	inference	does	not	fit	any	standard	form	of	
good	 inference.	As	Byrne	himself	notes,	 it	 isn’t	based	on	deduction,	 induction	or	
abduction.	But	that	 isn’t	the	only	way	in	which	the	doxastic	schema	fails	to	meet	





(in	 fact,	and	unbeknownst	 to	us)	false	–	 this	nonetheless	constitutes	a	difference	













objections	 still	 leave	 Byrne	 a	 way	 out.	 After	 all,	 Byrne	 claims	 that	 the	 doxastic	
schema	isn’t	a	normal	but	a	special	 inference,	which	is	 justified	because	it	 is	self-
                                                        
7 Cf. Barnett (2015), Boyle (2011b), Gertler (2011), Silins (2012), Valaris (2011). 
8 My depiction of the problem follows Barnett (2015, 16-7). For alternative ways of developing the 
objection, see e.g. Gertler (2011) and Silins (2012). 
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change	 the	 fact	 that	 the	premise	isn’t	 intelligibly	 related	 to	 the	conclusion,	 i.e.,	 it	




schema	as	 a	 rejoinder	 is	what	 I	will	 call	 the	assumption	 objection:	 it	 targets	 the	
aforementioned	 assumption	 underlying	 Byrne’s	 account.	 Byrne	 assumes,	 in	 his	
explanation	why	the	doxastic	schema	is	self-verifying,	that	‘inference	from	a	premise	
entails	belief	 in	 that	premise’	 (2011,	206).	This	assumption	 isn’t	unconditionally	
true.	 We	 quite	 often	 reason	 hypothetically	 or	 merely	 check	 the	 validity	 of	 an	
argument:	for	instance,	when	we	read	an	inference	off	the	paper	in	front	of	us	to	see	
whether	 the	 conclusion	 follows	 from	 the	 premises	without	 having	 any	 attitudes	
towards	the	premises;	or	listen	to	someone	explaining	why	they	believe	something,	
trying	to	follow	through	their	reasoning,	without	having	determined	for	ourselves	
whether	 to	 believe	 the	 premises.	 As	 Wright	 has	 stated,	 we	 should	 ‘distinguish	











                                                        
9 For such a response, cf. Setiya (2011, 185ff). 
10 For an argument in support of the view that reasoning doesn’t necessarily involve belief in premises 
and conclusions, see Chapter 3. 
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to	 recognize	 when	 following	 the	 procedure	 is	 appropriate.	 But	 since	 it	 is	 only	
appropriate	 to	 follow	 the	procedure	if	 she	accepts	 the	premise,	 this	again	would	
presuppose	self-knowledge	rather	than	explain	it.	Thus,	such	a	procedure	must,	as	
                                                        
11 This also holds for Byrne’s rule-following option: if p, then believe that you believe that p. Supposedly, 
to follow this rule, one has to recognize that p, not merely suppose that p. The question is how it is 
possible to recognize that p without presupposing some awareness of believing that p. 
12 One might think that Byrne could claim that the doxastic schema holds only when the premise p is 
true. This would exclude the possibility of reasoning hypothetically and safeguards the idea that the 
schema is always self-verifying. However, it would also imply that one cannot know any of one’s beliefs 
that are false. This isn’t, I presume, a concession Byrne would be willing to make. A broader implication 
of this argument concerns inferential accounts of self-knowledge more broadly construed (cf. Cassam 
2014; Lawlor 2009). If every piece of reasoning could be a piece of hypothetical reasoning, it seems that 
inferential accounts would always need to depend on a basis of self-knowledge. In what other way could 
we know that we believe the conclusion of our reasoning? See Concluding Reflections for an exposition 
of this argument. 
13 Cf. Goldman (1967). 
14 Setiya’s non-inferential rule-following account (cf. 2011, 183-6) might be read along these lines. Setiya 
actually claims that his account isn’t reliabilist but see Ometto (2016) for an argument in favor of a 
reliabilist interpretation. Another reliabilist account, related but different from the kind of account under 
discussion, can be found in Fernández (2013). For discussion of Fernández’ account, see Ashwell (2013b); 
Coliva (2014; 2016). 
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Hence,	 we	 arrive	 at	 the	 following	 evaluation	 of	 Byrne’s	 position.	 Byrne’s	
internalist	 (non-reliabilist)	 proposal	 faces	 Boyle’s	 madman	 objection	 and	 the	
assumption	objection.	If	he	were	to	hold	on	to	this	account,	he	would	need	to	accept	
that	 the	 inference	 is	both	crazy	and	 lacks	epistemic	 justification,	at	 least	without	
presupposing	awareness	of	one’s	belief	regarding	the	premise.	This	seems	a	very	







make	 such	 a	 transition	 intelligible	 for	 the	 subject.	 This	 implies	 dismissing	 the	
rational	demands	of	self-ascribing	the	belief	that	p.	Hence,	the	second	choice	that	
confronts	us	is	either	dismissing	Byrne’s	inferential	account	or	accept	the	following	
disjunction,	 that	 is,	 that	 the	 inferential	procedure	 is	crazy	and	unjustified	 (on	an	







transition	 from	 p	 to	 I	 believe	 that	 p	 is	 ill-conceived	 from	 the	 beginning.	 Rather,	
transparency	commences	with	judging	that	p.	If	one’s	judgment	that	p	is	the	basis	of	
(or	 the	 same	 as)	 one’s	 self-ascription	 of	 belief,	 so	 the	 thought	 goes,	 there	 is	 no	
transition	 between	 the	 two	 original	 topics.	 This	means	 that	 TTP	wouldn’t	 even	
surface	as	a	problem	at	all.	So,	initially,	judgment	views	seem	to	have	good	prospects	
in	solving	TTP.		
                                                        
15 This also points to a deeper problem concerning the methodological assumptions underlying such an 
approach. As Roessler (2013a, 13-4) writes: ‘If we adopt a radically externalist approach, we should not 
expect to be able to discover the basis of second-order beliefs simply through reflection on what we 
intentionally do when we reflect on our own beliefs, any more than we should expect to discover the 
non-conscious mechanisms underpinning vision by intently looking at the world.’ 
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sensation)	 (cf.	 C.	 Peacocke	 1998,	 88).	 Judgment	 views	 need	 to	 rely	 on	 this	
assumption	so	that	self-knowledge	of	judgment	and	belief	can	come	apart.	
However,	 the	 distinction	 itself	 doesn’t	 yet	 explain	 how	 we	 know	 our	
judgments.	We	 find	 two	 different	 kind	 of	 accounts	 in	 judgment	 views:	 the	 first	




                                                        
16 There are two broad categories of judgment views: epistemic judgment views and metaphysical 
judgment views. Epistemic judgment views maintain that my judgment that p forms an epistemic basis 
for my self-ascription of my belief that p. Judging that p is thus a reason for self-ascribing the belief that 
p. Some claim that I infer that I believe that p from the fact that I judge that p (cf. Cassam 2014), while 
others claim that my self-ascription of belief is non-inferentially based on my judgment (cf. C. Peacocke 
1998; Silins 2012). Cassam’s view will not figure in the discussion of judgment views, because ultimately 
it is based on an inferential view of self-knowledge. Silins clearly holds a judgment view – 'judgment is a 
guide to belief’ (2012, 297) – but will not figure in the discussion because he assumes that we have 
phenomenological awareness of judgment without giving an account of how he thinks this works. 
Metaphysical judgment views, by contrast, claim that my self-ascription isn’t based on but based in my 
judgment – the judgment manifests my self-knowledge of belief (cf. A. Peacocke 2017; Roessler 2013a). 
17 In the literature on transparent self-knowledge and TTP, there is extensive discussion on the correct 
metaphysics of judgment and belief (cf. Boyle 2009a; Peacocke 1998; Schwitzgebel 2010; Cassam 
2014). According to some, if one holds a view of judgment and belief, where judgment is a conscious 
act and belief a standing attitude, this would dissolve TTP. What the discussion of judgment views will 
make clear, however, is that one’s metaphysical presuppositions do not actually dissolve TTP. Even if all 
transparency theorists accept the claim that judgment is a conscious act (and different from belief), 
they still face the challenge of explaining how one is aware of one’s judgment. 
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One	 last	 general	 point	 concerns	 the	 possibility	 that	 an	 account	 of	 self-


















judges	 that	p,	 because	 of	 one’s	 view	of	p.	 And	 one	 is	 aware	 of	 one’s	 view	 that	p	






One	 basic	 worry	 here	 is	 that	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 our	 propositional	
attitudes	 isn’t	 sufficiently	 fine-grained	 to	 set	 judging	 that	 p	 apart	 from	 other	
propositional	attitudes,	such	as	supposing	that	p	or	wishfully	thinking	that	p.	I	don’t	
know	of	a	way	to	establish	this	negative	claim,	but	neither	do	I	think	that	C.	Peacocke	
is	 in	 a	 position	 to	 establish	 the	 positive	 claim.	 As	 Maja	 Spener	 (2011)	 argues,	
although	 the	 orthodox	 assumption	 that	 propositional	 attitudes	 lack	 phenomenal	
quality	has	lost	its	dominance,	the	idea	that	cognitive	phenomenology	is	sufficiently	
“thick”	 or	 distinctive	 to	 make	 subtle	 distinctions	 between	 different	 kinds	 of	
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propositional	attitudes	remains	highly	controversial.18	Moreover,	following	Spener’s	
argument,	 the	 disagreement	 underlying	 this	 controversy	 has	 consequences	 for	
establishing	such	a	negative	or	positive	claim,	because	the	only	means	available	to	




independent	way	 of	accessing	 such	cognitive	 phenomenal	 qualities,	 the	 fact	 that	
people	disagree	about	the	right	characterization	of	 it,	makes	their	 introspectively	






















can	 intend,	 for	 example,	 to	 answer	 a	 particular	 question,	 but	 I	 cannot	 have	 the	
intention	to	make	a	particular	judgment.	One	cannot	intend	to	judge	that	p	without	
                                                        
18 Cf. Spener 2011. For an excellent edited volume on cognitive phenomenology, see Bayne and 
Montague (2011). 
19 Other objections to C. Peacocke’s account have focused on the connection between judging that p 
and believing that p (cf. Boyle 2019). As outlined in the introduction, for the sake of the discussion, I 
only focus on his account of self-knowledge of judgment. 
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about	 a	 particular	 topic	 (A.	 Peacocke	 2017,	 362).	 Based	 on	 this	 idea	 of	 the	
intentionality	of	 judgment,	A.	Peacocke	claims	that	when	judging	is	 intentional,	a	




can	 be	 aware,	 that	 is,	 that	 you	 are	 doing	 this	 sort	 of	 thing	 (e.g.	 imagining	 one’s	







Answering	 a	 question	may	 take	 time.	 It	may,	 as	 Evans	 emphasized,	
involve	 many	 kinds	 of	 mental	 activity,	 such	 as	 observation,	
deliberation	or	recollection.	You	may	be	in	the	process	of	answering	
the	question	whether	p	without	ever	reaching	a	verdict,	due	to	being	
interrupted.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 is	hard	 to	 think	of	what	might	be	
involved	in	being	interrupted	in	judging	that	p.	(Roessler	2013a,	3)	
	
Most	 intentional	 actions,	 such	 as	 the	 one	 mentioned	 by	 A.	 Peacocke	 (e.g.,	
determining	whether	p	is	true),	may	be	actions	that	take	time.	By	contrast,	the	act	of	
judgment	marks	the	endpoint	of	these	former	actions	and	does	not	itself	take	any	
                                                        
20 C. Peacocke (2007; 2009) also seems to have something like this in mind. As he writes (2007, 365): ‘it 
is a feature of your consciousness that you are, for instance, judging something rather than forming an 
intention.’ 
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that	your	daughter	has	no	real	 skill	 at	 tennis,	you	might	 simply	not	
know	 whether	 that	 was	 a	 real	 judgment	 or	 merely	 a	 case	 of	






remain	 uncertain	 about	whether	 that	 thought	was	 a	 judgment	 or	 an	 instance	 of	
entertaining	 a	 hypothetical.	 However,	 the	 examples	 she	 gives	 of	 judgment	 as	
                                                        
21 The temporal aspects of judgment are also discussed in, for instance, Geach (1957, 104); Soteriou 
(2009, 240ff). 
22 One might object that there are non-mental actions that do not seem to take any time, but of which 
we can be aware nonetheless. As C. Peacocke (2009, fn. 9) writes: ‘One can have awareness of something 
that does not take time, both in the bodily and in the mental domains. Stopping talking can be an action, 
and the agent can have an action awareness of it. It is not a continuing event. Judging and deciding are 
also not temporally extended processes, but the subject can have an action awareness of them too.’ I 
think this underestimates the distinctive nature of judgments. Judgments are such that they could not 
have any duration, whereas stopping talking can be something that takes some time. For instance, the 
following sequence might be involved in the action “stopping talking”: one might hesitate in making a 
last reply, utter half a word, and then keep silent. Now, the real question seems to be what constitutes 
the difference in temporal possibilities between judgment and stopping talking? It isn’t just that judging 
isn’t a process in time, but also that it doesn’t seem to be a production of something at all (whereas 
“stopping talking” might be said to produce silence, closed lips, makes one’s vocal cords come to rest, or 
a change in the conversation). What could judging produce? Perhaps one thinks that an act of judgment 
produces the thought that p, where p is represented as true. But what would an act of judgment be if 
not the thinking of p as true? Distinguishing the two seems to make an act of judgment like a magical 
trick of the mind. If judging doesn’t produce anything, it’s also difficult to see how it can involve an 
intention parallel to normal intentional action. Compare Soteriou (2009, 244): ‘the mental act of judging 
does not seem to require the production of anything. This is why although it makes sense to ascribe to 
the agent an intention to assert that p [for it produces spoken word], it doesn’t make sense to attribute 
to the agent an intention to judge that p.’ For more on the unproductive character of judgment (and 
belief), see Boyle (2009a, 32ff). 
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contrastive	awareness	 to	Anscombe’s	question	 ‘Why?’.	 She	writes	 that	 ‘if	 you	are	
intentionally	assessing	your	daughter’s	skill	in	tennis,	I	can	ask	you	why,	and	you	can	





put	 doubt	 on	 the	 adequacy	 of	 contrastive	 awareness,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	
transparency.	If	contrastive	awareness	isn’t	related	to	one’s	view	on	the	matter,	then	






the	 intention	 inherent	 in	 judging,	 namely	 ‘to	 express	 one’s	 conviction	 that	 p’	
(Roessler	 2013a,	 3).	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 this	 cannot	 function	 as	 a	 normal	
(prior/prospective)	intention,	because	that	would	presuppose	knowledge	of	one’s	
belief	 that	 p	 (knowing	 one’s	 conviction	 that	 p).	 But	 according	 to	 Roessler,	 we	
shouldn’t	 think	 of	 the	 intention	 inherent	 in	 judging	 as	 a	 prior	 intention.	 The	
intention	 doesn’t	 have	 to	 preexist	 before	 the	 act	 of	 judging.	 Following	Williams’	
remarks	on	assertion,	Roessler	maintains	that	a	judgment	‘can	be	spontaneous	“as	





saying	 ‘1711’…may	be	premeditated	 ‘as	 to	whether’	–	 it	may	be	 the	
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belief,	 one	will	 thus	 be	 aware	 of	 one’s	 belief.	 In	a	 slogan:	 judging	 is	 ‘a	matter	 of	
intentionally	(hence	knowingly)	expressing	one’s	belief	that	p’	(Ibid.).	Supposedly,	
this	 doesn’t	 presuppose	 self-knowledge	 of	 one’s	 belief,	 because	 the	 intention	
inherent	in	judgment	is	a	proximal	intention.		
However,	we	aren’t	told	what	such	a	proximal	intention	actually	is.	In	general,	








self-knowledge	 of	 belief.	 But	 this	 makes	 it	 an	 odd	 kind	 of	 intention,	 because,	
normally,	 the	 functional	 role	 of	 an	 intention	 is	 such	 that	 the	 intention	 to	 do	













that,	 therefore,	 self-knowledge	 of	 belief	 and	 judgment	 come	 apart.	 Even	 if	 one	
accepts	this	distinction,	it	remains	an	open	question	how	judgment	views	account	





contrastive	 awareness	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 wrong	 kind	 of	 awareness:	 both	 to	 be	
awareness	of	judging	(for	judging	isn’t	temporally	extended)	and	to	be	awareness	of	
your	 view	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 judgment	 (and	 thus	 be	 transparent).	 Finally,	
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judgment	 and	 belief	 is	 false.	 Without	 a	 satisfying	 account	 of	 self-knowledge	 of	
judgment,	we	are	still	left	where	we	started.	This	means	that	–	pace	the	discussion	












one	 or	 one	 involving	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 difference	 between	 self-knowledge	 of	
judgment	and	belief.	The	central	idea	is	that	the	proper	understanding	of	the	nature	









Importantly,	both	of	 these	 transparency	accounts	hold	 that	mental	activity	
with	 the	 content	 p	 and	mental	 activity	with	 the	 content	 I	 believe	 that	 p	 can	 be	
instances	of	a	single	mental	attitude,	namely	consciously	believing	that	p.23	This	also	
means	that	there	cannot	be	an	inference	between	two	wholly	independent	facts	(or	
                                                        
23 Cf. Moran (2001, 27-32) and Boyle (2011, 233; 2019). 
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topics).	As	Boyle	writes,	transparent	self-knowledge	should	not	be	understood	as	
‘knowledge	of	one	realm	of	 facts	 [that	one	arrives	at]	by	 inference	 from	another,	
epistemically	 independent	 realm	 of	 facts’	 (Boyle	 2011,	 233).	 However,	 that	 one	


































he	 calls	 subject-matters),	 namely	 that	my	belief	 regarding	p	 (and	 thus	 the	 right	
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answer	to	the	question	whether	I	believe	that	p)	is	determined	by	my	answer	to	the	


























subject	 is	 supposed	 to	 grasp	 the	 intelligibility	 of	 her	 self-ascription.	Why	would	
having	this	ability	suddenly	render	the	self-ascription	intelligible	to	the	subject?25	
Moran	claims	that	a	self-ascription	involves	two	requirements,	i.e.,	of	endorsement	




                                                        
24 For this interpretation of Moran, see, for instance, Finkelstein (2012, 107) and Cassam (2014, 103).  
25 As a reminder, it isn’t possible to claim that the subject can assume that she has this ability and use 
that assumption in acquiring self-knowledge, for then self-knowledge is no longer epistemically 
immediate. 
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puts	 the	 nature	 of	 awareness	 central	 stage.27	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 Boyle	 provides	 a	
solution	to	TTP	by	postulating	that	the	nature	of	awareness	is	such	as	to	implicitly	
comprise	self-awareness.	I	think	Boyle’s	account	puts	the	action	precisely	where	it	






encompasses	 tacit	 knowledge	 about	 the	mental	 attitude.	 Following	 Sartre,	Boyle	
distinguishes	what	one	 thinks	 about	 (positional	 consciousness)	 from	 the	way	 in	
which	 one	 thinks	 about	 it,	 e.g.	 believing	 versus	 hypothesizing	 (non-positional	
consciousness	or	 the	mode	of	presentation)	 (2019,	17ff).	According	to	Boyle,	 the	
information	about	 this	mode	of	presentation	 is	already	 tacitly	present	when	one	
focuses	on	the	presentation	itself.		
                                                        
26 In the case of intention, more work has been done on what such a substantial account could be. 
Philosophers such as Hampshire (1975), Stroud (2003), and Roessler (2013b, 47-8) claim that it’s a 
structural element of deliberation that one’s practical reasoning warrants both the formation of an 
intention and an empirical statement about the future. But what is this structural element supposed to 
be? How would it provide a solution to TTP? Without settling these latter questions, saying that it’s a 
structural element of deliberation is just another name for what we seek to explain. 
27 For a defense and development of Moran, see, for instance, Boyle (2011a; 2011b). For his most recent 
account, see Boyle (2019). 
28 First, this statement was based on the claim that ‘…in the normal and basic case, believing P and 
knowing oneself to believe P are not two cognitive states; they are two aspects of one cognitive state – 
the state, as we might put it, of knowingly believing P’ (2011b, 228). Recently, he added his account of 
awareness to this, so I will focus on that. A puzzling aspect of Boyle’s proposal is that there are two 
thoughts, but only a single cognitive state. Boyle doesn’t explicitly consider this, but he must take it that 
the same cognitive condition may find expression in distinct thoughts. That is, being in a condition of 
believing that p can be expressed in a world-directed way – e.g., there will be a third world war – or as 
self-ascription – e.g., I believe there will be a third world war. The difference between the two is the 
concepts being used (epistemic), not the mental state that they express (metaphysical). One might be 
hesitant, however, to give up the plausible idea that two thoughts using different concepts and thus 
containing different information imply distinct mental attitudes. Namely, one attitude vis-à-vis the 
proposition p and one vis-à-vis the proposition I believe that p. 
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[S]ubjects	 who	 can	 deliberate	 competently…	 must	 be	 able	 to	
distinguish	between	a	factual	question	being	open	and	its	being	closed:	
between	 the	 attitude	 toward	 p	 in	 considering	 whether	 p	 and	 the	
attitude	 involved	 in	settling	 this	question	one	way	or	another…	The	
point	 here	 is	 not	 merely	 that	 the	 subject’s	 answer	 to	 the	 question	
whether	p	expresses	a	belief	 she	holds,	but	 that	 she	herself	already	
implicitly	 distinguishes	 between	 this	 mode	 of	 presentation	 and	 a	











presented	 as	 open	 is	 a	 person’s	 stance	 regarding	 the	 proposition.	 Similarly,	 if	 a	
question	is	resolved,	then	she	implicitly	represents	her	belief	as	determinate.	The	
idea	 is	 thus	 that	 world-directed	 thoughts	 aren’t	 merely	 world-directed.	 Boyle	
postulates	that	a	single	thought,	in	presenting	us	with	an	object,	necessarily	includes	
                                                        
29 Boyle explains his views by starting with the case of perception. According to Boyle, other people find 
his views most convincing in the case of perception (personal communication). In the case of perception, 
the idea is the following: suppose I perceive a purring cat in front of me and have the thought “This cat 
is purring”. In thinking this thought, it is presented to me in a certain way. I could not have the thought 
“This cat is purring” in the same mode, if this cat was not perceived by me. The use of the demonstrable 
this already contains that I am perceiving the cat rather than imagining a purring cat or hoping for one 
(cf. 2019, 21-22).  
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But	what	 remains	 unclear	 is	 how	 the	 tacit	 information	 about	 one’s	mental	 state	
becomes	explicit.	Boyle	(2011)	argues	that	it	becomes	explicit	through	a	reflective	












(Boyle	 2019,	 24).	 Now,	 one	 might	 become	 suspicious	 here,	 for	 notions	 such	 as	








What	would	 the	 subject	 do	 if	 she	 is	 uncertain	 about	 her	 self-ascription?	What	 a	
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3) 	Either	 dismiss	 judgment	 views	 of	 self-knowledge	 or	 address	 any	 of	 their	
problems	satisfactorily.	
4) 	Either	 dismiss	 metaphysical	 responses	 or	 accept	 that	 it	 is	 a	 structural	
element	of	reflective	abilities	that	they	enable	avowal	and	report	or	accept	













from	 the	 structure	 of	 deliberation	 (Moran),	 and	 awareness	 of	 the	 mode	 of	










                                                        
30 Hofmann (2018), Kind (2003), Paul (2014). 
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…that	which	makes	the	sensation	of	blue	a	mental	fact	seems	to	escape	












Animals	 don’t.	 You	do.	Where	 did	 you	 learn	 this?	 To	 insist	 that	we	
know	it	despite	there	being	no	identifiable	way	to	know	it	is	not	very	
helpful.	 We	 can’t	 do	 epistemology	 by	 stamping	 our	 feet.	 Skeptical	
suspicions	 are,	 I	 think,	 rightly	 aroused	 by	 this	 result.	 Maybe	 our	
conviction	that	we	know,	in	a	direct	and	authoritative	way,	that	we	are	









                                                        
31 For other descriptions of the same phenomenon, see, for instance, Harman (1990, 667) or Tye (1995, 
30). For careful discussion of the phenomenon and the metaphysical conclusions drawn from it, see Kind 
(2003), Nida-Rümelin (2007). 
32 Following Nida-Rümelin (2007), We should be careful to distinguish the phenomenon of transparency 
with the assumption that the only way in which we could become aware of our own awareness is by 
becoming aware of some new feature of our experience. As Nida-Rümelin pointedly describes the 
phenomenon, when I focus on my experience of the blue ‘I do not direct my attention into some inner 
space. I do not get aware – by attending to my own experience – of the instantiation of any property I 
was not already aware of before I focused attention upon my own experience’ (Nida-Rümelin 2007, 429). 
However, this is not yet to explain which information in our experience we employ to know we experience 
it (see main text). 
33 See also Byrne (2015). 
34 This doesn’t solve TTP, nor directly save transparency accounts of self-knowledge. It might even be 
used to maintain that self-knowledge or self-awareness is to be explained on a perceptual and reliabilist 
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model after all. However, for those who are convinced by the existing objections to such perceptual and 
reliabilist models (cf. Moran 2001; Shoemaker 1996), it does have positive consequences for 
transparency accounts of self-knowledge. The reason for this is that if TTP is a problem of conscious 
mentality in general, then the fact that transparency accounts face TTP is not in itself a bad thing. It might 
even speak in favor of transparency accounts that they bring out the problem in such an explicit form. 
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in	 attitudes.	By	combining	 insights	 from	Anscombe	and	 Frege,	 I	will	 propose	 an	
alternative	 view	 of	 reasoning,	 which	 holds	 that	when	 a	 person	 reasons	 she	 (1)	
makes	use	of	conditionals,	manifested	in	(2)	a	judgment	of	the	form	p	as	following	
from	q.	The	paper	ends	by	discussing	the	corollaries	of	this	proposal	for	the	relation	

























going	 from	 one	 belief	 to	 another	 (obviously,	 there	 will	 need	 to	 be	 additional	
conditions).	 Although	 reasoning	 often	 involves	 such	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes,	 e.g.,	








	 Arguing	 against	 the	 general	 idea	 that	 reasoning	 is	 a	mental	 process	 that	
involves	a	change	in	view	doesn’t	imply	arguing	against	any	involvement	of	mental	
processes	and	attitudes	in	reasoning.	Rather,	the	alternative	view	I	will	defend,	let	
me	 call	 it	 the	 form	 view,	 claims	 that	 reasoning	 shouldn’t	 be	 characterized	 in	




of	 smaller	 parts	 (i.e.,	 attitudes)	 and	 the	 (causal	 and	 rational)	 relations	 between	
them,	the	form	view	explicitly	rejects	the	possibility	of	analyzing	reasoning	in	terms	
of	smaller	parts	or	in	terms	of	an	essential	feature	or	property.	
                                                        
1 See also Valaris (2018). Valaris claims that this view actually includes two distinct mental categories, 
which he calls deduction (a mental process) and reasoning (a change in view). I will come back to 
Valaris’ account in section 6. Note that the second part, i.e., a change in attitudes, is often related ‘to 
the sort of “reasoned change in view” that Harman (1986) discusses’ (Boghossian 2014, 2). I have 
chosen “change in attitudes” because it is less committal than “change in view”. Change in attitudes 
will be explicated in section 2. 
2 Nor that it is sufficient. Much of the contemporary debate on reasoning is focused on the question 
what would make a change in attitudes an instance of reasoning. The difficulty here is formulating 
explanatory non-circular additional conditions. I come back to this in section 4. 
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	 The	 form	view	 follows	 a	 tradition	 that	Thompson	 (2008)	 dubbed	analytic	















approach	 relates	 to	 reasoning	with	and	 reasoning	without	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes	
(section	6).	 In	this	section,	I	also	compare	my	view	with	a	recent,	and	in	various	
respects	 similar,	 proposal	 by	Valaris	 (2018).	 Valaris	also	 argues	 that	 there	 is	an	
element	 in	 reasoning,	which	 he	calls	 deduction,	 that	 doesn’t	 involve	a	change	 in	









the	 relations	 between	 them.	 For	 instance,	 Broome	 (2013,	 221)	 writes	 that	
‘reasoning	is	a	process	whereby	some	of	your	attitudes	cause	you	to	acquire	a	new	
attitude.’	McHugh	and	Way	(2018,	167),	 too,	 state	 that	 in	 reasoning	 ‘[y]ou	bring	
some	existing	attitudes	to	mind,	saying	their	contents	to	yourself,	and	make	a	kind	
of	 transition	 to	 a	 further	 attitude	 which	 you	 thereby	 acquire.’	 And	 Boghossian	
(2014,	2)	writes	that	‘[b]y	“inference”	I	mean	the	sort	of	“reasoned	change	in	view”	
                                                        
3 Cf. Thompson (2008, 11); Hlobil & Nieswandt (2016, 182). See also, Boyle (2005); Ford (2015); Frey 
(2013); Vogler (2001). See also Valaris (2018) for a similar approach to reasoning. 
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4 “Inference” and “reasoning” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
5 If one would include these latter kinds of thinking about p in one’s category of mental attitude, then it 
would lead to an attitude view that might be true, but only trivially so: that reasoning involves thinking 
(whether we call it entertaining some proposition, supposing it, or just thinking) about the topic under 
consideration is so uncontroversial that it becomes an insubstantial claim and one not meriting much 
evaluation (cf. Valaris 2018). It might be worth noting that most attitude accounts start with a quite 
strong notion of attitude but sometimes stretch the notion of attitude when faced with 
counterexamples. This is a response that will play a role in the discussion of example (iv) in section 3. 
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Way),	 or	 ‘adding	 some	new	beliefs,	 or	 giving	 up	 some	old	 beliefs’	 (Boghossian).	
Moreover,	the	examples	(1)-(3)	also	indicate	that	the	change	in	attitudes	concerns	
the	conclusion,	for,	in	each	of	these	examples,	you	adopt	a	belief	in	the	conclusion.	
Hence,	 acquiring	 trivial	 beliefs	 such	 as	 the	 belief	 that	 you	 just	went	 through	 an	







between	 full	 belief	and	degrees	 of	 belief	 (credences).	 A	 change	 in	attitudes	may	
require	either	a	change	in	credences	(e.g.,	from	0.7	credence	to	0.9	credence)	or	a	
change	in	full	belief	(e.g.,	from	belief	to	disbelief	or	to	suspension	of	judgment).	The	
difference	 between	 the	 two	 is	 that	 only	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes	
consists	 in	 the	adoption,	 revision,	or	withdrawal	of	a	belief.	Given	 these	options,	
there	are	two	possible	ways	to	explicate	a	change	in	attitudes	in	the	attitude	view.	
	
The	 credence	 attitude	 view:	 Reasoning	 is	 (1)	 a	 mental	 process	

























belief	 in	 the	 conclusion	might	 involve	 a	 change	 in	 credence	 of	 belief,	 one	might	
suppose	that	it	brings	out	a	difference	between	the	credence	attitude	view	and	the	
full	 attitude	 view.	But,	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	 a	 counterexample	 to	 both	 accounts.	 The	 full	
attitude	 view	may	be	 held	 untenable	 for	 a	 very	 simple	 reason:	we	 often	 reason	
towards	a	conclusion	we	already	believe,	 for	 instance,	when	we	recognize	other	














	 However,	 a	 similar	 case	 against	 the	 credence	 attitude	 view	 is	 also	 easily	


































would	 be	 terribly	 implausible	 to	 call	 what	 [he]	 was	 up	 to	 anything	 other	 than	























left,	and	 that	 Jane	had	a	beer.	Then,	 there	would	be	none	 left.	Or	suppose	 that	 it	
rained	last	night	and	that	if	it	rained	last	night,	then	the	streets	would	be	wet.	Then	
the	 streets	 would	 be	wet.	 What	 should	 we	 say	 about	 these	 examples?	 Do	 they	
involve	a	change	in	attitudes?	This	is	a	difficult	issue	and	takes	some	time	to	spell	
out.	
Intuitively,	 hypothetical	 reasoning	 is	 precisely	 the	 kind	 of	 reasoning	 that	
brackets	 the	question	of	whether	one	believes	 the	premises	and	conclusion.	The	
expression	“for	the	sake	of	argument”	is	precisely	to	do	just	that:	to	bracket	one’s	
mental	attitudes	 to	 the	 topic	under	consideration,	 i.e.,	one’s	 commitments	 to	 the	
truth	or	falsity	of	the	propositions	involved	in	the	inference.	This	implies	that	one’s	














                                                        
6 Note that Valaris is here explaining his notion of deduction, which he distinguishes from reasoning. I 
will come back to the notions that Valaris uses (or, as he is careful to note, stipulates) and the 
distinctions he makes in section 6. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 93
REASONING	 81	










lines	 of	 response	 that	 McHugh	 and	 Way	 (2018)	 propose.	 They	 side	 here	 with	
Harman	(1986),	who	distinguishes	between	the	category	of	argument	(or	logic)	and	
the	 category	 of	 reasoning	 as	 a	 psychological	 process.	 The	 problem	 with	 this	
response	is,	in	my	view,	that	it	begs	the	question.	First,	this	response	assumes	that	
reasoning	is	a	mental	process	and	thereby	adopts	the	distinction	between	reasoning	















hypothetical	 reasoning	 doesn’t	 involve	 any	 mental	 attitudes	 that	 purport	
commitments	 to	 the	actual	world	being	a	certain	way	(let’s	 call	 them	categorical	
attitudes),	but	it	might	still	involve	attitudes	that	purport	commitments	to	possible	
worlds	(let’s	call	them	hypothetical	attitudes).	Accordingly,	the	change	in	attitudes	
in	 hypothetical	 reasoning	 concerns	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 belief	 in	 a	 conditional	
                                                        
7 See Knorpp (1997, 82-8) for further exposition of Harman’s argument and for critical analysis of 
Harman’s argument that logic isn’t relevant to belief-revision. 
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conclusion.8	Let’s	try	to	make	more	precise	what	this	entails	by	looking	at	example	
















Still,	 I	 don’t	 see	 why	 we	 should	 accept	 that	 hypothetical	 reasoning	 necessarily	
involves	adopting	a	belief	in	a	conditional	conclusion.	First	of	all,	examples	(i)-(iii)	
also	 count	 against	 this	 view	 of	 hypothetical	 reasoning.	 Sustaining	 belief	 in	 a	
conditional	 conclusion,	 reasoning	without	 coming	 to	 a	 conclusion,	 and	 failing	 to	
adopt	 a	 belief	 in	 a	 conditional	 conclusion	 are	 counterexamples	 to	 the	 idea	 that	
hypothetical	 reasoning	 necessarily	 involves	 a	 change	 in	 attitude	 regarding	 a	









                                                        
8 Cf. Broome 2013; McHugh and Way 2018. 
9 One might think that the logical identity between categorical and hypothetical reasoning is reason to 
include mental attitudes in one’s account of reasoning. That is the only way in which they can be 
distinguished. However, that including mental attitudes is the only way to distinguish between the two 
doesn’t imply that understanding the attitudes involved provides us with an understanding of the 
nature of reasoning. Nor with an understanding of why both cases are an instance of this same 
phenomenon, namely reasoning. 
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(vi)	The	last	example,	which	I	call	interpersonal	reasoning,	is	an	instance	of	(iv)	and	






2:]	 “If	you	 live	in	a	democracy,	you	should	 take	responsibility.”	And	












Suppose	 person	 B	 knows	 that	 there	 are	 multiple	 exceptions	 to	 the	 conditional	
statement.	 For	 instance,	 children	 who	 live	 in	 a	 democracy	 shouldn’t	 take	
responsibility,	 they	 should	 be	 taken	 care	 of.	 Hence,	 the	 conditional	 is	 false	 and	
person	 B	 knows	 that	 it	 is	 false.	 Still,	 the	 reasoning	 is	 comprehensible	 to	 her.	
Intuitively,	she	can	still	draw	the	conclusion	that	she	should	take	responsibility.	And	
she	 can	 do	 this	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 disbelieves	 the	 conditional	 statement	
postulated	by	person	A.10		
Hence,	again	we	have	an	example	of	a	piece	of	reasoning	without	a	change	in	




views,	 because	 they	 are	 examples	 of	 reasoning	without	 change	 in	 (credence	 of)	
belief.	Only	example	(iv),	hypothetical	reasoning,	isn’t	a	clear-cut	counterexample	
to	 both	 attitude	 views.	 What	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 in	 hypothetical	 reasoning	 one’s	
                                                        
10 What’s more, it seems she can also draw the conclusion while at the same time disbelieving it. But 
again, her belief or disbelief in the conclusion isn’t something that follows from going through the 
inference. 
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conclusion.	This	alternative	view	seems	 to	be	 reflected	in	Anscombe’s	 statement	
that	“inference	is	something	separable	from	the	attitude	of	the	one	who	is	making	
it”	 (1989,	 397).	 And,	 relatedly,	 in	 Wright’s	 claim	 that	 we	 should	 “distinguish	




	 Importantly,	denying	 that	 reasoning	always	 involves	a	 change	 in	attitudes	
leaves	much	common	ground	in	different	views	of	reasoning	unaltered.	Proponents	
and	adversaries	of	the	attitude	view	consider	reasoning	as	something	we	do;	as	a	













neither	 is	 it	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 of	 reasoning.	 This	 is,	 in	 and	 of	 itself,	
unproblematic.	 However,	 in	 trying	 to	 formulate	 additional	 conditions,	 attitude	
views	run	into	problems	of	circularity	and	regress.	In	this	section,	I	will	illustrate	
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central	 to	 the	 argument	 developed	 in	 this	 paper,	 but	 they	 help	 motivating	 and	
situating	the	account	that	I	will	propose	in	the	next	section.	
	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 merely	 having	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes	 isn’t	 sufficient	 for	
reasoning.	For	instance,	if	one	forgets	that	there	is	a	new	mayor	in	one’s	hometown,	
one’s	attitudes	are	changed,	but	one	didn’t	reason.	This	means	that	an	account	of	
reasoning	 that	 starts	 from	the	 idea	 that	 reasoning	involves	a	 change	 in	attitudes	
needs	to	formulate	additional	conditions	that	a	change	in	attitudes	must	satisfy	for	













the	 right	 (non-wayward)	 and	 thus	 rationalizing	 kind.	 Boghossian’s	 Taking	
Condition	seeks	to	secure	this	by	introducing	another	mental	item,	i.e.,	“the	taking”,	
on	top	of	the	thinker’s	attitudes	regarding	the	premises	and	conclusion.	Given	that	
such	 a	 “taking”	 is	 an	additional	 item,	 the	 question	 arises	which	 role	 this	 item	 is	
supposed	to	play	in	reasoning.	In	trying	to	account	for	the	role	of	the	taking,	one	
inadvertently	 seems	 to	 run	 into	regress	problems.	First,	 the	 role	of	 taking	in	 the	
inference	shouldn’t	be	 that	of	an	additional	premise,	as	 is	 familiar	from	Carroll’s	
argument	 (1895).	 Moreover,	 its	 role	 shouldn’t	 be	 merely	 causal,	 but	 it	 should	
rationalize	 the	 inference.	 However,	 if	 it	 is	 to	 rationalize	 the	 inference,	 it	 seems	
unavoidable	that	the	content	of	the	taking	should	be	related,	by	the	thinker	herself,	
to	the	content	of	the	inference,	and	as	of	yet	there	appears	to	be	no	way	to	relate	the	
                                                        
11 Cf. Boghossian 2014; Broome 2013, 2014; Hlobil 2014; McHugh & Way 2016, 2018; Valaris 2016, 
2017; Wright 2014; among others. The debate focusses predominantly on the impossibility of giving a 
non-circular account of rule-following, of the causal relation involved in reasoning (and how it is of the 
right non-wayward kind), and of the taking condition. Space forbids me to go into the circularity and 
regress problems in detail, but they are well-documented in the aforementioned literature. 
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reevaluation	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 reasoning	 should	 be	 characterized	 as	 involving	 a	
change	 in	 attitudes.	 One	 motivation	 for	 this	 steadfastness	 might	 be	 that	 this	
approach	 fits	 in	 the	 currently	 dominant	 scientific	 view	 of	 the	 mind.	 This	 may	









such,	 self-knowledge	 becomes	 a	 matter	 of	 designing	 the	 right	 relation	 between	
second-order	 belief	 and	 first-order	 attitude.	 Similarly,	 it	 is	 often	 assumed	 that	
understanding	intentional	action	means	understanding	the	right	relation	between	
an	 intention	 and	 behavior.	 And	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 paper,	 on	 the	 leading	
philosophical	 view	of	 reasoning,	 reasoning	 is	 analyzed	 in	 terms	 of	moving	 from	
premise-beliefs	 to	 a	 conclusion-belief.	 The	 result	 might	 be	 called	 a	 reductionist	
approach,	not	because	 the	mental	phenomena	are	 reduced	 to	one	component	or	
feature	 entailed	 in	 the	 phenomenon	 or	 to	 a	 different	 explanatory	 level	 (e.g.,	
psychological,	 neurological),	 but	 because	 the	 approach	 assumes	 that	 a	 correct	







and	regress.	Should	we	accept	 these	problems?	Not	 if	 there	 is	another	approach	
                                                        
12 This is an extremely short review of the route from the Taking Condition to regress. For more in 
depth analysis, see, for instance, Boghossian (2014); Broome (2013, Ch. 12); McHugh & Way (2016); 
Valaris (2014).  
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this	 section	 aren’t	 yet	 full-fledged,	 but	 I	 hope	 to	 convince	 the	 reader	 that	 the	
approach	itself	looks	promising.		



















	 Anscombe	 clarifies	 her	 argument	with	 the	 following	 example	 about	 plant	
growth	(1989,	394):	
                                                        
13 What it is to put X to a particular service requires more detailed analysis and might require a 
different analysis in the case of theoretical and practical reasoning. However, this doesn’t impinge the 
general point about reasoning. Cf. Müller (1979). 
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Theoretical	reasoning	 	 Investigation	 	 Practical	reasoning	
r	 	 	 	 	 Given:	p	 	 	 Wanted:	that	p	
if	r	then	q	 	 	 	 if	q	then	p	 	 	 if	q	then	p	
if	q	then	p	 	 	 	 if	r	then	q	 	 	 if	r	then	q	
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Boghossian	 interprets	 this	 as	 saying	 that	 ‘[a]	 transition	 from	 some	 beliefs	 to	 a	
conclusion	 counts	 as	 inference	 only	 if	 the	 thinker	 takes	 his	 conclusion	 to	 be	
supported	 by	 the	 presumed	 truth	 of	 those	 other	 beliefs’	 (2014,	 4).	 This	
interpretation	 leads	 him	 to	 his	 formulation	 of	 the	 Taking	 Condition,	 which	
postulates	 “the	 taking”	as	 an	additional	mental	 item	 involved	 in	 reasoning,	with	
regress	problems	as	a	result.	 	
	 Boghossian’s	 interpretation	 of	 Frege’s	 statement,	 however,	 isn’t	
uncontentious.	 Frege	 doesn’t	 mention	 any	 “taking”	 nor	 moving	 from	 premise-
beliefs	to	a	conclusion-belief.	What	Frege	does	mention	is	what	must	be	true	of	a	







then	 one	 judges	 that	p	as	 following	 from	q.	 On	 this	 interpretation,	Frege	 doesn’t	
describe	a	 process	 or	 an	 additional	mental	 state.	 Rather,	 he	 states	what	 kind	 of	
judgment	is	involved	in	reasoning.	










the	 person	 is	 reasoning	 and	 not	 memorizing	 a	 temporal	 sequence.	 In	 short,	 to	
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claim	 in	 this	 book	 is	 that	 ‘the	 term	 “intentional”	 has	 reference	 to	 a	 form	 of	
description	of	events’	(1957,	§47).	Importantly,	the	reference	to	form	is	not	meant	
to	depict	an	essential	feature	or	property	of	intentional	actions.	Anscombe	explicitly	
denies	 that	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 intentional	 action	 can	 be	 a	 matter	 of	
analyzing	it	in	terms	of	a	specific	feature	or	property,	or	by	stating	necessary	and	
sufficient	conditions.14	She	denies	this	because	she	thinks	that	any	such	analysis	will	
run	 into	circularity	problems:	 it	will	need	 to	presuppose	some	understanding	of	








reason,	 then	we	 need	 to	 presuppose	 the	 same	 distinction	 that	we	 are	 trying	 to	
understand.	‘[W]e	should	be	going	round	in	circles,’	as	Anscombe	(1957,	§5)	writes.	













                                                        
14 For recent illuminating papers on Anscombe’s method, see Ford (2015); Frey (2013); Hlobil & 
Nieswandt (2016); Vogler (2001). 
15 This is also the most central problem faced by attitude views of reasoning, as, for instance, 
Boghossian (2014) himself also points out. 
16 As an illustration, consider self-knowledge of my intention. Suppose I know that I intend to go to the 
movie’s tonight. Moreover, you know this too. Hence, we know the same fact about me, namely that I 
have this intention. Still, this same fact plays a completely different role for us, not least because it 
makes no difference to how you continue with your day, whereas for me it does: I have to actually 
make it happen that I go to the movies tonight. Your knowledge and my self-knowledge aren’t 
distinctive because it involves different information, but it is different because the information plays a 
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question,’	 as	 Thompson	 (ibid.)	 writes,	 ‘will	 come	 from	 grasping	 the	 specific	
character	of	 this	 form	of	unity	 in	each	case.’	This	means	 that	 such	philosophical	




is	 not	 the	 only	 mode	 of	 explanation	 (cf.	 Hlobil	 &	 Nieswandt	 2016,	 182).	 This	
approach	 thus	 holds	 that	 explaining	what	 something	 is,	 is	 not	 the	 only	 route	 to	





tradition	 doesn’t	 refer	 to	 logical	 principles	 or	 to	 answering	 to	 such	 principles.	
Rather,	it	means	that	we	are	not	after	any	kind	of	form,	but	a	form	of	judgment	or	a	
form	of	thought.	Analyzing	the	form	of	the	unity	depicted	by	the	concept	is	to	 lay	
bare	its	 logical	 structure	or	 its	 structure	 in	 thought.	Most	of	 the	 time,	 the	 logical	
structure	 of	 thoughts	 or	 concepts	 refers	 to	 their	 formal	 character,	 not	 to	 their	
content.	However,	the	focus	here	is	the	other	way	around,	namely	on	content	and	














sufficient	 conditions	 but	 as	 a	 “contentful	 form	 concept.”	 As	 such,	 the	 concept	
                                                        
different role. My tentative suggestion is that we should also understand this as a distinct logical form 
of knowledge. (cf. Wittgenstein 2009 [1953]; Moran 2001; Boyle 2019). See also the Concluding 
Reflections.  
17 cf. Boyle (2005, 2009a); Ford (2015); Hlobil & Nieswandt (2016). 
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I	 hope	 this	 exposition	 of	 the	 approach	 and	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 logical	 form	
suffices	to	show	that	Frege’s	form	of	judgment	need	not	be	understood	as	a	specific	
feature	or	necessary	condition	of	 reasoning.	Such	understanding,	after	all,	would	
just	make	us	 “going	 round	 in	 circles”:	 judging	 that	p	 as	 following	 from	q	 doesn’t	
provide	us	with	an	analysis	of	reasoning	in	terms	of	something	else,	but	explicates	
the	form	that	reasoning	has.	Frege’s	form	of	judgment	reveals	a	structure	inherent	
in	all	 the	 things	 that	 seem	to	be	united	under	 the	concept	 reasoning.	Whether	a	
person	is	drawing	up	an	argument,	solving	a	puzzle,	trying	to	follow	someone	else’s	
line	 of	 reasoning,	 deliberating	 about	what	 to	 believe,	 she	 judges	 that	 something	
follows	 from	 something	 else.	 And	 whether	 a	 person	 sees	 a	 truth-connection	
immediately	 or	 needs	 some	 time	 to	 imagine	 all	 the	 different	 possibilities	 before	











taking)	 that	 is	 involved	 in	 reasoning	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 premise-beliefs	 and	
conclusion-beliefs.	 The	 resulting	 view	 is	 explicitly	 non-reductionist	 because	 it	
















mental	 attitudes	 (categorical	 or	 hypothetical)	 are	 involved.	What	matters	 is	 not	

















	 As	 a	 consequence,	 we	 should	 distinguish	 between	 the	 logical	 and	
psychological	aspects	of	reasoning,	but	in	a	different	way	than	on	the	attitude	view,	
where	 the	 distinction	 is	 drawn	 from	Harman	 (1986).	He	makes	 a	 distinction,	as	
already	 mentioned	 in	 example	 (iv),	 between	 the	 category	 of	 argument	 and	 the	










                                                        
18 For instance, if one learns of something hurtful or of something contrary to many things one 
believes, it may take time for the belief to “sink in.” cf. Valaris (2018) 
19 Is this to say that the logical and (causal) psychological aspects of reasoning relate to each other as 
different explanatory levels? I don’t think so. The way I see it is that we are in the business of drawing 
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	 Similarly,	 there	 aren’t	 mental	 processes	 that	 are	 necessarily	 involved	 in	
reasoning.	Whether	mental	processes	are	involved,	and	which	mental	processes	are	
involved,	doesn’t	determine	whether	a	particular	thought	or	episode	of	thought	is	
an	 instance	 of	 reasoning.	 A	 person	 can	 judge	 that	 p	 as	 following	 from	 q	
instantaneously,	as	if	she	is	“just	seeing”	the	connection.	Or	she	can	first	 imagine	
that	q	is	true	but	p	isn’t;	she	might	need	to	do	some	calculations;	remember	certain	
situations	 or	 conditionals;	 she	 might	 even	 need	 to	 write	 down	 the	 different	




	 One	 might	 wonder	 whether	 reasoning	 doesn’t	 require,	 perhaps	 not	 one	
particular	mental	process,	but	some	mental	process	to	be	at	work.	Doesn’t	making	a	
judgment	depend	on	the	functioning	of	psychological	and	neurological	processes?	





in	 the	mental	 realm	 that	we,	 on	 a	mental,	 folk	 psychological	 level,	 call	 states	 or	






in	 this	 paper.	 For	 now,	 let	me	 just	mention	 that	process	 is	 not	 the	 only	 form	of	
activity	in	the	mental	realm.	Judgment,	for	instance,	is	often	categorized	as	a	mental	






                                                        
different kind of connections (i.e., logical versus causal) in the world. But given that we ourselves have 
the capacity to draw the logical connections, these logical connections can (and should) inform the 
mental attitudes that we have. Thanks to Katrien Schaubroeck for pressing me on this point. 
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recognize	 the	 importance	of	 conditionals.	Where	 the	form	view	uses	 the	form	of	





both	 mental	 process	 and	 change	 in	 view	 in	 his	 account	 of	 reasoning	 (my	
terminology)	but	thinks	that	they	belong	to	different	aspects	of	reasoning:	namely	
to	deduction*	and	reasoning*.	As	has	been	explicated,	on	 the	 form	view,	neither	
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reasoning.	They	are	instances	of	reasoning	because	they	both	involve	the	form	of	





rather	 than	 explains	 it.	 ‘Deduction,’	 as	 Valaris	 (2018,	 8)	 writes,	 ‘involves	 using	
information	 contained	 in	 your	 premises	 to	 eliminate	 or	 exclude	 possibilities…	
[W]hat	I	have	in	mind	is	simply	recognizing	that	certain	possibilities	are	inconsistent	
with	your	premises.’	Now,	my	question	is	whether	we	can	use	information	contained	
















I	 hope	 to	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 attitude	 view	 of	 reasoning,	 which	 states	 that	
reasoning	 is	 (1)	 a	 mental	 process	 that	 involves	 (2)	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes,	 faces	
numerous	 difficulties.	 Attitude	 views	 face	 the	 problem	 that	 there	 are	 many	
instances	 of	 reasoning	without	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes,	 and	 they	 face	 problems	 in	
trying	 to	 formulate	 sufficiency	 conditions.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 have	 focused	 on	 the	
                                                        
20 Valaris’ notion of reasoning* is defined as the adoption of a belief based on reasoning (my 
terminology). I doubt whether beliefs adopted on the basis of reasoning always have the form p, given 
q. Suppose a person already believes that q, and believes that if q then p, but only just now these 
beliefs become relevant. By reasoning, she now also adopts the belief that p. Surely, her realization of 
her belief that if q then p is manifested in a judgment that p as following from q, which is the basis for 
the adoption of the belief that p. But there is no need for her to adopt the belief that if q then p. She 
already believed that. Hence, I don’t see that reasoning* necessarily involves the adoption of a 
conditional belief. You have to put a belief in a conditional to use. 
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of	 hypothetical	 reasoning	 has	made	 clear,	 advocates	 of	 the	 view	 that	 reasoning	
involves	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes,	 have	 to	 make	 clear	 whether	 their	 view	 includes	
categorical	attitudes	or	hypothetical	attitudes	as	well.	










solving	 a	 puzzle,	 trying	 to	 follow	 someone	 else’s	 line	 of	 reasoning,	 deliberating	
about	what	to	believe,	she	judges	that	something	follows	from	something	else.	And	
whether	 a	 person	 sees	 a	 truth-connection	 immediately	 or	 needs	 some	 time	 to	







































                                                        
1 This chapter has been published as: Kloosterboer, Naomi. 2015. “Transparent Emotions? A critical 
analysis of Moran’s Transparency Claim.” Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 246-258. Special issue “Self-
knowledge in perspective,” guest edited by Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos. 
2 Bear in mind that philosophical discussions of self-knowledge are mainly about first-person awareness 
of one’s mental attitudes (see Moran 2001, 31-32) and not about self-knowledge as we are familiar 
with in everyday usage: self-knowledge as knowing who we are, what is important to oneself, one’s 
character traits or one’s deeper concerns. However, this latter form of self-knowledge will play a role in 
the argument later.  
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discuss	 TC	 and	 address	 some	 of	 its	 problems.	 Especially,	 I	 will	 take	 issue	with	
Moran’s	 claim	 that	 TC	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 all	 mental	 attitudes,	 including	 one’s	
emotions	 (Moran	 2001,	 64-5;	 2012,	 214;	 2004a,	 471).	 Since	 Moran	 does	 not	
explicate	 this	 claim,	 I	 will	 investigate	 whether	 and	 how	 TC	 can	 be	 applied	 to	
emotions.		
Crucial	to	Moran’s	account	of	self-knowledge	is	his	distinction	between	two	
different	 stances	 we	 can	 take	 toward	 our	 mental	 lives:	 a	 theoretical	 and	 a	
deliberative	 stance.	 Put	 concisely,	 from	 a	 theoretical	 perspective,	 I	 answer	 a	
question	about	whether	I	have	a	particular	mental	attitude	by	looking	for	evidence	
for	my	having	the	attitude.	From	a	deliberative	perspective,	by	contrast,	I	answer	
such	 a	 question	 in	 the	way	 described	 by	 TC,	 namely	 by	 deliberating	 about	 the	
reasons	in	favor	of	or	against	the	content	of	the	attitude.	Moran’s	account	makes	





“p	 but	 I	 don’t	 believe	 p”.	 This	 exhibits	 a	 paradox	 or	 even	 irrationality,	 because	
believing	p	 implies	believing	 it	 to	be	 true	 (see	Moore	1993;	and	 for	 the	claim	of	
irrationality,	see	Shah	and	Velleman	2005).	Believing	p	and	taking	p	to	be	true	are	
conceptually	 connected.	 In	 general,	 from	 a	 first-person	 perspective,	 there	 is	 a	
conceptual	relation	between	having	an	attitude	with	content	C	and	endorsing	C	(or	
other	 forms	of	approval/disapproval,	e.g.	 in	 the	case	of	disbelief,	 rejecting	C).	As	
soon	as	one	neglects	the	reasons	one	has	pertaining	to	the	content	of	the	attitude,	
one	 distances	 oneself	 from	 one’s	 relation	 to	 the	world	 as	 a	 rational	 agent.	 This	
manifests	an	alienation	of	one’s	first-personal	agential	perspective	and	a	failure	of	
taking	responsibility	for	being	a	rational	agent.	For	this	reason,	Moran	claims	that	
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(see	Shoemaker	2003;	McGeer	2007).	Nor	will	I	address	the	question	whether	TC	
can	 be	 applied	 to	 all	 instances	 of	 belief,	 for	 example,	 biased	 belief,	 dispositional	
beliefs,	 so-called	 hinge	 beliefs,	 and	 more	 (see	 Heal	 2004;	 Cassam	 2011).	
Furthermore,	I	will	not	criticize	Moran’s	account	on	empirical	grounds.	That	is,	I	will	
not	examine	whether	we	in	fact	acquire	self-knowledge	of	our	mental	attitudes	in	







TC	 to	 emotions	 in	 the	 first	 place	 (section	 3),	 I	will	 subsequently	 argue	 that	 it	 is	









When	 someone	 asks	 me	 whether	 I	 currently	 believe	 something	 –	 for	 instance,	























uses	 them	 interchangeably	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Moran	 2001,	 60;	 2012,	 212).	












herself	 to	 the	corresponding	question	about	 the	 topic	of	 that	very	belief’	 (Moran	
2012,	212,	my	italics).	This	seems	to	be	in	line	with	Moran’s	overall	account.	Also,	it	
seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	 plausible	 interpretation,	 given	 that	 the	 empirical	













                                                        
3 See also Chapter 1. 
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mind	 (e.g.,	my	belief	about	 the	weather)	by	 attending	 to	 a	 logically	
independent	matter	(the	weather	itself)	unless	it	were	legitimate	for	
me	 to	 see	 myself	 as	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 what	 I	












my	 own	 conclusion	 by	 my	 deliberation	 on	 the	 matter.	 And	 as	 a	 consequence,	
avowing	the	belief	that	p	expresses	my	endorsement	of	p.	Moreover,	it	involves	a	
commitment	to	the	truth	of	p.	As	soon	as	I	start	doubting	p’s	truth	or	as	soon	as	I	
reconsider	 the	 issue,	 the	 avowal	 ceases	 to	 exist	 (Moran	 2001,	 74-7,	 80-2).	 Put	
                                                        
4 In Chapter 1, Qa and Qc are characterized for belief as QB (question about the belief) and QP 
(question about the proposition), respectively. 
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is	 reason-responsive.	 The	 idea	 that	 a	 deliberative	 conclusion	 (or	 resolution	 as	
Moran	calls	it)	constitutes	my	belief	that	p	can	only	be	true	if	we	assume	that	‘my	
belief	about...[p]	is	determined	by	my	sense	of	the	reasons	in	favor	of	[p],	and	not	by	









reasons	 for	 the	attitudes	 one	 holds	 is	 not	a	 necessary	 requirement.	 The	 point	 is	
rather	that	one	should	not	be	aware	of	a	defeater	for	one’s	attitude.6	In	this	way,	













be	 true	 insofar	 as	 my	 mental	 attitude	 is	 reason-sensitive,	 that	 is,	 is	 actually	
                                                        
5 For a helpful elucidation of what kind of agency is involved, see Boyle (2011) and Hieronymi (2009). 
Hieronymi dubs the agency exercised in being reason-responsive “evaluative control”.  
6 This is also Shoemaker’s interpretation (2003, 396).  
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Although	Moran	 explicates	 his	 account	 only	 for	 belief,	he	 asserts	 that	 TC	 is	also	






when	 we	 do	 not	 know	 what	 we	 feel	 or	 what	 we	 should	 feel.	 And	 maybe	 such	
situations	 are	 not	 that	 uncommon:	 if	 we	 consider	music,	 literature	 and	 art,	 the	
ambiguity	 and	 uncertainty	 of	 our	 emotional	 lives	 stand	 out.	 Not	 to	 mention	













                                                        
7 For the stronger claim that for an attitude to be an emotion, it must be intentional, see (Moran 2001, 
54; De Sousa 2007; Teroni 2007; Döring 2007). For the claim that even feelings are intentional, see, for 
example, Goldie (2002).  
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Second,	emotions	put	these	circumstances	in	a	certain	light:	your	anger	says	




















Even	 if	 Moran	 has	 not	 spelled	 out	 TC	 for	 emotions,	 his	 work	 suggests	 a	




                                                        
8 This is not to say that emotions are as reason-responsive as our beliefs. Emotions are known for their 
impenetrability (see Döring 2007). But we still criticize them if they diverge with one’s evaluative 
perspective (see Smith 2005).  
9 An interpretation of TC that can be applied to all mental attitudes is proposed by Finkelstein (2012, 
103), and endorsed by Cassam (2014, 4): ‘The question of whether I believe that P is, for me, 
transparent to the question of what I ought rationally to believe – i.e. to the question of whether the 
reasons require me to believe that P. I can answer the former question by answering the latter.’ 
Finkelstein’s formulation of Qc is “Ought I rationally believe that P?” in which, so the thought goes, 
believe can be substituted by desire, feel, intend and so on. Although it seems to be a very elegant 
solution to the problem of applying TC to other attitudes than belief, I think it is incorrect. The main 
reason why it does not seem right to me is that it is not a question about the content of the mental 
attitude, but another inward-directed or self-related question, namely about what kind of believing it 
is, that is, whether it is rational. Clearly, more needs to be said about this, but that will have to wait for 
another time.  
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In	various	familiar	therapeutic	contexts,	 for	 instance,	the	manner	in	

































                                                        
10 Shoemaker has criticized this last sentence (2003, 397), and Moran has corrected it (2003, 410). It 
should actually say: she will avow the psychological judgment “I believe that p” but will not affirm the 
embedded proposition of p itself.  
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believe	something	comes	down	 to	determining	whether	 the	belief	 is	 true	or	not,	
because	beliefs	aim	at	truth	(Moran	2001,	52,	69-77;	Shah	and	Velleman	2005,	498).	
Only	 those	 considerations	 that	 are	 about	 the	 content	 of	 the	 belief	 play	 a	 role	 in	





































justified,	and	not	merely	whether	 the	 evaluation	 inherent	 in	 the	 emotion	 is	 apt.	
Otherwise,	there	would	be	no	difference	between	a	mere	evaluation	and	an	emotion.	
And	there	is	at	 least	this	minimal	yet	very	important	difference,	namely,	that	we	
make	value	 judgments	about	anything,	but	we	only	 feel	an	emotion	 if	 something	
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If	 one	 does	 not	 respond	 emotionally	 when	 something	 that	 one	 cares	 about	 is	













is	 important	 to	 one:	 the	 justification	 of	 emotions	 depends	 on	 the	 question	why	
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Telling	whether	 something	 is	 hurtful,	 offensive,	 or	 joyful	 for	 a	 specific	 person	 is	
grounded	 in	 considerations	 that	 depend	 upon	 who	 that	 person	 is,	 with	 certain	
character	traits,	concerns,	plans,	ambitions,	fears,	vulnerabilities,	relations	to	other	
persons	and	so	on.		







appropriate	 object	 of	 concern	 is	 very	 important	 in	 determining	whether	 to	 care	





of	 emotions,	 desires,	 judgments,	 intentions	 and	 actions	 (2010,	 311-5).	 Similarly,	




concern,	and	 the	more	attuned	you	are	 to	notice	circumstances	of	and	about	 the	
object	of	your	concern,	the	stronger	your	concern	is	(see	also	Smith	2005).	Now,	for	
a	concern	being	constituted	by	these	other	attitudes	and	actions	means	that	one	can	
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betrayed.	 The	 rationality	 of	 her	 response	 requires	 that	 she	 be	 in	 a	
position	 to	 avow	her	attitude	 toward	him,	 and	not	 just	 describe	 or	
report	 on	 it,	 however	 accurately,	 for	 it	 is	 only	 from	 the	 position	 of	
avowal	 that	 she	 is	 necessarily	 acknowledging	 facts	 about	 him	 as	
internally	relevant	to	that	attitude	(say,	as	justifying	or	undermining	
it),	 and	 thereby	 (also)	as	 relevant	 to	 the	 fully	empirical	question	of	
whether	 it	 remains	 true	 that	 she	 indeed	 has	 this	 sense	 of	 being	











only	 the	patient’s	 “sense	of	 the	 truth”	about	 that	person	 is	 relevant,	but	also	her	
sense	of	the	truth	about	herself.	The	difference	between	being	able	to	attribute	the	
feeling	of	betrayal	and	to	avow	the	feeling	of	betrayal	lies	as	much	in	the	acceptance	
of	what	 that	other	person	has	done	as	in	 the	acceptance	of	what	 is	 important	 to	
oneself	and	what	kind	of	person	one	is.		
To	conclude,	Moran’s	claim	that	TC	can	also	be	applied	to	emotions	does	not	
hold.	 As	we	have	 seen,	 reasons	 for	 having	 an	emotion	 include	 not	 only	 content-
related	considerations	but	also	considerations	about	other	attitudes,	for	example,	
about	what	is	important	to	one.	This	means	that	the	reasons	I	have	to	answer	the	






is	 no	 deliberative	 question	with	which	 I	 can	 determine	whether	 the	 emotion	 is	










concerns	 for	 Moran’s	 account	 of	 commitment	 and	 agency.	 Moran’s	 deliberative	
account	 of	 agency	 and	 commitment	 has	 already	 been	 criticized	 for	 being	 too	
rationalistic	or	idealized	(see	McGeer	2007;	Cassam	2014).	My	criticism,	however,	
does	not	issue	from	the	fact	that	his	account	is	deliberative,	but	from	the	fact	that	
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Two	 people	 can	 reflectively	 endorse	 identical	 things	 but	 be	 very	












time,	 I	also	have	 to	worry	about	being	on	 time,	 feel	ashamed	 if	 I	am	not,	excuse	
myself	for	not	being	on	time,	and	take	precautions	to	be	on	time.	If	I	were	a	person	
for	whom	none	of	these	things	matter,	the	fact	that	in	deliberating	I	decide	to	be	a	

















who	 I	am	or	who	 I	 can	become	can	be	seen	as	a	genuine	commitment.	And	 this	
assumes	that	I	have	the	capacity	to	relate	my	current	attitudes	to	what	is	important	
to	myself.	For	I	cannot	know	what	is	important	to	me	by	means	of	deliberating	about	
content-related	 considerations	 of	 a	 specific	 attitude	 alone	 precisely	 because	
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critique	 of	 Moran’s	 view.	 All	 attitudes	 that	 are	 related	 to	 one’s	 evaluative	
perspective	 exhibit	 a	 conceptual	 relation	 to	 concerns.	 Belief	 and	 other	 mental	
attitudes	 that	 aim	 at	 truth	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 exception	 rather	 than	 the	 rule.	 So,	
analogous	to	the	case	of	emotions,	having	a	desire	does	not	make	sense	without	the	
thing	desired	being	related	to	something	that	is	important	to	you,	and	intending	to	




the	 picture	 of	 self-knowledge.	 But	 it	 seems	 that	 Moran’s	 conception	 of	 agency	
remains	focused	on	epistemic	agency,	because	Moran’s	agent	only	deliberates	about	
the	 question	 whether	 her	 attitudes	 are	 true.	 He	 thereby	 neglects	 other	
considerations	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 practical	 rationality	 of	 the	 agent.	 To	 get	
epistemic	and	practical	agency	into	view,	making	up	our	mind	includes	taking	into	





our	 mental	 attitudes	 neglects	 important	 aspects	 of	 our	 practical	 agency,	 in	








provide	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 relevant	Qc	 –	whether	 the	 attitude	 is	 justified.	 In	 this	
process	of	deliberation,	the	considerations	taken	into	account	are	limited	to	those	
related	to	the	truth-value	of	the	content	of	the	attitude	and	hence	to	the	justification	
of	 the	 attitude.	 The	 justification	 of	 emotions,	 however,	depends	 not	 only	 on	 the	
question	whether	the	content	of	the	emotion	is	true	or	apt,	but	also	on	the	question	
whether	 the	 emotion	 is	 a	 response	 to	 something	 that	 is	 of	 one’s	 concern.	 Our	
emotions	only	make	sense	if	they	are	responses	to	things	that	are	important	to	us.	
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is	 claimed	 that	whereas	 perhaps	 trivial	 self-knowledge	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 special	
                                                        
1 Although “trivial” and “substantial” might not be the best terms to depict these different kinds of self-
knowledge – after all, what is coined “trivial” in this distinction is also crucial in our lives – I stick to the 
terminology for simplicity’s sake.  
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer





















be	 addressed	 is	 whether	 a	 person	 can	 know	 her	 substantial	 mental	 attitudes	
without	avowal	(section	3).	I	will	argue	that	mental	attitudes	cannot	be	“revealed”	
in	 patterns	 of	 action	 and	 reaction.	 The	 basic	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 significance	 of	
patterns	 of	action	 and	 reaction,	 and	what	 such	 patterns	 tell	 about	 our	attitudes,	
ultimately	depends	on	avowal.	This	also	means	 that	 current	popular	accounts	of	
self-knowledge	 that	 seek	 to	 relativize	 or	 even	 undermine	 the	 special	 relation	 a	





implies.	 It	 is	 often	 assumed	 that	 such	 a	 gap	 implies	 ignorance,	 or	 that	 making	




                                                        
2 For such accounts, cf. Cassam (2014); Lawlor (2009); Schwitzgebel (2012); Wilson (2002).  
3 Cf. Carruthers (2011); Cassam (2014); Doris (2015); Schwitzgebel (2010), among others.  
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self-knowledge	of	 substantial	mental	attitudes	 is	a	 struggle,	namely,	 to	 fulfill	 the	





























                                                        
4 Moran’s view of avowal is often portrayed in a way that it necessarily involves considering reasons and 
determining whether it would be rational to have the attitude (cf. Cassam 2014; Finkelstein 2012). At 
some points, Moran seems to be committed to such a demanding picture of avowal, though another 
interpretation of Moran’s view is also possible (see also Boyle 2015). In this paper, I will leave this issue 
aside and go with a less demanding notion of avowal. This notion captures, not the rational status of a 
person’s attitudes, but her stance towards them, i.e., a stance that manifests the relation between a 
person’s self-attribution and her view of the world at large (hence, of not being alienated from one’s 
mental attitude, as Moran would say). 
5 Importantly, this claim holds for self-knowledge of intentional mental attitudes. These attitudes, such 
as beliefs, emotions, desires and intentions, are fundamentally different from sensations, headaches and 
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I	 feel	 for	 someone,	 not	 because	 I	 could	 reason	 in	whatever	way	 I	 wish	 or	 love	
whomever	I	favor,	but	precisely	because	the	reasoning	and	love	are	expressive	of	
my	 own	 stance	 (cf.	 Moran	 2008).	 It	 is	 often	 presumed	 that	 one	 exercises	 one’s	
agential	capacities	only	in	forming	or	changing	one’s	mental	attitudes,	but	I	take	it	
that	the	agency	involved	in	avowal	is	best	understood	if	one	sees	these	capacities	at	
work	 also	 in	 having	 a	 mental	 attitude.	 We	 might	 say	 that	 a	 subject’s	 agential	
capacities	 are	 at	 work	 insofar	 as	 her	 mental	 attitude	 is	 not	 a	 given	 fact,	 but	
something	she	must	settle	and	sustain	(cf.	Moran	2001,	77;	Boyle	2015,	341).7		






Finally,	 as	 a	 last	 remark,	 Moran’s	 view	 is	 often	 portrayed	 as	 saying	 that	
avowal	in	and	of	itself	is	sufficient	for	self-knowledge.	This	seems	to	be	implied	in	
Moran’s	claim	that	avowal	constitutes	self-knowledge.	But	Moran	also	seems	to	hold	
                                                        
heart rates, because they involve, for the subject of those states, a characteristic grasp of the world. That 
is to say that these attitudes involve, from a first-person perspective, grasping the (propositional) object 
of those states as true, as to be done, as dangerous, etcetera.  
6 This is reflected in Moran’s notion of the deliberative stance, which is to be distinguished from the 
theoretical stance. These stances correspond with two kinds of questions about and inquiries into one’s 
mental life. A theoretical question about one’s mental life is ‘one that is answered by discovery of the 
fact of which one was ignorant’, Moran explains, ‘whereas a practical or deliberative question is 
answered by a decision or commitment of some sort, and it is not a response to ignorance of some 
antecedent fact about oneself’ (2001, 58). 
7 This form of mental agency is further developed in Boyle (2011); Hieronymi (2009); and Moran (2012). 
Moran also extensively focuses on deliberation and (justifying) reasons. I leave this aspect of Moran aside 
and focus on commitments and the agency inherent in being committed. What is thus left open by my 
discussion is whether and how deliberation and justification ought to be involved in an account of self-
knowledge. This paper thus isn’t a defense of Moran’s account. Rather, it investigates the role of avowal 
in substantial self-knowledge.  
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8 In his response to Shoemaker and O’Brien, for instance, Moran (2003, 20) emphasizes how the 
capacity to make up one’s mind depends on prior experience and evidence. He asserts that whereas an 
adequate history and the right empirical facts must be in place to make up one’s mind, it cannot 
replace making up one’s mind: ‘…there is a great deal of empirical complexity that must be assumed 
and relied on for something as simple as ordering from a menu, and when all this is in place, the 
transition from not knowing to knowing what one will have is made by arriving at a decision’. 
9 This is also reflected in Cassam’s (2014, 31-2) value-condition, which is part of his definition of 
substantial self-knowledge. 
10 Cf. Arpaly (2003); Helm (2010); Smith (2005); Seidman (2016). In Helm’s terminology, caring about X 
means that X is the focus of a pattern of emotions, desires, judgments, intentions and actions (2010, 
311-5). According to Arpaly, caring is constituted by three types of engagement: a motivational, 
emotional and cognitive one (2003, 85-7). 
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The	right	kind	of	engagement,	i.e.,	the	right	pattern	of	actions	and	reactions,	
involves	both	a	 requirement	of	 coherency	and	a	 requirement	of	 robustness.	The	
engagement	should	be,	first,	reasonably	coherent	considering	a	range	of	actions	and	






how	 often	 or	 in	what	way	 a	 substantial	 attitude	 changes:	 normally,	 it	 shouldn’t	
change	randomly,	nor	very	often.	
What	 follows	 from	 the	 characterization	 of	 care	 as	 involving	 a	 particular	
engagement	(patterns	of	action	and	reaction)	is	that	care	isn’t	only	manifested	in	
what	a	person	says	she	is	committed	to,	but	also	in	her	actions	and	reactions.	This	
means	 there	 is	 reason	 to	doubt	 the	unique	status	of	avowal.	Suppose	I	avow	my	
belief	that	taking	care	of	the	environment	is	very	important.	I	thereby	express	my	




the	environment	 is	very	 important.	 If	a	person’s	avowal	of	a	 substantial	attitude	
doesn’t	 resonate	 in	 her	 actions	 and	 reactions,	 then	 what	 significance	 does	 her	
avowal	have?		





self-conception	 and	 avowals.	 As	 a	 consequence,	with	 respect	 to	 substantial	 self-






                                                        
11 I focus on paradigmatic cases of care and withhold from discussions about the alleged possibility that 
a person might, e.g., care about X just a moment in time or very short period. 
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rather	what	is	reflected	in	my	overall	patterns	of	action	and	reaction,	









really	 know	herself	 if	 she	 observes	and	 interprets	 her	actions	 and	 reactions	 (cf.	
Cassam	 2014;	 Lawlor	 2009;	 Schwitzgebel	 2012).	 The	 role	 left	 for	 avowal	 is	 not	
entirely	clear:	is	it	just	one	piece	of	evidence	amongst	the	rest	of	one’s	behavior?	Is	
it	an	obstacle	in	achieving	self-knowledge	because	it	reflects	the	distorting	lens	of	
one’s	 self-conception?	Or	 does	 it	 serve	as	a	 contrast	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 our	 behavior,	
which	helps	us	and	others	to	reveal	our	own	ignorance?	Whatever	the	role	left	for	







kinds	 of	 responses	 available	 in	 the	 literature,	 but	 both	 seek	 to	 safe	 the	 theory	
despite	 the	 objection,	 rather	 than	 address	 the	 objection	 itself.	 Matthew	 Boyle	
(2015),	 for	 instance,	 emphasizes	 that	 even	 if	 Moran’s	 account	 doesn’t	 apply	 to	
substantial	 self-knowledge,	 it	 still	 addresses	 fundamental	 questions	 about	 self-
knowledge.12	According	to	Boyle,	Moran’s	project	contributes	to	understanding	the	
relation	 between	 having	 a	 mental	 life	 and	 being	 a	 subject	 with	 a	 first-person	
                                                        
12 Other responses that accept that Moran applies only to trivial self-knowledge can be found in 
Schwenkler (2018), who claims that Moran addresses a paradigmatic form of self-knowledge, and Gertler 
(2016), who argues that trivial self-knowledge is the kind of self-knowledge that is epistemically distinct, 
which merits the philosophical attention given to it. What is quite striking in this respect is that such 
acceptance is, as far as I can tell, absent in Moran’s view. He doesn’t talk of trivial or substantial self-
knowledge, but he does claim that his account applies not only to beliefs but also to emotions and 
intentions (Moran 2001, 64-5; 2012, 214; 2004, 471). Moreover, the examples that Moran turns to are 
often examples of substantial self-knowledge: for instance, the case of the analysand (2001, 93-5); 
akratic gambler (2001, 78-82; 162-3); the rakehell (2001, 174-187); and Fred Vincy (2001, 188-192). 
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perspective.13	 The	 other	 kind	 of	 response	 is	 to	 say	 that	avowal	 is	 necessary	 but	
should	 be	 supplemented	 with	 other	 necessary	 conditions.	 In	 this	 vein,	 McGeer	
(1996;	2007)	argues	that	a	person’s	capacity	to	avow	mental	attitudes	should	be	






the	 starting-point	 of	 the	 question,	 namely	 that	 our	 avowals	will	 resonate	 in	 our	
behavior	 if	we	regulate	ourselves	properly,	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	 importance	of	
avowal	even	in	face	of	the	possibility	of	a	lack	of	alignment	between	our	words	and	
deeds.	What	if	we	accept	that	(a)	substantial	attitudes	are	(also)	reflected	in	one’s	
patterns	of	action	and	reaction	and	accept	 that	 (b)	 these	patterns	might	be,	and	
often	are,	contrary	to	one’s	avowals,	but	reject	that	this	means	that	(c)	one	shouldn’t	
rely	on	one’s	avowals?		
In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 argue	 that,	 despite	 (a)	 and	 (b),	 avowal	 remains	
necessary	 and	 still	 has	 a	 unique	 status	 in	 achieving	 self-knowledge	 of	 one’s	
substantial	mental	attitudes.	There	are	two	ways	to	reject	the	conclusion	that	we	
shouldn’t	 rely	on	avowals.	First,	 I	will	 inquire	whether	it	 is	possible	 to	deny	any	
status	to	avowal	in	achieving	substantial	self-knowledge	(section	4).	For	this	seems	
to	 be	 assumed	 by	 those	 putting	 forth	 the	 objection:	 that	 a	 person’s	 substantial	
attitudes	can	be	“discovered”	in	her	patterns	of	action	and	reaction	–	without	any	
necessary	 role	 for	 avowal.	 Let’s	 call	 this	 the	discovery	 assumption.	 Secondly,	 the	







                                                        
13 As Boyle (2015, 346) writes: ‘The idea is that, to understand the mind, we must understand subjectivity, 
and subjectivity is expressed primarily in a special mode of awareness of certain states: awareness of 
them from a standpoint one has precisely in virtue of being in those states.’ Boyle is explaining his 
sympathy for a claim made by Sidney Shoemaker: ‘…it is essential to a philosophical understanding of 
the mental that we appreciate that there is a first-person perspective on it, a distinctive way mental 
states present themselves to the subjects whose states they are, and that an essential part of the 
philosophical task is to give an account of mind which makes intelligible the perspective mental subjects 
have on their own mental lives’ (Shoemaker 1996, 157; quoted in Boyle 2015, 345). 
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In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 question	 the	 discovery	 assumption:	 the	 assumption	 that	
substantial	mental	attitudes	can	be	discovered	in	patterns	of	action	and	reaction	
independently	of	a	person’s	avowals.	An	influential	example	used	to	argue	for	the	
idea	 that	 one’s	 prior	 engagement	 is	 evidence	 for	 having	 an	 attitude	 is	 Lawlor’s	
example	 of	 Katherine,	 who	 achieves	 self-knowledge	 by	 inferring	 whether	 she	
desires	to	have	another	child	through	 internal	promptings,	such	as	that	 ‘she	finds	
herself	lingering	over	the	memory	of	how	a	newborn	feels	in	one’s	arms’	and	that	
‘[s]he	 notes	 an	 emotion	 that	 could	 be	 envy	 when	 an	 acquaintance	 reveals	 her	
pregnancy’	 (2009,	 47).	 Internal	 promptings	are	 imaginings,	 fantasies,	memories,	
emotions	and	sensations	and,	according	to	Lawlor,	 ‘self-knowledge	of	desire	is	 in	
routine	cases	a	matter	of	self-interpretation	of	one’s	 imaginings,	where	that	self-
interpretation	 is	 a	 causal	 inference	 to	 the	 best	 explanation’	 (2009,	 62).	 But	 can	
internal	 promptings	 serve	 as	 evidence	 in	 the	 way	 suggested	 by	 Lawlor?	 Does	









attention	 to	 her	 own	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 in	 the	 way	 Lawlor	
describes,	 but	 is	 it	 really	 plausible	 to	 represent	 this	 as	 a	matter	 of	
detecting	 some	 standing	 fact	 of	 the	matter?	 Her	 feelings	when	 she	
boxes	 up	 outgrown	 clothes	 and	 receives	 news	 of	 her	 friend’s	







already	 so	 but	 of	 reaching	 a	 settled	 attitude	 on	 the	 matter.	 To	
investigate	 this	 as	 if	 it	were	 a	matter	 for	 discovery	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer









genuinely	 embrace.	 Although	 I	 agree	 with	 the	 first	 claim,	 I	 think	 the	 second	
misrepresents	the	case.	Boyle	seems	to	offer	a	revision	of	the	original	case:	on	his	








example.	 Namely:	 why	 is	 it	 problematic	 to	 claim	 that	 internal	 promptings	 are	
evidence	for	having	the	desire?	Can’t	we	imagine	that	Katherine	would	experience	
internal	 promptings	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that	 she	cannot	 but	 infer	 that	 she	 has	 the	
desire?		
Notably,	Moran	extensively	discusses	cases	where	doubt	about	the	strength	
of	 one’s	 decision	 (or	 commitment)	 undermines	 the	 decision	 (or	 commitment).14	
Such	doubt	sometimes	seems	to	be	required	if	one	is	to	be	‘realistic’	about	oneself,	
i.e.,	about	one’s	character	and	capacities.	In	view	of	this,	the	question	Moran	(2001,	
81)	 asks	 himself	 is	 how	 taking	 responsibility	 can	 be	 compatible	 with	 being	
psychologically	realistic	about	oneself.	What	is	the	relation	between	an	avowal	and	
the	psychological	facts	of	the	matter,	i.e.,	the	facts	manifested	in	patterns	of	action	
and	reaction?	And	here	Moran	argues	 that	avowal	 is	necessary	for	 first-personal	






                                                        
14 See, for instance, as already mentioned in fn. 12, Moran’s discussion of the akratic gambler (2001, 78-
82; 162-3); the rakehell (2001, 174-187); and Fred Vincy (2001, 188-192). 
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their	 relevance	 to	 the	 question	 at	 hand;	 but	 it	 does	 deny	 their	
completeness	and,	in	a	word,	their	decisiveness.15	(Moran	2001,	163)	
	
What	does	Moran	mean	by	saying	 that	 the	 facts	of	 the	matter	aren’t	complete	 or	





that	her	envy	reveals	a	deeper	 truth	about	herself	and	isn’t	due	 to,	 for	example,	
having	a	grumpy	day?	The	envy	itself	doesn’t	wear	it	on	its	sleeves	whether	it	is	a	
symptom	of	a	deeper	desire.	After	all,	emotional	episodes	have	different	kinds	of	
significance	 for	 a	 person.	 Among	 other	 things,	 a	 person	 may	 discard	 them	 for	
making	 a	 fuss	 about	 something	 insignificant,	 or	 she	may	 experience	 them	as	an	
expression	of	what	she	cares	about.	Katherine’s	envy	thus	cannot	be	seen	as	plain	
evidence	for	her	deeper	desire.		




child,	 she	 first	 needs	 to	 recognize	 her	 emotional	 reaction	 as	 envy.	 How	 does	
Katherine	know	that	the	emotion	she	feels	is	envy?	
The	problem	taking	shape	here	is	that,	like	desire	itself,	internal	promptings	
often	 are	mental	 attitudes	 one	 needs	 to	 know	about.	 Is	 it	 possible	 to	 argue	 that	
Katherine	knows	it	is	envy	she	feels	because	of	yet	other	internal	promptings	that	
could	be	 taken	as	evidence	 for	it?	Such	a	 response	isn’t	possible	ad	 infinitum.	As	
Moran	writes,	it	is	impossible	to	treat	one’s	entire	mental	life	as	mere	data:	‘a	person	
cannot	treat	his	mental	goings-on	as	just	so	much	data	or	evidence	about	his	state	
of	mind	all	 the	way	down’	 (Moran	2001,	 150).	 At	 a	 certain	 point	a	 person	must	




                                                        
15 See fn. 8. See also, for instance, Anscombe’s principle as formulated by Setiya (2011, 174): ‘If A has the 
capacity to act for reasons, she has the capacity to know what she is doing without observation or 
inference – in that her knowledge does not rest on sufficient prior evidence’ (my italics). See Falvey (2000) 
for an insightful discussion of the implications of such a claim in the case of intention and action. 
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disavow	 it	and	wouldn’t	 see	 it	as	 symptomatic	 of	 any	of	my	deeper	 values.16	 As	

























To	know	 that	 a	 person	 cannot	 achieve	 self-knowledge	of	 her	 substantial	mental	
attitudes	without	avowal	is	not	yet	to	understand	the	precise	function	of	avowal	in	
                                                        
16 I owe this vivid example to Fleur Jongepier. 
17 Cf. Moran (2001, 121-4). If I would treat all my mental life as mere data, I could not even arrive at a 
conclusion about my mental attitudes: ‘The radical abrogation of first-person authority means that he 
cannot take for granted that the conclusion he arrives at just is, now, what he genuinely believes about 
the matter. Thus, his problem is not only that the current of his true beliefs and feelings runs somewhere 
out of sight of his consciousness, but also that this current seems to run its own course and have nothing 
to do with his explicit thinking about the people and things his feelings are supposedly directed upon’ 
(2001, 123). 
18 Wouldn’t Lawlor simply reject that Katherine needs to avow her internal promptings and instead claim 
that they might just feel as expressive of her perspective? Can’t she just turn to phenomenology? In 
response, I take it that an internal prompting can only feel as expressive of one’s perspective if it feels 
related to one’s grasp on the world, i.e., if it is related to one’s commitments. This is precisely what 
avowal is about.  
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achieving	such	self-knowledge.	What	is	the	positive	role	of	avowal?	And	how	can	













I	 have	 done	 so	 in	 the	 past;	 I	 have	 good	 self-regulation	 skills).	 Let’s	 call	 this	 the	










reasons	 against	 the	 skeptical	 picture.	 These	 reasons	 concern	 1)	 the	 provisional	
nature	of	avowals,	2)	the	significance	of	a	gap	between	avowal	and	engagement,	and	




of	 avowals.	 That	 avowal	 has	 a	 provisional	 quality	 is,	 in	 my	 view,	 a	 direct	
                                                        
19 The “skeptical picture” owes its label to the argument from illusion, which assumes, roughly, that the 
possibility of being wrong (being under the sway of an illusion) implies the need for external 
justification. Cf. Dancy (1995). 
20 The idea that exercising capacities, especially “normative” capacities, involves the possibility of 
failure is not a new idea. See, for instance, Korsgaard (1996). However, the ideas presented about the 
significance of this possibility and of making mistakes in light of achieving substantial self-knowledge 
are, as far as I can tell, novel. 
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relation;	 rather,	 it	merely	 expresses	 it	 –	 or	we	might	 say,	 pays	 “tribute”	 to	 it.	 A	
mental	attitude	is	not,	after	a	person	avows	it,	suddenly	considered	as	a	given	fact.	
Rather,	a	person	will	keep	seeing	the	attitude	as	expressive	of	her	commitment,	and	






that	 mental	 attitudes	 are	 expressive	 of	 one’s	 commitments,	 avowal	 should	 be	
provisional.	
This	 also	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 relation	 between	 avowal	 and	 other	
agential	capacities,	such	as	self-regulation.	It	seems	as	if	self-regulation	doesn’t	only	
supplement	 avowal,	 as	 for	 instance	 in	 McGeer’s	 (2007)	 proposal,	 but	 can	 also	
undermine	one’s	capacity	to	avow	one’s	mental	attitudes.	According	to	McGeer,	self-
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one’s	own	reactions,	i.e.,	reactions	that	may	reveal	something	about	one’s	grasp	of	
the	world,	as	 “wayward	 tendencies”	 that	one	should	overcome,	 instead	of	 taking	
them	as	expressive	of	one’s	stance.	McGeer	refers	here	to	 ‘some	of	the	American	
soldiers	who,	against	their	own	feelings	of	anxiety	or	revulsion,	ended	up	torturing	
prisoners	 in	 Iraq’s	 Abu	 Ghraib’	 (2007,	 104).	 One	 problem	with	 the	 soldiers,	 as	
McGeer	observes,	is	that	they	regulated	these	negative	feelings,	whereas	they	should	
have	taken	them	at	face	value:	they	expressed	their	grasp	of	the	horrific	nature	of	






whether	 the	 gap	 between	 avowal	 of	 one’s	 care	 and	 future	 engagement	 actually	
constitutes	a	 failure	 to	 live	up	 to	 one’s	avowed	care,	nor	2)	whether	 that	 failure	
constitutes	a	failure	to	know	one’s	care.	First,	it	cannot	be	concluded	that	a	person	











                                                        
21 I don’t mean to claim here that what McGeer describes as Moran’s deliberative ideal would be 
sufficient in the case of the American soldiers to have retained from torture. I think that the social 
influence (and of course the influence of being at war) on self-knowledge and on one’s ability to 
recognize one’s grasp of the world is substantial. But I see it more as part of the struggle to avow one’s 
attitudes (cf. Pippin 2005). More on this struggle further on in this section. 
22 This is not to say that any change of mind (or heart) is acceptable. For instance, ‘sufficient amount of 
time’ is important here, especially for substantial self-knowledge. If the period is too short, it becomes 
doubtful whether my care for X is genuine. Or if the change of mind happens randomly, i.e., for no reason 
at all, this might also raise the suspicion that I didn’t genuinely care for X. Additionally, it would be 
dubious whether I actually cared for X if I would change my mind (or heart) successively or very often. In 
situations like these, having a change of mind (or heart) does seem to constitute a failure to live up to 
one’s avowal. 
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For	 instance,	 failing	 on	 too	many	 or	 too	 important	 occasions	 undermines	 caring	
about	something.	But	like	the	difference	between	a	change	of	mind	and	a	failure,	this	
difference	 isn’t	 observable	 in	 the	 engagement	 itself.	 There	 isn’t	 a	 clear	 division	
between	a	failure	to	live	up	to	one’s	care	about	X	and	a	failure	to	care	about	X	(and	
thus	a	failure	to	know	it).	Rather,	what	counts	as	a	certain	kind	of	failure	is,	in	my	





















                                                        
23 This latter condition, i.e., the negotiation with others, is part of the social dimension of self-knowledge, 
which, as already admitted, I cannot do full justice in this paper due to lack of space and complexity. See 
McGeer (2007), especially for the social dimension of developing the requisite capacities for first-person 
authority. And see Pippin (2005, 309, 318-322) for a discussion of the influence of “negotiation with 
others.” 
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oneself	 and	with	 others.	 This	 brings	 me	 to	 the	 next	 point	 against	 the	 skeptical	
picture.	
The	third	reason	counting	against	the	skeptical	picture	concerns	the	kind	of	

















































setbacks?	 Obviously,	 as	 portrayed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 these	 sorts	 of	 things	
matter.	Joan’s	avowal	that	she	wants	to	be	married	to	David	cannot	float	free	from	






conception	 of	 how	her	 life	with	David	will	 be,	 and	with	 a	 self-conception	 of	 the	
person	she	will	be	as	having	David	as	her	husband	and	as	being	his	wife.		
                                                        
24 David could, of course, also be another woman. Being of different gender, however, makes it easier 
in writing, because one can refer to “he”, “she”, “him” and “her”. 
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actually	 experiencing	 the	 mentioned	 doubt	 and	 by	 returning	 to	 one’s	 sense	 of	
commitment	(or	failing	to),	or	by	actually	experiencing	the	difficulties	and	finding	a	

















and	 ‘show’	 the	 behavior	 that	 is	 deemed	 appropriate,	 but	 the	 relation	 to	 her	
relationship	 with	 David	 is	 not	 the	 same.	 She	 cannot	 be	 challenged	 or	 take	
responsibility	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 For	 instance,	 if	 she	 starts	 to	 have	 feelings	 for	
someone	 else	 or	 if	 she	 accepts	 a	 job-offer	 abroad,	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 her	






because	 avowal	 actually	 should	 be	 provisional,	 because	 one	 cannot	 observe	
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The	 alternative	 picture	 taking	 shape	 here	 is	 that	 the	 possibility	 and	




precisely	because	caring	 involves	expressing	one’s	 commitment	 through	avowal.	
And	similar	to	acting,	planning,	intending,	etc.,	an	agent	can	fail	in	being	committed:	
an	 agent	 can	 act	 badly,	 fail	 to	 fulfill	 her	 plans,	 fail	 to	 act	 on	 her	 intentions	 and,	
analogously,	fail	to	fulfill	her	commitments.	Under	certain	conditions,	e.g.,	if	one	fails	
on	too	many	or	too	important	occasions,	such	failure	might	indicate	a	lack	of	care	
and	 thus	 be	 a	 sign	 of	 self-ignorance.	 However,	 this	 cannot	 be	 decided	 by	 some	
independent	criteria,	but	is	something	the	person	herself	must	negotiate,	both	with	
herself	as	well	as	with	others.	
This	 alternative	 picture	 brings	 us	 back	 to	 the	 agential	 aspects	 of	 self-








risk	 of	 making	 mistakes;	 and	 through	 both	 these	 things,	 to	 seek	 deeper	
understanding	of	who	one	is.26	This	brings	us	back	to	the	main	question	of	the	paper:	
                                                        
25 Here, I am inspired by and paraphrasing Pippin (2005, 309): ‘Being the subject of one’s life, a subject 
who can lead a life rather than merely suffer what happens, who can recognize her own agency, the 
exercise of her subjectivity, in the deeds she produces, also means being able to fail to be one.’ However, 
there is an essential difference between the two ways of phrasing: where Pippin sees the concept of 
agency as something one can fail to be, I think that the concept of agency is connected to failure by 
exercising one’s agency, i.e., through acting, intending, committing, etc. One cannot fail to be an agent, 
but, as an agent, one can fail to lead one’s life. I don’t know who would do the failing otherwise. 
26 Compare again Pippin (2005, 317): ‘Put one final way, the problem I have called Marcel’s “becoming 
who he is” amounts to his becoming a determinate agent, someone who leads his life, both carries the 
past into the future in a certain way and does so, acts, in light of some conception of the subject he is 
struggling to become. But this is mostly manifested by a kind of via negativa, the often palpable sense in 
the novel of the great and almost intolerable burden of the demands of such agency and the sweet 
pleasures to be gained by avoiding such a burden.’  
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does	 avowal	 have	 a	 necessary	 and	 unique	 status	 in	 achieving	 substantial	 self-














































The	 aim	of	 this	 dissertation	 has	 been	 to	 contribute	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 self-
knowledge	 within	 a	 moral	 psychological	 framework,	 where	 the	 connections	 to	
personhood,	moral	psychology,	and	 (mental)	agency	are	 recognized	as	crucial	 to	
understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 self-knowledge.	 I	 have	 given	 critical	 analyses	 of	
Moran’s	 account	 of	 self-knowledge,	 of	 the	 different	 responses	 to	 the	 two	 topics	
problem,	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 reasoning	 and	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 person’s	 active	
relation	 to	 her	 own	 substantial	 mental	 attitudes.	 Taken	 together,	 they	 help	 to	
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for	only	 if	a	person	 takes	 the	responsibility	 to	avow	her	mental	attitude	will	 she	





Characterizing	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 in	 this	 way	 is	 distinct	 from	
identifying	 any	 transparency	 procedure.	 Whether	 achieving	 transparent	 self-
knowledge	should	be	explicated	as	going	 through	a	 transparency	procedure	 is	a	
different	matter.	Even	if	self-knowledge	is	often	thought	to	be	transparent	by	virtue	
of	 such	a	 procedure,	 it	 seems	 exceedingly	 difficult	 to	 explain	 the	 picture	 of	 self-
knowledge	just	sketched	in	terms	of	a	transparency	procedure.		
Formulating	 a	 transparency	 procedure	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 way	 in	 which	 a	
person	achieves	self-knowledge.	Such	a	procedure	can	be	called	 transparent	 if	 it	
follows	the	sense	of	Evans’	notion	of	transparency	(as	distinguished	from	Cartesian	




attitudes	 by	 attending	 to	 their	 objects.	 I	 have	 presented	 two	 arguments	 against	































I	 don’t	 want	 to	 claim	 that	 this	 implies	 that	 we	 cannot	 have	 transparent	 self-




According	 to	 the	 first	 argument	 then,	 either	 the	 scope	 of	 Moran’s	
transparency	 claim	 doesn’t	 match	 Moran’s	 delineation	 of	 what	 the	 scope	 is	
supposed	 to	 be	 or	 its	 scope	 is	 more	 limited	 than	 it	 should	 be.	 Of	 course,	 this	
argument,	 as	 it	 was	 advanced	 in	 the	 dissertation,	 holds	 only	 against	 Moran’s	















One	 of	 the	 accounts	 discussed	 was	 Byrne’s	 inferential	 account	 of	 self-
knowledge.	 Based	 on	my	 argument	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 reasoning	 (in	 Chapter	 3),	 I	
argued	 that	 his	 assumption	 that	 inference	 from	 a	 premise	 entails	 belief	 in	 that	
premise,	 which	 is	 required	 for	 the	 epistemic	 justification	 of	 the	 inference,	 is	
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reasoning	 and	 arrive	 at	 a	 conclusion	 doesn’t	 tell	 us	 anything	 about	 our	 beliefs	
regarding	 the	 premises	 and	 conclusion.	 Nor	 could	we	 refer	 to	 another	 piece	 of	
reasoning	 to	 solve	 this	 lacuna,	 for	 there	 too,	 one’s	 belief	 in	 the	 conclusion	 isn’t	
implied	in	making	the	inference:	if	one	is	to	believe	the	conclusion	of	that	piece	of	
reasoning,	one	would	need	yet	another	piece	of	reasoning	to	know	of	that	belief,	and	
infinite	 regress	 ensues.	Hence,	 if	we	 accept	my	 argument	 that	 reasoning	 doesn’t	
necessarily	 involve	 that	 one	 believes	 in	 the	 premises	 and	 conclusion	 of	 one’s	
reasoning,	then	self-knowledge	cannot	be	based	on	reasoning	–	at	least	not	all	of	our	
self-knowledge.	 And	 as	 a	 corollary,	 this	means	 that	 our	 ability	 to	 know	 that	we	
believe	 the	 conclusion	 of	 our	 reasoning	 presupposes	 self-awareness	 of	 one’s	
beliefs.1		
Leaving	these	considerations	on	the	difficulties	of	inferential	accounts	of	self-
knowledge	 aside,	 let	 me	 return	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 transparency	
                                                        
1 In addition, I think that something similar holds for deliberation. Making up one’s mind by considering 
reasons presupposes awareness of what one takes to be a reason.  
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procedures.	 Because	 of	 the	 problem	of	 scope	 and	because	 of	 TTP,	 it	 seems	 that	
Evans’	 notion	 of	 transparency,	 including	 the	 transparency	 accounts	 based	 on	 it,	
cannot	fully	explain	the	source	of	transparent	self-knowledge.	One	might	think	that	




















could	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 be	 compatible	 with	 a	 form	 of	 attitudinal	
awareness?	Such	compatibility	would	seem	to	depend	on	the	way	in	which	this	form	
of	 awareness	 modifies	 a	 person’s	 relation	 to	 her	 own	 mental	 life.	 It	 shouldn’t	
impugn	on,	most	importantly,	the	relation	between	attitude	and	commitment.	Put	
differently,	we	might	say	that	the	compatibility	of	transparent	self-knowledge	and	






                                                        
2 Chapter 2 showed that different kind of solutions to TTP postulate a form of attitudinal awareness. 
For example, phenomenal awareness (C. Peacocke), contrastive awareness (A. Peacocke), awareness 
that comes with a proximal intention (Roessler), awareness that springs from the structure of 
deliberation (Moran), and awareness of the mode of presentation (Boyle). 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer








This	 question	 appears	 even	 more	 pertinent	 given	 the	 weight	 attached	 to	 the	








but	 in	 its	 form.	 Such	 understanding	 seems	 to	 require	 an	 analytic	 Aristotelian	
approach.	
Before	 explaining	 why,	 I	 think	 we	 need	 analytic	 Aristotelianism	 to	
understand	transparent	self-knowledge,	let	me	first	return	to	the	basic	motivation	
for	 thinking	 there	 must	 be	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 transparent	 self-knowledge.	 The	
motivation	is	that,	in	order	to	make	a	genuine	distinction	between	the	first-person	
and	 third-person	 perspective	 (and	 thereby	 between	 self-knowledge	 and	 other-
knowledge),	we	need	the	concept	of	transparent	self-knowledge.	What	sets	the	first-
person	stance	apart	is,	first	and	foremost,	the	connection	between	having	a	mental	
attitude	 and	 grasping	 the	 world	 in	 a	 certain	 way.	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 Evans’	
observations	about	transparency3,	but	also,	 for	 instance,	 in	the	way	we	treat	our	
own	 and	 each	 other’s	 self-attributions.	 Following	 Moran,	 I	 take	 it	 that	 these	
“phenomena	of	transparency”	require	us	to	recognize	the	person’s	active	relation	to	





these	 “phenomena	 of	 transparency”	 and	 agential	 connection	 between	 mental	
attitudes	and	commitments,	we	need	the	concept	of	transparent	self-knowledge.4		
                                                        
3 And in Moore’s paradox, which seems to expose a phenomenon that mirrors Evans’ transparency. 
4 Other philosophers (and scientists), such as Carruthers and Dennett, would want to deny that any of 
the apparent differences between the first-person and third-person perspective amount to substantial 
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But	the	question	remains	how	we	should	understand	the	distinctiveness	and	





from	q.	 In	 our	 quest	 to	 analyze	everything	 to	 its	 core,	we	might	 sometimes	 pull	
things	apart	that	belong	together.	The	problems	we	run	into	in	analyzing	reasoning	
as	an	activity	where	there	is	a	certain	relation	between	different	beliefs,	stimulate	
the	 view	 that	 reasoning	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 one	 thing:	 namely	 recognizing	 the	
truth-connection	 between	 two	 statements	 (i.e.,	 making	 a	 judgment	 that	 p	 as	







and	 necessary	 conditions	 (or	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 explanatory	 essential	 feature	 or	
property),	 and	 secondly,	 because	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 only	 way	 in	 which	 the	
extensive	variety	of	instances	of	reasoning	form	a	unity.	
The	suggestion	I	want	to	make	is	that	something	similar	is	true	of	transparent	









a	 distinct	 category.	 As	 it	 was	 characterized	 from	 the	 start,	 transparent	 self-
                                                        
differences between them. What would speak in favor of their position is that there appears no way to 
make sense or to give a unified understanding of the differences. In face of the “threats” to self-
knowledge from a scientific, or perhaps “scientistic” perspective, it is therefore important to delineate 
the way in which the concept of transparent self-knowledge explains and unifies these different 
observations about the first-person perspective. In other words, if we can’t make sense of transparent 
self-knowledge, then giving up on the idea of the distinctiveness of the first-person perspective 
becomes a more viable alternative. 
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considerations	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 make	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 different	 from	
other	kinds	of	self-knowledge	or	knowledge	of	other’s	mental	attitudes	in	what	it	is;	
they	all	concern	facts	about	someone	having	a	particular	attitude.	Instead,	it	seems	
that	 they	 are	 considerations	about	 the	way	 in	which	 transparent	 self-knowledge	
exists:	 the	 logical	 form	 of	 self-knowledge.	 Future	 research	 of	 transparent	 self-







It	 is	 obvious	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 analysis	 in	 this	 dissertation	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 the	




First	 of	 all,	 the	 account	 of	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 discussed	 in	 the	
dissertation	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 the	most	 compatible	with	 contemporary	 views	 in	
psychology	is	the	reliabilist	construal	of	Byrne’s	inferentialist	account	(Chapter	2).	
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that	 p.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 however,	 the	 reliabilist	 construal	 has	 unwelcome	
consequences.	 For	 it	 implies	 that	 (as	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 2),	 in	 order	 not	 to	






is	 indeed	 in	 line	with	contemporary	views	 in	psychology,	 this	gives	us	 reason	 to	

















the	subject’s	active	 relation	 to	her	own	mental	 life	and	the	agency	manifested	in	
taking	and	having	a	stance?	What	I	have	argued	is	that,	even	if	some	mental	attitudes	
might	be	thus	inferred,	each	instance	of	inferring	depends	on	the	subject	taking	a	
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the	 first-person	agential	perspective.	This	gives	us	 reason	 to	 think	 that	a	wholly	
scientific	third-personal	perspective	of	the	mind	cannot	be	adequate.	
I	don’t	mean	to	be	claiming	that	these	considerations	would	convince	those	
in	 favor	 of	 scientism	 nor	 those	 who	 disregard	 the	 first-person	 perspective.	
Nonetheless,	 if	my	 arguments	 are	 sound,	 then	 the	 very	 practice	 of	 science	 itself	
depends	on	the	non-reductive	exposition	of	reasoning	and	self-knowledge	advanced	
in	 this	 dissertation.	 It	 thus	 seems	 that	 science	 cannot	 bypass	 the	 agential	
perspective.		
Nor	am	I	claiming	that	my	approach	couldn’t	benefit	from	closer	attention	to	
the	 scientific	 results.	 This	 would	 be	 a	 worthwhile	 and	 exciting	 line	 of	 future	
research.	The	point	I	want	to	make	is	that	a	genuine	understanding	of	the	nature	of	







Foot’s	 remarks	 are	 spot	 on.	 Evidence,	 reasons,	 inner	 promptings,	 and	 mental	
attitudes	require	the	subject	to	take	a	stance	–	to	manifest	her	agency.	Rather	than	
waiting	for	the	right	state	of	mind,	the	reflections	presented	in	this	dissertation	are	
an	 invitation	 to	 take	 a	 stance;	 an	 invitation	 to	 reconsider	 the	 importance	 of	




Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 161








Anscombe, G.E.M. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Anscombe, G.E.M. 1989. “Von Wright on Practical Inference.” In The Philosophy of Georg 
Henrik von Wright, edited by Paul A. Schilpp and Lewis E. Hahn, 377-404. La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court. 
Armstrong, David M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge. 
Arpaly, Nomy. 2003. Unprincipled Virtue. An Inquiry into Moral Agency. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ashwell, Lauren. 2013a. “Deep. Dark,… or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires.” 
Philosophical Studies 165 (1): 245-256. 
Ashwell, Lauren. 2013b. “Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by 
Jordi Fernández.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 8. 
Audi, Robert N. 1998. Epistemology. London: Routledge. 
Barnett, David J. 2016. “Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.” Nous 50 
(1): 184-212. 
Bayne, Tim and Michelle Montague (eds.). 2011. Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bilgrami, Akeel. 2006. Self-knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Boghossian, Paul. 1989. “Content and Self-Knowledge.” Philosophical Topics 17 (1): 5-26. 
Boghossian, Paul. 2014. “What is inference?” Philosophical Studies 169: 1-18. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2005. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness. PhD Dissertation. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2009a. “Active Belief.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (suppl. 35): 
119-147. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2009b. “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 78 (1): 133-164. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2011a. ““Making up your Mind” and the Activity of Reason.” 
Philosopher’s Imprint 11 (17): 1-24. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2011b. “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society 85 (suppl.): 
223-241. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2015. “Critical Study: Cassam on Self-Knowledge for Humans,” European 
Journal of Philosophy 23 (2): 337-348. 
Boyle, Matthew. 2019. “Transparency and reflection.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
(forthcoming): 1-28. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 162
BIBLIOGRAPHY	150	
Broome, John. 2013. Rationality through Reasoning. Sussex: Blackwell. 
Broome, John. 2014. “Comments on Boghossian.” Philosophical Studies 169: 19-25. 
Burge, Tyler. 1998. “Reason and the first person.” In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by 
Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith and Cynthia Macdonald, 243-270. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Byrne, Alex. 2005. “Introspection.” Philosophical Topics 33: 79-104. 
Byrne, Alex. 2011. “Transparency, Belief, Intention.” Aristotelian Society 85 (supp.): 201-
221. 
Byrne, Alex. 2015. “Skepticism about the Internal World.” In The Norton Introduction to 
Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana V. 
Shiffrin. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 
Byrne, Alex. 2018. Transparency and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Carroll, Lewis. 1895. “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” Mind 4 (14): 278-280. 
Carruthers, Peter. 2011. The Opacity of mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cassam, Quassim. 2011. “How We Know What We Think.” Revue de Métaphysique Et de 
Morale 4 (4): 553–569. 
Cassam, Quassim. 2014. Self-knowledge for Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chisholm, Roderick M. 1982. The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Coliva, Annalisa. 2016. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Coliva, Annalisa. 2014. “Review of Jordi Fernández Transparent Minds.” Theoria 81: 442-
445. 
Dancy, Johathan. 1995. “Arguments from illusion.” Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181): 421-
438. 
Dennett, Daniel C. 1978. “Conditions of Personhood.” In Brainstorms: 267-285. Boston, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Dennett, Daniel C. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Boston, MA: MIT Press 
Dennett, Daniel C. 2017. From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
De Sousa, Ronald. 2007. “Truth, Authenticity, and Rationality.” Dialectica 61 (3): 323–
345.  
Döring, Sabine A. 2007. “Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational 
Motivation.” Dialectica 61 (3): 363–394. 
Doris, John M. Talking to Ourselves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Doyle, Casey. (2018). “Agency and observation in knowledge of one’s own thinking.” 
European Journal of Philosophy: 1-14. 
Dretske, Fred. 2003. “How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?” In Privileged Access: 
Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, edited by Brie Gertler. Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 163
BIBIOGRAPHY 151	
Edgley, Roy. 1969. Reason in Theory and Practice. London: Hutchinson. 
Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Falvey, Kevin. 2000. “Knowledge in Intention.” Philosophical Studies 99 (1): 21-44. 
Fernández, Jordi. 2013. Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Finkelstein, David. 2003. Expression and the Inner. Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Finkelstein, David. 2012. “From Transparency to Expression.” In Rethinking Epistemology, 
vol. 2, edited by Gunter Abel and James Conant: 101-118. Berlin/Boston: De 
Gruyter. 
Foley, Richard. 2001. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Foot, Philippa. 1958. “Moral Arguments.” Mind 67 (268): 502-513. 
Ford, Anton. 2015. “The Arithmetic of Intention.” American Philosophical Quarterly 52 
(2):129-143. 
Frege, Gottlob. 1979. “Logic.” In Posthumous Writings: 1-8. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Frey, Jennifer. 2013. “Analytic philosophy of action: a very brief history.” Philosophical 
News 7: 50-58. 
Gallois, Andre. 1996. The World Without, the Mind Within: An Essay on First-Personal 
Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Geach, Peter. 1957. Mental Acts. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 
Gelfert, Axel. 2014. A Critical Introduction to Testimony. London: Bloomsbury. 
Gertler, Brie. 2011. “Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.” In Self-Knowledge, 
edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis: 125-145. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gertler, Brie. 2015. “Self-knowledge.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited 
by Edward N. Zalta.   
Gertler, Brie. 2016. “Critical notice of Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans.” 
Mind 125: 269-280. 
Goldie, Peter. 2002. “Emotions, Feelings, and Intentionality.” Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 1: 235-254. 
Goldman, Alvin I. 1967. “A Causal Theory of Knowing.” The Journal of Philosophy 64 
(12): 357-372. 
Goldman, Alvin I. 1993. “The Psychology of Folk Psychology.” Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 16: 15-28. 
Goldman, Alvin I. 2006. Stimulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience 
of Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Haldane, John. 2012. “Scientism and its Challenge to Humanism.” New Blackfriars 93 
(1048): 671-686. 
Hampshire, Stuart. 1975 [1965]. Freedom of the Individual. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 164
BIBLIOGRAPHY	152	
Harman, Gilbert. 1986. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Harman, Gilbert. 1990. “The intrinsic quality of experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4: 
31-52. 
Heal, Jane. 2004. “Moran’s ‘Authority and Estrangement’.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69 (2): 427–432. 
Helm, Bennett W. 2009. “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings.” Emotion Review 1 (3): 248–
255.  
Helm, Bennett W. 2010. “Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian 
Accounts.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, edited by Peter 
Goldie: 303-324. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hieronymi, Pamela. 2009. “Two Kinds of Agency.” In Mental Actions and Agency, edited 
by Lucy O'Brien and Matthew Soteriou: 138-162. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hlobil, Ulf. 2014. “Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference.” Philosophical 
Studies 167 (2): 419-429. 
Hlobil, Ulf and Katharina Nieswandt. 2016. “On Anscombe’s Philosophical Method.” 
Klēsis Revue Philosophique 35: 180-198. 
Hofmann, Frank (2018). “How to know one’s experiences transparently?” Philosophical 
Studies: 1-20. 
Jones, Karen. 2004. “Emotional Rationality as Practical Rationality.” In Setting the Moral 
Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers, edited by Cheshire Calhoun: 333-352. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Jongepier, Fleur. 2017. The Circumstances of Self-Knowledge. PhD Dissertation. 
Kind, Amy. 2003. “What’s so transparent about transparency?” Philosophical Studies 115: 
225-244. 
Kloosterboer, Naomi. 2015. “Transparent Emotions? A Critical Analysis of Moran’s 
Transparency Claim.” Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 246-258. 
Knorpp, William M. 1997. “The Relevance of Logic to Reasoning and Belief Revision: 
Harman on ‘Change in View’.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 78-92. 
Kompridis, Nikolas. 2000. “So We Need Something Else for Reason to Mean.” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (3): 271-295. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora O’Neill. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press. 
Ladyman, James. 2011. “The Scientistic Stance: The Empirical and Materialist Stances 
Reconciled.” Synthese 178 (1): 87-98. 
Lamme, Victor. 2011. De Vrije Wil Bestaat Niet. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker. 
Lawlor, Krista. 2009. “Knowing What One Wants”. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 79 (1): 47-75. 
Lycan, William G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 165
BIBIOGRAPHY 153	
Maier, John. 2013. “The Agentive Modalities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 90 (1): 113-134. 
Martin, M.G.F. 1998. “An Eye Directed Outward.” In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by 
Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith and Cynthia Macdonald, 99-122. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
McGeer, Victoria. 1996. “Is ‘Self-Knowledge’ an Empirical Problem? Renegotiating the 
Space of Philosophical Explanation.” Journal of Philosophy 93 (10): 483-515. 
McGeer, Victoria. 2007. “The moral development of First-Person Authority.” European 
Journal of Philosophy 16 (1): 81-108. 
McHugh, Conor and Jonathan Way. 2016. “Against the Taking Condition.” Philosophical 
Issues 26 (1): 314-331. 
McHugh, Conor and Jonathan Way. 2018. “What is Reasoning?” Mind 127 (505): 167-
196. 
Moore, G.E. 1903. “The Refutation of Idealism.” Mind 12 (48), 433-453. 
Moore, G.E. 1993. “Moore’s Paradox.” In G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, edited by 
Thomas Baldwin, 207-212. London: Routledge. 
Moran, Richard. 2001. Authority and Estrangement. An Essay on Self-Knowledge. 
Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Moran, Richard. 2003. “Responses to Shoemaker and O’Brien.” European Journal of 
Philosophy 11: 402-419. 
Moran, Richard. 2004a. “Replies to Heal, Reginster, Wilson, and Lear.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 69 (2): 455-72. 
Moran, Richard. 2004b. “Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’.” In Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement, edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward: 43-68. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Moran, Richard. 2008. “Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguity of Activity in Mental Life.” 
In Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah 
Buss and Lee Overton: 189-217. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Moran, Richard. 2012. “Self-Knowledge, ‘Transparency’, and the Forms of Activity.” In 
Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar: 
211-235. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Müller, A.W. 1979. “How theoretical is practical reason?” In Intention and Intentionality: 
Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe, edited by Cora Diamond and Jenny 
Teichman: 91-108. Sussex: Harvester Press. 
Nagel, Thomas. 1996. “Universality and The Reflective Self.” In Sources of Normativity, 
edited by Onora O’Neil: 200-209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nichols, Shaun and Stephen P. Stich. 2003. Mindreading: An Integrated Account of 
Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2007. “Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of 
Phenomenal Awareness.” Philosophical Perspectives 21: 429-455. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 166
BIBLIOGRAPHY	154	
Nisbett, Richard and Timothy Wilson. 1977. “Telling more than we can know: Verbal 
reports on mental processes.” Psychological Review 84: 231-259. 
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
O’Brien, Lucy. 2003. “Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge.” European Journal of 
Philosophy 11 (3): 391-401. 
O’Brien, Lucy. 2007. Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Ometto, Dawa. 2016. Freedom and Self-Knowledge. PhD Dissertation. 
Paul, Sarah K. 2012. “How we know what we intend.” Philosophical Studies 161: 327-346. 
Paul, Sarah K. 2014. “The Transparency of Mind.” Philosophy Compass 9 (5): 295-303. 
Peacocke, Antonia. 2017. “Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.” 
Philosophical Studies 174 (2): 353-377. 
Peacocke, Christopher. 1998. “Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge.” 
In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith and Cynthia 
Macdonald, 63-98. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Peacocke, Christopher. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Peacocke, Christopher. 2007. “Mental Action and Self-Awareness.” In Contemporary 
Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Jonathan D. Cohen and Brian P. 
McLaughlin: 358-375. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Peacocke, Christopher. 2009. “Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II): Epistemology.” In 
Mental Actions, edited by Lucy O’Brien and Matthew Soteriou: 193-215. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Peels, Rik. 2018. “A Conceptual Map of Scientism.” In Scientism: Prospects and Problems, 
edited by Jeroen D. de Ridder, Rik Peels, and René van Woudenberg. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pippin, Robert B. 2005. “On ‘Becoming Who One Is’ (and Failing): Proust’s Problematic 
Selves.” In The Persistence of Subjectivity: on the Kantian Aftermath: 307-338. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reed, Baron and Diego Machuca (eds.). 2018. Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Reid, Thomas. 1764 [1997]. Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common 
Sense. Edited by Derek Brookes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Ridder, Jeroen D. de, Rik Peels, and René van Woudenberg. 2018. Scientism: Prospects 
and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rödl, Sebastian. 2007. Self-consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Roessler, Johannes. 2013a. “The Silence of Self-Knowledge.” Philosophical Explorations 16 
(1): 1-17. 
Roessler, Johannes. 2013b. “The Epistemic Role of Intentions.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 113 (1): 41-56. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 167
BIBIOGRAPHY 155	
Rosenberg, Alex. 2011. The Atheist’s Guide to Reality: Enjoying Life without Illusions. New 
York: W. W. Norton. 
Rosenthal, D.M. 2005. Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Schöttler, Peter. 2012. “Szientismus. Zur Geschichte eines schwierigen Begriffs.” NTM 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 20 (4): 245-
269. 
Schroeder, Tim. 2015. “Desire.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by 
Edward N. Zalta.    
Schwenkler, John. 2018. “Self-Knowledge and its Limits.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 
(1): 85-95. 
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2010. “Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between 
Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 
(4): 531-553. 
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2012. “Self-Ignorance.” In Consciousness and the Self, edited by Jeeloo 
Liu and John Perry. Cambridge University Press. 
Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2015. “Belief.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by 
Edward N. Zalta. 
Seidman, Jeffrey. 2016. “The Unity of Caring and the Rationality of Emotion.” 
Philosophical Studies 173 (10): 2785-2801. 
Setiya, Kieran. 2011. “Knowledge of Intention.” In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, edited 
by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and F. Stoutland: 170-197. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
Shah, Nisha and David Velleman. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation.” The Philosophical Review 
114: 497-534. 
Shoemaker, Sydney. 1996. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Shoemaker, Sydney. 2003. “Moran on Self-Knowledge.” European Journal of Philosophy 
11 (3): 391-401. 
Shoemaker, Sydney. 2009. “Self-Intimation and Second-Order Belief.” Erkenntnis 71 (1): 
35-51. 
Silins, Nicholas. 2012. “Judgment as a Guide to Belief.” In Introspection and 
Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar: 295-317. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Smith, Angela M. 2005. “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.” 
Ethics 115: 236-71. 
Sosa, Ernest. 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge Volume II. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Soteriou, Matthew. 2009. “Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking, and Phenomenal 
Character.” In Mental Actions, edited by Lucy O’Brien and Matthew Soteriou: 232-
252. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 168
BIBLIOGRAPHY	156	
Spener, Maya. 2011. “Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology.” In Cognitive 
Phenomenology, edited by Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague: 268-284. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Stoljar, Daniel. 2004. “The Argument from Diaphanousness.” In New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Language and Mind, edited by Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton, 
Christopher Viger: 341-390. Calgary: University of Calgary Press. 
Stroud, Barry. 2002. Understanding Human Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stroud, Sarah. 2003. “Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement.” In Weakness of Will 
and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet: 121-
146. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Teroni, Fabrice. 2007. “Emotions and Formal Objects.” Dialectica 61 (3): 395-415. 
Thompson, Michael. 2008. Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and 
Practical Thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Tugendhat, Ernst. 1986. Self-consciousness and self-determination. Transl. by Paul Stern. 
Cambridge, Mass./ London: MIT Press.  
Tye, Michael. 1995. Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Valaris, Markos. 2011. “Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne.” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 111 (2): 319-324. 
Valaris, Markos 2014. “Reasoning and Regress.” Mind 123 (489): 101-127. 
Valaris, Markos. 2016. “Supposition and blindness.” Mind 125 (499): 895-901. 
Valaris, Markos. 2017. “What Reasoning might be.” Synthese 194: 2007-2024. 
Valaris, Markos. 2018. “Reasoning and Deducing.” Mind: 1-25. 
Velleman, David. 2000. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Vogler, Candice. 2001. “Anscombe on Practical Inference.” In Varieties of Practical 
Reasoning, edited by Elijah Millgram. Cambridge: MIT University Press. 
Wilson, Timothy. 2002. Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive 
Unconsciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009 [1953]. Philosophical Investigations. Transl. by G.E.M 
Anscombe. New York: Wiley. 
Woudenberg, René van. 2005. “Intuitive Knowledge Reconsidered”. In Basic Belief and 
Basic Knowledge, edited by René van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser, Ron Rood: 15-
39. Frankfurt: Ontos. 
Woudenberg, René van, Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels. 2018. “Introduction.” In Scientism: 
Prospects and Problems, edited by Jeroen D. de Ridder, Rik Peels, and René van 
Woudenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Woudenberg, René van, and Naomi Kloosterboer. 2019 (forthcoming). “Three 
Transparency Principles Examined.” Journal of Philosophical Research. 
Wright, Crispin. 2014. “Comment on Paul Boghossian, ‘What is inference?’.” 
Philosophical Studies 169: 27-37.
535355-L-bw-Kloosterboer
Processed on: 16-9-2019 PDF page: 169













kinds	 of	 questions	 whose	 answers,	 if	 true,	 provide	 one	 with	 a	 piece	 of	 self-
knowledge,	namely,	self-knowledge	of	one’s	own	intentional	mental	attitudes.		











My	 study	 of	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 has	 been	 partly	 born	 out	 of	
amazement	 at	 the	 increasingly	 all-encompassing	 scientific	 perspective	 on	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 human	mind.	 From	 the	 scientific	 perspective,	 all	 self-knowledge	 is	
regarded	with	skepticism	and	sometimes	even	declared	illusory.	To	give	an	idea	of	





an	 inseparable	mix	 of	 confabulation,	 retrospective	 self-justification,	
and	 (on	 occasion,	 no	 doubt)	 good	 theorizing.	 (Dennett	 1987,	 91;	
emphasis	in	original)	
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Theorizing	 that	 is	 often	 better	 left	 to	 persons	 other	 than	 ourselves,	 for	 our	 own	
theorizing	is	obfuscated	by	our	self-conception.	
The	 departure	 point	 of	 this	 dissertation	 is	 to	 question	 the	 scientific	
skepticism	about	self-knowledge	and	its	underlying	assumptions	about	the	nature	
of	 self-knowledge.	 What	 seems	 to	 be	 most	 problematic	 about	 the	 view	 of	 self-





















self-knowledge	 be	 conceived?	 First	 of	 all,	 let	me	 relate	 it	 to	 philosophy	 of	 self-















A	philosopher	who	has	 refocused	attention	 in	 the	philosophical	debate	on	
self-knowledge	 to	such	moral	psychological	 issues	is	Richard	Moran	 (2001).	The	







that	 it	 is	 raining;	 in	 feeling	 hurt	 she	 commits	 herself	 to	 the	 view	 that	 someone	
wronged	her	or	something	is	hurtful;	in	intending	to	go	to	the	new	Wes	Anderson	
movie	tonight,	she	commits	herself	to	making	it	her	business	to	be	there.		
In	 respecting	 the	 relation	 between	 attitude	 and	 commitment,	 transparent	
self-knowledge	 seeks	 to	 do	 justice	 to	 this	 essential	 difference	 between	 self-
knowledge	and	knowledge	of	someone	else’s	mental	attitudes.	It	is	self-knowledge	
that,	in	the	case	of	belief,	not	merely	puts	me	in	a	position	to	report	that	I	have	a	
certain	 belief,	 but	 ‘to	 speak	 of	 [my]	 conviction	 of	 the	 facts’	 (Moran	 2001,	 76).	
Similarly,	in	the	case	of	intention,	in	being	aware	of	my	intention	to	go	to	the	movie	
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SUMMARY	160	
one	answers	the	question	whether	one	believes	that	p	by	answering	the	question	
whether	 p.	 One	 main	 objective	 of	 this	 dissertation	 has	 been	 to	 analyze	 such	
transparency	 procedures.	What	 I	 have	 argued	 is	 that	 these	 procedures	 face	 two	
kinds	of	 limits:	 limits	in	scope	and	in	solving	what	I	have	dubbed	the	Two	Topics	
Problem	 (TTP).	 Let	me	discuss	 both	 in	 turn,	 before	 coming	 back	 to	 the	 relation	
between	a	transparency	procedure	and	transparent	self-knowledge.		
Are	there	limits	in	the	scope	of	transparency	procedures?	In	the	dissertation,	
I	 have	 looked	 at	 the	 scope	 of	Moran’s	 transparency	 claim.	Chapter	1	 begins	 by	
addressing	 the	 question	what	Moran’s	 transparency	 claim	 precisely	 consists	 of.	
Before	 being	 able	 to	 evaluate	 the	claim	 that	 a	 person	 is	 to	 answer	 the	 question	
whether	she	has	a	belief	that	p	by	answering	the	question	whether	p	is	true,	we	need	






Elisabeth’s	 belief	 based	 on	 non-justifying	 reasons.	 Years	 after	 the	 war	 is	 over,	







reason	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 proposition	 believed.	 Hence,	 she	 might	 fulfill	 the	 second	




claim	 seems	most	 plausible,	 i.e.	 has	 the	widest	 scope,	 if	 it	 means	 that	 the	 first	
requirement	should	be	met.	This	isn’t	very	surprising,	of	course,	because	the	first	
requirement	 is	 fairly	 minimal.	 But	 because	 it	 is	 so	 minimal,	 it	 also	 has	 some	




believed	 without	 really	 being	 open	 to	 the	 question	 whether	 to	 believe	 that	
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application	 is	 that	 where	 the	 relevant	 “outward-directed”	 question	 for	 belief	 is	
simply	whether	the	proposition	under	consideration	is	true,	the	relevant	“outward-
directed”	question	 for	emotion	 is	 less	easy	 to	discern.	The	reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	
emotions	do	not	only	seem	to	be	about	the	world,	but	also	about	what	is	important	
to	the	person	having	the	emotion.	Even	if	we	all	agree	that	a	person	has	betrayed	
me,	 I	 need	 not	 feel	 betrayed	 if	 either	 the	 person	 or	 the	 betrayal	 itself	 were	
insignificant	to	me.	Similarly,	only	if	I	care	about	a	sports	team,	will	their	wins	and	
losses	 spark	 joy	 or	 disappointment,	 respectively.	 We	 only	 feel	 an	 emotion	 if	
something	 matters	 to	 us	 (cf.	 Helm	 2010).	 Chapter	 4	 thus	 argues	 that	 Moran’s	
transparency	 claim	 cannot	 be	 applied	 to	 emotions,	 at	 least	 not	 without	
incorporating	an	account	of	the	relation	between	transparency	and	what	matters	to	
us	(a	question	that	is	addressed	in	Chapter	5).	























A	 careful	 glance	 at	 the	 state	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 transparent	 self-knowledge	
shows	that	there	is	no	consensus	of	what	the	relation	between	p	and	I	believe	that	p	









contend	 that	 a	 crucial	 assumption	 in	 his	 account,	 namely	 that	 inference	 from	 a	
premise	entails	belief	in	that	premise,	is	unwarranted	(a	claim	that	is	corroborated	
in	Chapter	3).	Thirdly,	I	argue	that	both	the	judgment	views	and	the	metaphysical	
views	 need,	 albeit	 for	 different	 reasons,	 to	 presuppose	 a	 form	 of	 attitudinal	
awareness,	 i.e.	 an	 awareness	 of	 one’s	 judgment	 or	 belief	 regarding	 p.	 This	 is	
incompatible	with	delineating	a	transparency	procedure	to	achieve	self-knowledge.	
Hence,	transparency	procedures	find	their	limit	in	TTP.	
However,	 I	 don’t	 think	 that	 this	 means	 that	 achieving	 transparent	 self-
knowledge	is	impossible.	We	need	to	distinguish	clearly	between	transparent	self-
knowledge	 and	 a	 transparency	 procedure	 to	 arrive	 at	 self-knowledge.	Where	 the	
former	expresses	something	about	 the	nature	of	 the	self-knowledge	at	 issue,	 the	
latter	aims	 to	 identify	an	epistemically	 justified	method	of	moving	 from	thinking	
about	the	world	at	large	to	a	self-ascription	of	a	mental	attitude.	My	explication	of	
the	 nature	 of	 transparent	 self-knowledge	 as	 self-knowledge	 that	 manifests	 the	
connection	between	mental	attitude	and	view	of	 the	world,	doesn’t	 imply	 that	 it	
necessarily	depends	on	a	 transparency	procedure.	Even	 if	 the	way	 in	which	one	
achieves	transparent	self-knowledge	is	not	fully	transparent,	there	is	no	immediate	
implication	 that	 there	 isn’t	 another	way	 in	which	 such	 self-knowledge	might	 be	
achieved.	This	is	where	I	would	like	to	point	to	the	prospects	of	the	involvement	of	
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self-knowledge	 be	 compatible	 with	 a	 form	 of	 attitudinal	 awareness?	 Such	
compatibility	would	seem	to	depend	on	the	way	in	which	this	form	of	awareness	
modifies	a	person’s	relation	to	her	own	mental	 life.	 It	shouldn’t	 impugn	on,	most	
importantly,	 the	 relation	 between	 attitude	 and	 commitment.	 Put	 differently,	 we	
might	say	that	the	compatibility	of	transparent	self-knowledge	and	the	involvement	
of	 attitudinal	 awareness	 requires	 the	 latter	 to	 meet	 certain	 transparency	























responsibility	 to	 avow	 her	 mental	 attitude	 will	 she	 achieve	 transparent	 self-
knowledge.	
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Safeguarding	this	stance	of	agency	in	matters	of	the	human	mind	is	thus,	as	
argued	 in	 this	dissertation,	 the	reason	why	we	need	 transparent	 self-knowledge.	





taking	 the	 responsibility	 to	 avow	 them.	Were	 a	 person,	 say	 Katherine,	 to	 desire	
another	child,	this	should	be	reflected	not	only	in	her	avowal	on	the	matter	but	also	









attitudes	 require	 one	 to	 have	 a	 self-conception.	 Acquiring	 self-knowledge	 of	
substantial	mental	attitudes	can	be	seen	as	a	 struggle	 to	 fulfill	 the	commitments	




A	 final	 worry	 for	 providing	 a	 genuine	 conception	 of	 transparent	 self-
knowledge	 is	 the	 wide	 variety	 to	 which	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 apply.	 Following	 the	
literature,	it	seems	as	if	we	should	slightly	adjust	the	conception	of	transparent	self-
knowledge	for	each	different	mental	attitude.	How	are	we	supposed	to	account	for	
some	kind	of	unified	conception	of	 transparent	 self-knowledge?	The	suggestion	 I	
want	to	make	is	that	the	analytic	Aristotelian	approach	would	be	helpful	to	answer	
this	 question.	 I	 have	 introduced	 analytic	 Aristotelianism	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 in	 a	
discussion	on	the	nature	of	reasoning.	Reasoning,	like	self-knowledge,	comes	in	a	
wide	variety.	Chapter	3	develops	an	argument	against	the	claim	that	all	reasoning	
necessarily	 involves	 a	 change	 in	 attitudes	 (this	 argument	 also	 undermines	 the	














The	 alternative	 view	 that	 I	 develop	 is	 the	 form	 view.	 It	 holds	 that	 all	 the	
instances	of	reasoning	can	be	unified	if	we	adopt	the	view	that	reasoning	is	first	and	













self-knowledge.	 I	 think	 that	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 transparent	 self-
knowledge	 –	 understanding	what	 it	means	 to	 have	 self-knowledge	 of,	 say,	 one’s	






own	 distinguishing	 and	 constraining	 possibilities	 for	 success	 and	
failure.	(Moran	2001,	xxxi)	
	















and	patterns	 of	action	 and	 reaction	 have	 symptomatic	value	 only	 if,	 somewhere	
down	the	line,	the	subject	takes	them	to	be	expressive	of	her	perspective.	Mental	
data	and	internal	promptings	aren’t	just	given	facts	about	the	subject	that	she	can	
discover,	 experience	 or	 note,	 but	 are	 themselves	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 subject’s	
commitments	to	the	world	at	large.	They	are,	at	least	always	partly,	an	expression	
of	her	agency.	 It	 thus	seems	 that	we	cannot	do	without	 the	 first-person	agential	













Foot’s	 remarks	 are	 spot	 on.	 Evidence,	 reasons,	 inner	 promptings,	 and	 mental	
attitudes	require	the	subject	to	take	a	stance	–	to	manifest	her	agency.	Rather	than	
waiting	for	the	right	state	of	mind,	the	reflections	presented	in	this	dissertation	are	
an	 invitation	 to	 take	 a	 stance;	 an	 invitation	 to	 reconsider	 the	 importance	 of	
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Geloof	 ik	 dat	 het	 regent?	Dat	mijn	 partner	 en	 ik	 samen	oud	worden?	Heb	 ik	 de	
intentie	om	het	geleende	geld	terug	te	geven?	Hou	ik	meer	van	aardbeien	of	van	
frambozen?	Vind	 ik	 familie	 belangrijker	 of	werk?	Waarop	moet	 ik	me	het	meest	
richten:	 genieten	 van	 het	 leven,	 ouderschap,	 carrière,	 of	 vriendschap?	 Dit	 soort	





Aan	 zelfkennis	 van	 mentale	 attitudes	 wordt	 vaak	 een	 speciale	 status	






De	 verbinding	 tussen	 attitude	 en	 instemming,	 en	 in	 het	 bijzonder	 de	
zelfkennis	 die	 deze	 verbinding	 in	 acht	 neemt,	 behoort	 tot	 de	 kern	 van	 dit	
proefschrift.	 Deze	 vorm	 van	 zelfkennis	 noem	 ik	 transparante	 zelfkennis.	
Transparant	omdat	 je	 jezelf	 in	een	bepaalde	modus	kent,	waarbij	 je	als	het	ware	
door	je	attitude	heen	kijkt	naar	datgene	waar	de	attitude	betrekking	op	heeft.	De	
onderliggende	 vraag	 van	 dit	 proefschrift,	 bestaande	 uit	 vijf	 opzichzelfstaande	
artikelen,	 is	 dan	 ook:	 hoe	 kunnen	 we	 het	 concept	 van	 transparante	 zelfkennis	
systematisch	analyseren	en	formuleren?	
Mijn	 studie	 naar	 transparante	 zelfkennis	 is	 deels	 ingegeven	 door	 mijn	
verwondering	over	het	feit	dat	het	wetenschappelijke	perspectief	op	de	menselijke	









an	 inseparable	mix	 of	 confabulation,	 retrospective	 self-justification,	
and	(on	occasion,	no	doubt)	good	theorizing.	(Dennett	1987,	91)	
	
Ons	 vermogen	 tot	 zelfkennis	wordt	 hier	 afgedaan	 als	 illusoir.	 We	 hebben	 geen	
toegang	tot	onze	ware	motieven.	De	verklaringen	die	we	geven	zijn	niets	meer	dan	
het	resultaat	van	interpretatie,	waarbij	we	antwoord	geven	op	de	vraag	wat	er	in	
ons	 hoofd	 om	 zou	 moeten	 gaan	 om	 ons	 gedrag	 afdoende	 te	 verklaren.	 Deze	
wetenschappelijk	 geïnspireerde	 visie	 op	 zelfkennis	 stelt	 zelfs	 dat,	 aangezien	 ons	













van	 rekening	 is	 het	 haar	mentale	 leven	dat	 haar	 unieke	 standpunt	 in	 de	wereld	
weergeeft.	Om	hier	recht	aan	te	doen,	moet	de	persoon	zelf	daar	besef	van	hebben:	




persoon	 zich	 niet	 als	een	 psycholoog	 tot	 haar	mentale	 leven	 verhoudt,	maar	 als	
iemand	die	de	attitudes	als	het	ware	“van	binnenuit	leeft.”	Zo	blijft	de	verbinding	












transparante	 zelfkennis	 begrijpen?	 Allereerst	 is	 het	 goed	 om	 dit	 vraagstuk	 in	
verband	 te	 brengen	 met	 de	 filosofie	 van	 zelfkennis	 in	 algemenere	 zin.	 Een	
fundamenteel	startpunt	in	het	denken	over	zelfkennis	is	het	verschil	tussen	kennis	
van	de	eigen	mentale	attitudes	 en	kennis	 van	de	 attitudes	 van	anderen.	Meestal	
worden	 de	 epistemologische	 aspecten	 van	 dit	 verschil	 benadrukt:	 zo	 ziet	 men	




buiten	beschouwing	blijft,	 is	de	 relatie	 tussen	zelfkennis	en	de	aard	van	de	naar	
zelfkennis	 strevende	mens:	waarom	 is	 zelfkennis	 belangrijk	 voor	 de	mens?;	 hoe	
verhoudt	 zelfkennis	 zich	 tot	 ons	 persoonszijn,	 tot	 morele	 psychologie	 en	 tot	
(mentale)	 agency?;	 op	 welke	 manier	 werken	 deze	 moreel	 psychologische	





niet	 in	 privilege	 of	 unieke	 toegang,	 maar	 in	 de	 manier	 waarop	 een	 persoon	

























naar	 de	 bioscoop	 te	 gaan.	 Het	 idee	 is	 dus	 dat	 transparante	 zelfkennis	 het	 soort	




Met	 deze	 eerste	 kenschets	 van	 transparante	 zelfkennis	 heb	 ik	 nog	 geen	 theorie	
geformuleerd.	 Hiervoor	 zou	 op	 z’n	 minst	 een	 uitleg	 van	 de	 manier	 waarop	
zelfkennis	vergaard	wordt	nodig	zijn.	 In	het	algemeen	stelt	men	dat	dat	het	best	
begrepen	kan	worden	als	het	doorlopen	van	een	transparantie-procedure.	De	basis	











kort	 besproken	worden,	 voordat	 teruggekomen	wordt	 op	 de	 verhouding	 tussen	
transparante	 zelfkennis	 en	 transparantie-procedures.	 Door	 deze	 verhouding	 te	




nemen.	 In	Hoofdstuk	 1	 begin	 ik	 met	 het	 expliciteren	 van	 zijn	 thesis	 om	 deze	
vervolgens	te	toetsen.	De	voorwaarden	aan	het	beantwoorden	van	de	vraag	over	
datgene	 waarop	 de	 attitude	 betrekking	 heeft,	 dienen	 allereerst	 verhelderd	 te	
worden.	Op	geloof	toegepast,	gaat	dit	dus	om	de	vraag	“Is	p	waar?”	(dus	de	vraag	
“Regent	 het?”	 in	 het	 bovengenoemde	 voorbeeld).	 Morans	 werk	 suggereert	 drie	
verschillende	 opties:	 1)	 dat	 er	 geen	 condities	 aan	 de	manier	 van	 beantwoorden	
gesteld	worden;	 2)	 dat	gerefereerd	moet	worden	 aan	 redenen	 voor	p;	 en	 3)	 dat	
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gerefereerd	moet	worden	aan	redenen	die	geloof	 in	p	rechtvaardigen.	Door	deze	
drie	 voorwaarden	 op	 verschillende	 vormen	 van	geloof	 toe	 te	 passen,	worden	 ze	
geëvalueerd.	Het	resultaat	van	deze	evaluatie	is	dat	Morans	transparantie-thesis	de	
grootste	 reikwijdte	 heeft	 als	 aan	 de	 eerste	 en	 dus	 meest	 minimale	 voorwaarde	




van	 een	Moran-achtige	 visie	 op	 transparantie-procedures	moeten	 kiezen	 tussen	
twee	 uitdagingen:	 óf	 ze	moeten	 rechtvaardigen	 dat	 transparante	 zelfkennis	 niet	
essentieel	verbonden	is	met	het	perspectief	van	een	agent,	óf	ze	moeten	de	grenzen	
aan	het	bestek	van	de	transparantie-procedure	rechtvaardigen.	
Een	 gerelateerde	 vraag	 over	 de	 reikwijdte	 van	 transparantie-procedures	
betreft	 de	 toepassing	 op	 andere	 attitudes	 dan	 geloof,	 zoals	 emoties,	 verlangens,	
intenties,	 geven	 om,	 etc.	Hoofdstuk	 4	 richt	 zich	 op	 de	 vraag	 of	 en	 hoe	Morans	





hebben	 ook	 betrekking	 op	wat	 voor	 iemand	 belangrijk	 is.	 Zelfs	 als	we	 allemaal	




kunnen	 we	 stellen	 dat	 een	 persoon	 alleen	 een	 emotie	 voelt	 als	 iets	 voor	 haar	
belangrijk	 is	 (cf.	 Helm	 2010).	 Via	 deze	 analyse	 beargumenteer	 ik	 dat	 Morans	
















geloof:	er	zijn	 talloze	situaties	denkbaar	waarin	het	wel	 regent,	maar	 ik	dat	niet	
geloof,	of	waarin	ik	wel	geloof	dat	het	regent,	maar	dat	niet	zo	is.	Zodoende	staan	
transparantie-procedures	 tegenover	 het	 Twee	 Subjecten	 Probleem	 (Two	 Topics	




een	 overzicht	 van	 de	 verschillende	 benaderingen	 van	 TTP	 en	 probeert	 zo	 het	
probleem	 zelf,	 maar	 vooral	 ook	 de	 relatie	 tussen	 transparantie-procedures	 en	
transparante	 zelfkennis	 te	 verhelderen.	 In	 het	 hoofdstuk	 beargumenteer	 ik	 dat	
transparante	zelfkennis	onlosmakelijk	verbonden	is	met	het	idee	dat	het	aan	jezelf	
toeschrijven	 van	 een	 geloof	 dat	 p	 twee	 beweringen	 inhoudt:	 een	 empirische	
bewering	 dat	 de	 geest	 in	 die	 toestand	 verkeert,	 maar	 ook	 instemming	 met	 de	
waarheid	van	p.	Met	dit	idee	als	uitgangspunt	blijken	alle	oplossingen	ontoereikend.	
Uiteindelijk	kan	transparante	zelfkennis	niet	zonder	enige	vorm	van	bewustzijn	van	
een	 attitude	 tot	 stand	 komen	 –	 en	 is	 dus	 niet	 uitsluitend	 gebaseerd	 op	 een	






Betekent	 dit	 dat	 transparante	 zelfkennis	 onmogelijk	 is?	 Niet	 als	 we	
transparante	zelfkennis	en	transparantie-procedures	zorgvuldig	uit	elkaar	houden.	
De	 eerstgenoemde	 betreft	 de	 aard	 van	 de	 bedoelde	 zelfkennis,	 terwijl	 de	
laatstgenoemde	tot	doel	heeft	om	een	methode	te	identificeren	die	de	sprong	tussen	




aard	 van	 transparante	 zelfkennis	 maakt	 een	 transparantie-procedure	 niet	
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van	 zelfkennis	 is	 nodig	 om	 het	 eerste-	 en	 derde-persoonsperspectief	 (en	 tevens	





de	 verantwoordelijkheid	 die	 zij	 voor	 deze	 attitudes	 draagt.	 Een	 persoon	 neemt	
immers,	 omdat	 attitudes	 samenhangen	 met	 de	 relevante	 instemming,	
verantwoordelijkheid	 door	 deze	 instemming	 te	 erkennen,	 maar	 faalt	 als	 ze	 de	
betekenis	van	haar	instemming	ontkent.	In	het	geval	van	een	geloof	dat	p	neemt	een	
persoon	 verantwoordelijkheid	 als	 zij	 haar	 instemming	 met	 de	 waarheid	 van	 p	
erkent,	 in	 gedachten	 of	 expliciet.	 Zo	 beargumenteer	 ik,	 dat	 het	 bereiken	 van	
transparante	zelfkennis	een	uitdrukking	van	agency	vergt.	Alleen	als	een	persoon	
verantwoordelijkheid	 draagt	 en	 instemming	 erkent,	 kan	 er	 sprake	 zijn	 van	
transparante	zelfkennis.	
Het	behouden	van	het	perspectief	van	de	agent	inzake	de	menselijke	geest	
toont	 de	 noodzaak	 van	 transparante	 zelfkennis.	 Desalniettemin	 blijven	 er	
problemen.	Een	belangrijk	punt	betreffende	de	rol	van	agency	is	dat	deze	lijkt	af	te	
nemen	 naarmate	 de	 mentale	 attitudes	 betekenisvoller	 worden.	 Wij	 lijken	 veel	










In	 Hoofdstuk	 5	 ga	 ik	 in	 op	 dit	 probleem	 en	 beargumenteer	 ik	 het	
tegenovergestelde:	een	dergelijk	verlangen	moet	zich	wel	manifesteren	in	iemands	
handelen,	 denken	 en	 voelen,	 maar	 het	 nemen	 van	 verantwoordelijkheid	 door	
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instemming	 blijft	 essentieel	 om	 zelfkennis	 van	 dit	 verlangen	 te	 vergaren.	 De	
manifestaties	van	het	verlangen	 in	 iemands	handelen,	denken	en	voelen	kunnen	
alleen	als	betekenisvol	herkend	worden	als	er	sprake	is	van	instemming.	Ook	blijkt	



















samenhangend	 beeld	 van	 transparante	 zelfkennis?	 Ik	 ben	 van	 mening	 dat	 de	
analytisch	 Aristoteliaanse	 benadering	 hiervoor	 nodig	 is.	 Deze	 benadering	
introduceer	 ik	 in	Hoofdstuk	 3	 om	 de	 aard	 van	 redeneren	 te	 verhelderen.	 Ons	
vermogen	tot	redeneren	lijkt	op	ons	vermogen	tot	zelfkennis,	omdat	ook	zij	op	zeer	










Hoewel	 het	 voor	 zich	 spreekt	 dat	 redeneren	 vaak	 een	 verandering	 van	 attitude	
inhoudt	 –	 bijvoorbeeld	 het	 vormen,	 herzien	 of	 herroepen	 van	 een	 overtuiging	 –	
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Het	 ontwikkelde	 alternatieve	 beeld	 van	 redeneren	 richt	 zich	 niet	 op	 wát	
redeneren	 is,	 maar	 op	 “hoe”	 het	 is.	 In	 de	 analytisch	 Aristoteliaanse	 benadering	
wordt	 dit	 de	 logische	 vorm	 genoemd,	waarmee	bedoeld	wordt	 dat	 1)	 redeneren	
altijd	bestaat	uit	een	gedachte	(ook	wel	oordeel	genoemd)	en	2)	deze	gedachte	altijd	
een	 bepaalde	 structuur	 heeft.	 Dit	 is	 erg	 abstract	 en	 vergt	 nadere	 filosofische	
uitwerking.	Desalniettemin	toont	Hoofdstuk	3	dat	wanneer	we	redeneren	op	deze	
manier	 analyseren,	 duidelijk	 wordt	 waarom	 het	 concept	 zoveel	 verschillende	
verschijningsvormen	heeft,	maar	toch	samenhangend	kan	zijn.	
Ook	 lijkt	 iets	 soortgelijks	 te	 gelden	 voor	 ons	 vermogen	 tot	 transparante	
zelfkennis,	 die	 zich	 ook	 kenmerkt	 door	 verscheidenheid.	 Haar	 aard	 kan	 mijns	
inziens	 in	 een	 samenhangend	 concept	 vervat	 worden	 als	 we	 de	 analytisch	
Aristoteliaanse	benadering	hanteren.	Dit	sluit	aan	bij	de	opmerking	van	Moran	dat	
zelfkennis	categorisch	verschilt	van	kennis	van	andermans	mentale	leven	(cf.	Moran	









laat	 de	 actieve	 houding	 die	 een	 persoon	 aanneemt	 ten	 opzichte	 van	 haar	 eigen	
mentale	 leven	 buiten	 beschouwing.	 Is	 dit	 in	 het	 licht	 van	 de	 in	 dit	 proefschrift	
gepresenteerde	argumenten	plausibel?	 Ik	 toon	aan	dat,	zelfs	als	het	bestaan	van	
sommige	 mentale	 attitudes	 op	 deze	 manier	 geconcludeerd	 kan	 worden,	 een	
dergelijke	conclusie	altijd	afhangt	van	de	instemming	van	de	persoon.	Mentale	data,	
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dat	we	niet	zonder	het	perspectief	van	de	agent	kunnen.	Dat	leidt	er	mijns	inziens	


















een	 uitnodiging.	 Niet	 om	 achterover	 te	 leunen	 en	 te	 wachten	 op	 de	 juiste	
geestestoestand,	 maar	 om	 stelling	 te	 nemen	 –	 om	 de	waarde	 van	 transparante	
zelfkennis	 en	 de	 onmisbaarheid	 van	 een	 filosofische	 kijk	 op	 zelfkennis	 te	
heroverwegen.
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